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As the Post-Conflict Peace has been shown to be severely fragile, several researchers have asked 
both what determines the risk for post-conflict peace collapse, and how it can be reduced. In their 
article "Post-Conflict Risks" Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) argue that per capita income 
level and economic growth reduce post-conflict risks significantly and substantially. These 
findings have received considerable attention in both academic and in policy circles and they 
therefore deserve careful inspection. In this thesis I test the robustness of their results by 
changing from the Correlates of War to the UCDP\PRIOArmed Conflict Database. I also change 
to Maddison’s (2006) per capita income dataset, to avoid missingness and thereby reduce 
biasness. To account for repeated events I change to the Conditional Elapsed Time model. Doing 
this I find that poor countries are more likely to experience a peace collapse, indicating that risk 
reducing efforts should be inversely proportional to the level of income. However, my findings 
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A  great  war  leaves  the country  with  three armies –  
an army of cripples, an army of mourners, and an 
army of thieves.                                                                                    
~German Proverb 
 
Fred C. Iklé (2005) certainly was right when he named his book “Every War Must End”. Sadly, 
many of these wars will start again. When a civil war comes to an end, former martial enemies 
must continue to live and work together within the same borders. History has shown that this can 
be highly problematic (see: Collier et al. 2008; Elbadawi et al. 2008; Bigombe et al. 2000). 
Avoiding a new civil war outbreak is a hard task to fulfil, nevertheless of all the challenges policy 
makers in post-conflict societies have to meet; this is perhaps the most essential. If war breaks out 
again all hopes of prosperity, reducing poverty and hunger will once again be set aside. To state 
the obvious; sound development does not have good odds during times of war.  
Unfortunately the post-conflict peace has been shown to be fragile. Bigombe et al. (2000) find 
that within the first ten years after a war has ended, 31 percent of conflicts restart. The numbers 
become even more pessimistic when the unit of analysis is changed from the conflict to the state. 
Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008: 465) find that between 1960 and 2002, the risk of peace 
collapse during the first decade was 40 percent. The collapse was either due to recurrence of the 
old conflict, or outbreak of another conflict within the state. Elbadawi and Hegre (2008: 453-454) 
show that an increasing portion of civil conflicts are due to recurring old rather than outbreak of 
new ones. Since 1993 recurrences of old conflicts have constituted more than half of all civil war 
onsets, and in both 2005 and 2006 all onsets were due to renewed fighting over old 
incompatibilities. Based on these numbers Elbadawi and Hegre (2008: 458) argue that “effective 
handling of post-conflict periods is arguably the most important component in international 
efforts to bring down the incidence of civil war”. 
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1.1 POST-CONFLICT RISKS 
In their article “Post-Conflict Risks” Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008)1 find that there is a 
strong and negative relationship between civil war recurrence, and per capita income and 
economic growth. If the level of income is twice the mean, and all other characteristics are held 
constant, decade risk falls from 40 to 31 percent. If the economy remains stagnant throughout the 
decade, risk is 42.1 percent.  “If, instead, the economy grows at 10 percent per year, which is fast 
but not without precedent, decade risk falls to 26.9 percent” (Collier et al. 2008: 469). Based on 
this they argue that poor countries are more likely to experience a peace collapse, and that  “faster 
growth directly and significantly reduces risk in the year which it occurs” (Collier et al. 2008: 
469). Their findings should be of interest to anyone trying to reduce the incident of post-conflict 
peace collapse. They both identify which post-conflict societies that are the most fragile; the poor 
ones, and provide a possible mean in order to reduce post-conflict risk; economic growth. 
Although not even the will of the entire international community can guarantee economic growth, 
it does indicate what kind of reforms need to be promoted. 
In this thesis I test the robustness of Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom’s findings to changes in the 
conflict dataset. As will be discussed at length below there are a number of problems with the 
dataset used by Collier et al, Correlates of War (COW).  I therefore change from that dataset to 
the Armed Conflict Database (ACD). If findings were robust such a change should not affect 
Collier et al’s substantial findings. Doing this, however, I find that lower per capita income is 
associated with higher risk of civil war recurrence, but I find no significant relationship between 
economic growth and post-conflict risk. Hence, my analysis does not support that increasing 
economic growth will reduce post-conflict risk, -at least not in the short run. In the longer 
perspective it is only through economic growth that a low income country can develop to become 
a middle or high income country, and by this reduce post-conflict risk. However, as post-conflict 
risk is at a peak when war ends, before it slowly starts to decrease, the crux is normally how to 
get the country through the first decade. In order to reduce post-conflict risk the first decade, my 
analysis does not support that increasing economic growth will lead to lower risk. 
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1.1.1 The Need For a Replication Study 
The CHS article, although recently published, has already been cited by 9 other articles.2 In 
addition to being discussed by other scholars it is utilized in the UN report “Post-Conflict 
Economic Recovery. Enabling Local Ingenuity” (2008). In accordance with the findings of CHS 
the UN report clearly states that post-conflict economic recovery is important because it can help 
reduce the risk of conflict recurrence (Ohiorhenuan and Stewart 2008: 8). Flores and Nooruddin 
(2009: 3) hold that “increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of 
postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics”. This has made several 
researchers study which conditions favor post-conflict economic recovery (see: Collier 2009; 
Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Davies 2008). As the director of the Research Development 
Department of the World Bank group, Paul Collier is well placed to influence the thinking and 
decisions of the World Bank. When the president of the World Bank Robert B. Zoellick state that 
”only by securing development can we put down root deep enough to break the cycle of fragility 
and violence” (WB 2009) he is not necessarily influenced by Collier, but they are definitively on 
the same page.  In 2007 the IMF decided to start priotitizing post-conflict countries in Africa in 
order to “re-energize the economy of the world’s poorest continent”(BIC 2007). 
Both the preceding statements and the research of Collier (2009), Davies (2008) and Flores and 
Nooruddin (2009) presupposes that economic growth will in fact reduce post-conflict risk. 
Although this is the conclusion of CHS; there are good reasons to argue that neither the 
relationship between economic growth and post-conflict risk, nor between per capita income and 
post-conflict risk have been sufficiently scrutinized to conclude that the relationships are robust. 
Firstly, Barbara Walter (2004) is the only one else who has conducted a similar study,3 but 
instead of using GDP per capita she uses the infant mortality rate. The infant mortality rate is an 
often used indicator for socio-economic development (see: Esty et al. 1999; Goldstone 2002; 
Urdal 2005). In accordance with the findings of CHS she finds that a high infant mortality rate 
and increases in the infant mortality rate are associated with higher risk for multiple wars. Both 
Walter and CHS use the COW database in order to identify post-conflict societies. As I will argue 
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in chapter three utilizing the COW database when studying post-conflict peace episodes is 
problematic as we know little about how start and end dates are coded. 
Secondly CHS (2008: 469) claim that “income matters: it is highly significant and the effect is 
large”. A closer look at the CHS table4 demonstrates that per capita income is less significant 
than they let us believe. Their table includes four different models, where the same method has 
been used; a piecewise exponential model, but with different independent variables. Both income 
level and economic growth are included in the four models. While per capita income growth is 
significant at the 5 percent level in all of the models, irrespectively of which covariates are 
included, per capita income level is not. Per capita income is only significant at the 5 percent 
level in the fourth model. In the three other models it is significant at the 10 percent level. 
However, when running their do-file on their data; per capita income is no longer significant at 
the 10 percent level in the three former models. In the fourth model per capita income continues 
to be significant at the 5 percent level.5 The rest of the covariates are more or less unchanged. 
Thirdly, CHS include a polity variable in each of the four models (Collier et al. 2008: 468-469). 
The polity variable is a 21 point scale ranging from -10 to 10, where -10 indicate a autocracy and 
10 a democracy (Marshall et al. 2009). To avoid treating an ordinal variable as a scale variable 
CHS have transformed it into a dummy variable (Collier et al. 2008: 470). The dummy scores 1 if 
the country-year is autocratic and scores between -5 and -10 at the polity variable. If not it scores 
0. This is not the conventional way of treating the polity variable. Most other researchers 
transform it into two dummy variables and thus include three categories: “autocracy” (-10 to -6), 
“anocracy” (-5 to 5) and “democracy” (6-10). When using autocracy as the reference category 
and introducing both the “anocracy” and “democracy” variable into the fourth model, I find that 
per capita income is no longer significant in any of the models. The growth variable on the other 
hand is significant at the 1 percent level in all four models. Based on the scarcity of alternative 
research, the use of COW and the fragility of the effect of per capita income, there should be 
good reasons to perform a replication study of Collier, Hoeffler and Söderboms findings 
regarding the effect of per capita income and economic growth on post-conflict risk. 
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1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF ROBUSTNESS 
Edward E. Leamer (1985: 308) once wrote that “a fragile inference is not worth taking seriously”. 
It is essential that research leading up to broad policy advice is based on robust findings. If results 
are significantly altered by small changes in the data, basing policy decisions on these results is 
risky. This becomes even more important when the unit of analysis is as heterogeneous as post-
conflict societies. Take as an example of this the difference between post-conflict Pakistan in 
1971 and post-conflict Colombia in 1993. While the war in Pakistan lasted six months and caused 
50 000 battle-related deaths the war in Colombia lasted nine and a half year and caused less than 
8,500 battle-deaths.6 It is beyond doubt that the heritage of these conflict years has left very 
different challenges. If the relationship between income level and economic growth, on post 
conflict risk is fragile, it is unlikely that these two variables will have corresponding effects on 
different post-conflict societies. Dissimilar strength in the effect is not, of course, by itself 
problematic; in fact it is to be expected. The problem appears if the effect is none-existent or 
worse fundamentally altered in some societies. This is most likely to happen when inferences are 
fragile. Basing broad policy advices on such results is not recommended. If the relationships are 
fragile one should attempt to identify under which circumstances and through which mechanisms 
the desired effect is likely to occur. To know whether it is wise to act upon the findings of CHS, 
then, it is absolutely necessary to know whether the results are robust. 
1.3 PLAN OF THE THESIS 
As there exists little theory on the relationship between the economy and post-conflict risk I start 
the next chapter by laying out the two main theories explaining why civil wars tend to break out 
in poor countries; the opportunity theory and the state capacity theory. I identify the mechanisms 
inherent in the two theories and discuss whether it is probable that they are operable in post 
conflict societies as well. I argue that apart from a few exceptions that it is. The mechanisms in 
the opportunity theory imply that economic growth will, although it might take some time do 
nothing but reduce post-conflict risk. In contrast, the mechanisms in the state capacity theory 
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imply that economic growth might increase post-conflict risk in the short run. In the long run 
however, it predicts a reduction in post-conflict risk. 
In the third chapter I test whether CHS findings are robust to changes in the database; from COW 
to PRIO-Uppsala’s Armed Conflict Database (ACD). As information regarding the coding 
criteria in COW is absent I construct eight candidate post-conflict dataset and compare these with 
CHS’. When running the analysis on the most similar dataset I find that the effect of per capita 
income becomes stronger, and is now significant at the 1 percent level. The effect of economic 
growth continues to be negative, but is now weak and highly insignificant. In chapter four I try to 
explain why the effect of economic growth differs to such an extent when changing from the 
COW to the ACD database. I argue that it is caused by differences in which conflicts are included 
and differences in how start and end dates are coded.  
In chapter five I continue to use the ACD dataset, and change to what I consider to be a more 
valid definition of post-conflict peace. In order to better account for missingness I shift to 
Maddison’s (2006) per capita income data. I change to a method that better accounts for repeated 
events; the Conditional Elapsed Time model. Doing this I find that per capita income continues 
to be significant, though only at the 10 percent level in two of the models. The effect of economic 
growth continues to be highly insignificant, and is even positive in one of the models. I argue that 
the lack of a significant relationship between economic growth and post-conflict risk can either 
be due to (1) noise in the data, making it hard to capture the effect. (2)  Economic growth 
affecting post-conflict risk in both directions. Or (3) that there does not exist a relationship 
between the two. The thesis does not provide an answer to how to reduce post-conflict risk. 
However, hopefully it adds some knowledge to questions regarding the effect of what is 




In this chapter I discuss the two main theories attempting to explain why civil wars tend to occur 
in poor countries: the opportunity theory and state capability theory. I argue that the mechanisms 
inherent in the two theories are likely to be operable in post-conflict societies as well as pre-war 
societies. Thus the two theories should be able to explain the observed relationship between 
poverty and post-conflict risk. While the opportunity theory, associated with Collier and Hoeffler, 
predicts that economic growth will reduce post-conflict risk, the state capability theory, put forth 
by Fearon and Laitin, implies that economic growth might increase post-conflict risk in the short 
run. In the longer perspective economic growth should reduce post-conflict risk. 
Few, if any, have made the case for understanding the connection between peace and war as well 
as Geoffrey Blainey. In his classic book “The Causes of War” (1988: 3) he writes that “for every 
thousand pages published on the causes of war there is less than one page directly on the causes 
of peace. And yet the causes of war and peace, logically, should dovetail into one another. A 
weak explanation of why Europe was at peace will lead to a weak explanation of why Europe 
was at war. A valid diagnosis of war will be reflected in a valid diagnosis of peace.” As post-
conflict societies exist in a grey zone between war and peace they should be ideal cases for 
testing theories. It is very possible that the mechanisms causing war and peace are stronger and 
more readily observable in precisely these societies. However it might just as well be the case 
that the mechanisms causing the first war might be different from the mechanisms causing the 
second war. The process of war might change a society so fundamentally that we will need 
different theories to understand the second or third outbreak of the war, than the first. 
2.1 WHY DO CIVIL WARS BREAK OUT IN POOR COUNTRIES? 
The vast majority of intrastate conflicts take place in developing countries. Sambanis argues that  
civil war is mainly a problem of the poor (2002: 216). Besides population size no other known 
variable predicts civil war outbreak as well as GDP per capita (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The 
apperance of this negative relationship has made Collier argue that poor countries are at risk of 
being captured in a conflict trap, where history can be summed up as a vicious circle between 
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poverty and war. Poverty makes civil war outbreak more likely, civil war increases poverty, 
which again makes another civil war outbreak more likely (Collier 2007: 32-35).  
Little theorizing has been done on the effect of the economy on post-conflict risk. Hence, in order 
to explain the observed relationship between post-conflict risk, and per capita income and 
economic growth, I make use of the two main theories explaining civil war occurrence in poor 
countries. Both Collier and Hoeffler’s opportunity theory and Fearon and Laitin’s state capability 
theory focus upon opportunities for going to war rather than motives. They justify this by 
claiming that there will always be groups within a society that are motivated for going to war. 
What is unique about societies where conflict breaks out is not the existence of motives, but 
rather the existence of structural opportunities enabling civil war outbreak (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004: 564-565; Fearon and Laitin 2003: 76). Collier and Hoeffler focus on the existence of 
opportunities for financing and recruiting rebels. Unless the economic structure of the society 
makes it possible for the rebel organization to finance an army; there will be no civil war 
outbreak. The economic circumstances that generate profitable opportunities for rebel 
organization are rare, and expected to exist in poor rather than rich societies (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004: 564). If a rebel organization is to succeed in mobilizing its own army, it must have (1) an 
income to finance the army, and (2) access to laborers that are willing to join the army for the 
payment the rebel organization is able to offer. Consequentially the potential for building an army 
will be better if the rebel organization’s income is relatively high, and the wage they must offer 
soldiers is low. Both of these conditions are more likely to exist in poor rather than rich societies. 
In order to exist, rebel organizations must engage in income-related activities. Collier and 
Hoeffler claim that looting is the most available source of revenue, and primary commodity 
export is the most lootable of all economic activities. One indication of this is that primary 
commodity exports are also the most heavily taxed activity. As looting is nothing else than illegal 
taxation, the same characteristics that make it easy for government to tax them, should also make 
it easy for rebels to loot them (Collier 2006: 9-10). As the proportion of primary commodity 
exports is expected to decrease with per capita income, thus rebel organization’s income 
possibilities should be better in poor than in rich states.  
In order to mobilize an army, having an income is a necessary but not sufficient condition. 
Whether a potential recruit wants to join the army is contingent on how much he would earn if he 
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joined the conventional workforce instead. When people are poor they have little to lose from 
joining a rebel group, and rebel organizations can therefore find  relatively cheap recruits (Collier 
2006: 10). This is exemplified by the desertion rate during the Russian civil war. One might 
expect that most soldiers would leave the army during the harsh winter; however this was not the 
case. Most soldiers deserted during summertime when they had crops to attend to, and the 
opportunity cost of fighting necessarily increased (Figes 1990: 182; Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 
569). 
2.1.1 The State Capacity Framework 
Fearon, among others, has criticized Collier and Hoeffler’s framework. Fearon (2008: 297) 
argues that although poor people have less to lose from joining a rebel organization, they also 
have less to win. Rebel organizations in rich countries can attract potential soldiers with higher 
benefits if they win the war.7 According to Fearon these two mechanisms cancel each other out; 
and hence they cannot explain why civil wars are concentrated in poor countries (Fearon 2008: 
299). Nevertheless, he agrees with Collier and Hoeffler on one point; it should be easier for a 
rebel group to obtain an adequate income to finance the army in a low-income country. While 
Collier and Hoeffler argue that this is caused by the lootability of primary commodities, Fearon 
maintain that it is due to the immobile capital of small-holding peasant economies. “The standard 
“appropriative technology” of insurgency consists of visits to households or businesses in order 
to collect revolutionary taxes” (Fearon 2008: 299). “In a richer economy with more income from 
human capital, individuals are more able to move in response to local extortion threats and the 
danger of living in a conflict zone, making the effective tax rate for rebels lower. By contrast 
farmers’ income comes from immovable capital” (Fearon 2008: 314). 
Fearon and Laitin (2003: 79) claim that the main factors determining civil war outbreak are 
conditions that favour insurgency. “Although many civil wars after 1945 have been “ethnic” or 
“nationalists”, as these terms are often understood, even more have been fought as insurgencies. 
Insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands 
practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. As a form of warfare insurgency can be 
harnessed to diverse political agendas, motivations and grievances”. Insurgencies are weak 
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relative to government forces, at least at the beginning of the operations. Therefore if the 
government knew their identity and where they were hiding, they would fairly easily be 
destroyed or captured. As a result no war would break out (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 79-80). 
Based on this Fearon and Laitin argue that the main condition explaining civil war outbreak is 
whether insurgents can hide efficiently from government forces. How efficient the hiding is will 
be determined by two conditions; (1) the access to good hiding places, and (2) the ability of the 
government to obtain good intelligence and localize the insurgents. These conditions are both 
expected to correlate with GDP per capita. 
2.1.2 Hide And Seek 
Hiding from government forces should be easier in rural settings, poorly served by roads, at large 
distance from the centres of state power (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 80). As rich countries are 
expected to be less rural and better served by roads; it should also be harder to find a good hiding 
place than in developing countries. Having a good hiding place however, is of little use if the 
government has the necessary resources to localize the rebels wherever they are hiding. In order 
to expose the identity and hiding place of the insurgents, the state depends on good intelligence 
and a professional military. Efficient counterinsurgency is an exceptionally difficult political and 
military task, but essential if the government is to succeed in capturing rebels before war breaks 
out. The crux is to acquire adequate intelligence to distinguish between active rebels and non-
combatants, as well as to prevent military units from killing indiscriminately thus increasing 
support for rebels, and prevent corruption in which military units loot and pillage from helpless 
populations (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 80). Fearon and Laitin claim that the accomplishment of 
these challenges depends on the state’s overall police, military and administrative capabilities. 
State capabilities are expected to correlate with per capita income (Fearon 2008: 314). 
2.1.3 The Mechanisms at Play 
Based on the two theories three conditions vital for civil war risk can be identified; (a) rebel 
organizations must have income opportunities, (b), they must be able to recruit fighters (c) and 
they must be able to efficiently escape from the reach of the state, i.e. hide. The opportunity 
theory only focuses on condition number one and two. Collier and Hoeffler claim that these will 
be affected by the income level through two mechanisms; the lootability of primary commodities 
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and the potential rebel’s opportunity costs. Fearon and Laitin on the other hand maintain that all 
three conditions are decisive for civil war risk. In their theory however, the ability to recruit 
fighters will not change with the income level, because the two mechanisms they identify; 
opportunity costs and the size of the possible award, cancel each other out. In section  2.3.1 I 
argue that it takes longer for economic growth to result in new income opportunities, than it takes 
potential rebels to realize that there has been an increase in the possible award of winning a war. 
Thus in the short run the ability to recruit fighters will be affected by changes in the income 
level. Accordingly I include the two mechanisms in the following discussion. Five mechanisms 
can therefore be identified in the Fearon and Laitin model. The immobility of capital in small-
holding economies, potential rebel’s opportunity costs, the size of the possible award, the supply 
of good hiding places and the ability of the state to seek and capture the insurgents. As one of the 
mechanisms “opportunity costs” appears in both theories the two theories can be summarized 
through six mechanisms in Table  2-1. 
Table  2-1   Theoris on Civil War 
Condition The opportunity theory The state capacity theory 
(a) (1) Lootability of primary commodities (2) Immobility of capital in small holding 
peasant economies. 
(b) (3) Opportunity costs (3) Opportunity 
costs 
(4) Size of the possible 
award 
(c)   (5) Hiding places (6) Seeking abilities of the 
state 
2.2 HOW ARE POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES DIFFERENT? 
Post-conflict societies differ from other societies. First of all they have just experienced a 
conflict. Second of all, as Collier et al. (2003: 32) point out; civil war is development in reverse. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 133) find that the adverse growth effects of a conflict during the 
conflict is equivalent to a loss of 115 percent of initial GDP of one country. Nevertheless Collier 
et al. (2003: 14-15) argue that the main economic losses comes from the damage the diverted 
resources do when they are used for violence. The most obvious cause arises from the direct 
destruction of infrastructure. During war rebel forces target physical infrastructure as part of their 
strategy. The main targets are the enemy’s communication and support lines, such as 
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telecommunication, airports, ports, roads and bridges. Although no quantitative study has 
examined the extent and costs of the direct destruction of the infrastructure, the severity of the 
damage is supported by case studies. e.g. Brück (2001) on Mozambique. Both the consequences 
of the war and the fact that civil wars tend to break out in poor countries indicates that post-
conflict societies can normally be characterized by a weak economy and a weak state. 
2.2.1 Economy and Post-Conflict Societies 
There are few good reasons to expect that the six mechanisms inherent in the two theories should 
not appear in post-conflict societies. Rebel organization should still be able to finance themselves 
either through looting of primary commodities or house to house visits. Of course; it presupposes 
that there is money to collect, or primary commodities to loot. Civil wars cause damage both to 
private assets and business. However; the society is seldom or never left completely damaged, so 
there will still be people to rob, or commodities to loot. An ended civil war also invariably leaves 
plenty of weapons around, and consequentially rebel organization might not need to invest in new 
weapons. If this is the case, they will only need the necessary income to feed and pay soldiers. 
Although the war might make it harder to get hold of the necessary income, it should be easier to 
extract the necessary income in a post-conflict society dependent on primary commodity export, 
or consisting of a small-holding peasant economy than one based on human capital. Hence 
mechanism (1) the lootability of primary commodities and/or (2) the immobility of capital in 
small holding peasant economies, should be able important for understanding both civil war 
outbreak and recurrence 
The war might change the preferences of potential soldiers, and thereby reduce the effect of 
mechanism (3) opportunity costs and (4) the size of the possible award, explaining soldier’s 
recruitment. Walter (2004) and Hartzell et al. (2001) find that long-lasting civil wars are followed 
by stable post-conflict peace periods. Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 785) argue that this might be 
due to lasting wars offering a chance for the parties to learn and reflect over the benefits of peace 
and thereby control war-related hostility. If this is the case, one might see a change in preferences 
of potential soldiers in post-conflict societies; making them more war reluctant. However, if 
longs wars make potential soldiers more war-reluctant, intense wars should also be followed by 
stable peace periods. The findings of Hartzell et al. (2001: 202) indicate the opposite; the higher 
the number of battle-deaths; the more likely is it that war will resume. Thus there are no good 
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reasons to assume that mechanism 3 and 4 should be mitigated in post-conflict societies. The 
importance of mechanism (5) hide and (6) seek depend on whether potential insurgents need to 
hide from government forces. If the war ends in a negotiation between two equally strong sides, 
hiding from government forces in order to avoid combat while strengthening the organization, 
might not be necessary. Accordingly the importance of the hide and seek mechanisms will 
diminish, or completely disappear. This will only be the case when we are calculating the risk for 
the same conflict to reoccur in post-conflict societies where the two sides continue to be more or 
less equally strong. In every other case the mechanisms should continue to matter.  
2.3 ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The aim of Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (CHS)’s study is both to identify which post-conflict 
societies are likely to be most fragile, and identify possible risk reducing methods. While per 
capita income level is merely used to identify which post-conflict societies are most at risk, 
economic growth can also be used to lower post-conflict risk. However, if stimulating economic 
growth leads to a reduction in post-conflict risk it presupposes that economic growth affects post 
conflict risk either directly, or (more likely) indirectly. The observed correlation between 
economic growth and civil war risk might just as well be caused by either (1) spuriousness ; a 
third variable, for example the strength of the state, affecting both economic growth and post-
conflict risk or (2) endogeneity; the relationship being adverse, that the absence of post-conflict 
risk increases economic growth. Countries with lower risk are more likely to attract foreign 
investment or reduce capital flight. If this is the case stimulating economic growth will not affect 
post-conflict risk. In order to avoid the problem of endogeneity CHS have given economic 
growth a one year lag. The rationale for doing so is that post-conflict risk this year does not affect 
economic growth the previous year. Nevertheless as they do not control for any of the most likely 
candidates causing a spurious relationship; the strength of the state and social capital,8 one 
cannot rule out that the observed relationship is spurious. 
There are good reasons for assuming that the observed relationship is caused at least partially by 
economic growth directly or indirectly affecting post-conflict risk. Firstly, given the strength and 
                                                 
8
 Data on the strength of the state and social capability is severely limited in post-conflict societies. Therefore 
including such variables in the former analysis is not possible. 
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significance of the relationship,9 it is less likely that it is caused merely by spuriousity. Secondly, 
a large part of economic growth, at least during the first years of the post-conflict peace period, 
originates from IMF loans and aid. This part of the economic growth cannot be subscribed to 
either changes in state capacity or changes in social capital. Hence, at least a considerable part of 
the observed relationship between economic growth and post-conflict risk should be due to a 
direct or indirect effect of economic growth on post-conflict peace risk. 
2.3.1 Short Run vs. Long Run Effects 
Few scholars have attempted to explain why economic growth tends to reduce civil war risk. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 569) argue that economic growth is a proxy for new income 
opportunities, making guerrilla warfare less attractive, and can be equated with mechanism 
number 3; opportunity costs in section 1.1.3. However, as Collier (2009: 102) points out, 
economic growth, reducing post-conflicts risk is likely to work through a number of other 
channels as well.10 There are few good reasons to assume that economic growth in the long run is 
less likely to affect post-conflict risk through the other five mechanisms identified in section 
1.1.3. In order for economic growth to reduce post-conflict risk through new income possibilities 
economic growth must in fact lead to new and/or better jobs. In the long run economic growth is 
also likely to increase the state’s military, police and administrative capabilities, improve 
communication systems such as roads, and modernize the economic system. The argument is 
partly strengthened by the fact that aid programs in post-conflict societies normally focus on 
repairing or rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure, such as roads, waterways, energy and 
communication networks, as well as restoring the provision of basic public services (Demekas et 
al. 2002: 3).  
Unfortunately, creating new jobs, building roads, strengthening state institutions and modernizing 
the economy takes time. Of these four the two former are likely to take the lesser time. The two 
mechanisms in the opportunity theory are likely to be stimulated by economic growth, but it 
probably takes much shorter time before economic growth generates new income possibilities 
than it takes for it to modernize the economy. While CHS (2008: 469) claim that “faster growth 
directly and significantly reduces risk in the year which it occurs”, Collier has also argued  that  
                                                 
9
 See section  1.1.1 
10
 He does not suggest which channels this might be. 
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“only by the end of the post-conflict decade does even economic growth cumulate to a substantial 
reduction in post-conflict risk” (Collier 2009: 103). 
The implications of Collier and Hoeffler’s theory is that although it might take some time, 
economic growth will in the end reduce post-conflict risk. The implication of Fearon and Laitin’s 
theory on the other hand differs quite a bit in the short run. Within a shorter time horizon 
economic growth might just as well increase post-conflict risk. Imagine that you take a typical 
post-conflict country with a weak state and weak economy and (somewhat magically) turn 
economic growth to 10 percent. According to CHS this will reduce post-conflict decade risk to 
26.9 percent. However the only immediate change from economic growth is the amount of 
money available in the society, the rest takes time. The amount of wealth available in the society 
affects one of the mechanisms directly, the size of the possible award. As Fearon (2008: 295) 
points out increasing the amount of money in the society should make it easier for rebel 
organization to attract potential soldiers because of  greater benefits if they win the war. This of 
course presupposes that potential rebels are informed about the increase in the possible award. If 
the leaders of a rebel organization are to have any chance of starting a civil war they must be 
strategically oriented, i.e. they must engage in some strategic behaviour. Strategically oriented 
leaders are likely to seek information and thus be better informed than the average citizen. Such 
information they will of course disseminate, and this reduces the information lag.  
Given the five mechanisms in Fearon and Laitin’s model it is likely that economic growth firstly 
(1) stimulates the incentives for going to war and (2) secondly it produces new income 
possibilities. Then in the long run it (3) increases the mobility of capital, (4) reduces the supply of 
good hiding places and (5) increases the counter insurgency capacity of the state. If this is correct 
we should see an increase in post-conflict risk in the period between mechanism number 1 and 2. 
Then when both mechanism number 1 and 2 are in operation, they should cancel each other out, 
making post-conflict risk independent of economic growth. In the longer run however when 
mechanism 3, 4 and 5 are operable, economic growth should, as the theory of Collier and 
Hoeffler implies, reduce post-conflict risk. Nevertheless if my argument and Fearon and Laitin’s 
theory are correct economic growth will not reduce post-conflict risk in the shorter run. This is 
serious as post-conflict risk falls with time (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 576), thus reducing risk in 
the short run should be priority number one. An alternative to focus on economic growth is to 
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focus directly on risk reducing factors such as generating new income possibilities and 
strengthening the state’s overall capabilities.  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
As there exists little theory on the relationship between the economy and post-conflict risk I 
started this chapter by laying out the two main theories explaining why civil wars tend to occur in 
poor countries; the opportunity theory and state capability theory. I argued that apart from some 
exceptions regarding the insurgency group’s need to hide, the mechanisms in the two theories are 
expected to be operable in post-conflict societies as well as pre-war societies. According to both 
of the theories post-conflict risk should be higher in low than in middle or high income 
economies. The implications of the two theories differ when it comes to the effect of economic 
growth in the short run. The mechanisms in the opportunity theory implies that economic growth 
will, although it might take some time, exclusively reduce post-conflict risk. The implications of 
the state capability theory however, are that economic growth might increase post-conflict risk in 
the short run. In the long run however, economic growth should reduce post-conflict risk. This 
stands in contrast to CHS’ findings; while the negative effect of per capita income seems to be 
somewhat fragile,11 the effect of economic growth is strong and significant at the 5 percent level 
in all of the models. In the next chapter I test whether CHS findings depend on the choice of 
database. In order to do so I change from the COW to the ACD database, and try to do everything 
else as similar as possible.  
                                                 
11
 See section  1.1.1 
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3 CHANGING DATASET 
             “You live and die by your coding criteria” 
   J. David Singer 
The goal of this chapter is to test the robustness of Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom’s findings to 
changes in the conflict database. Such a change should not, if their findings are robust, alter their 
substantive results. I start the chapter by examining how the chosen battle-death thresholds used 
to operationalize civil war, affects the understanding of post-conflict peace. I then focus on the 
lack of clear coding criteria for how civil war is defined in the updated COW database. As this is 
the database used by Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (CHS) we are left without the necessary 
knowledge of how their unit of analysis is defined.  By using the PRIO - Uppsala Armed Conflict 
Database I construct a dataset that is as similar to CHS as possible. When running the CHS’s 
statistical model on this dataset I find that the effect of per capita income is negative and 
significant, while the effect of economic growth is highly insignificant. 
3.1 DEFINING POST-CONFLICT PEACE 
Peace is often defined through what it is not; war. Post-conflict peace is defined both through the 
absence of war, and by the war it follows. Consequentially, in order to identify post-conflict 
peace episodes, one must start by identifying the civil conflicts; when they start and when they 
end. Several scholars and research projects have offered definitions of civil war (see: Gleditsch et 
al. 2002; Small and Singer 1982; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004). One of the main 
differences between these definitions is which battle-death threshold has been used. The battle-
death threshold is essential for deciding which conflicts are severe enough to be coded as civil 
wars, and for coding start and end dates. We can differ between three main threshold criteria; (1) 
a strict annual, (2) a lenient annual and (3) a cumulative criterion. When studying post-conflict 
risk it is necessary that the unit being analyzed is in fact a post-conflict peace. Or to put it 
differently; as in any study measurement must be valid. Measurement will be valid “when the 
scores, derived from a given indicator can meaningfully be interpreted in terms of the 
systematized concept that the indicators seeks to operationalize” (Adcock and Collier 2001: 531). 
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In the following I demonstrate how battle-death threshold affects the measurement validity of 
post-conflict peace. 
3.1.1 The strict Annual Criterion 
COW was the first conflict database available. It was initiated by Melvin Small and J. David 
Singer, and the most recent update was carried out by Kristian Gleditsch in 2004. Small and 
Singer (1982: 213-215) defined civil war as military action that causes at least 1,000 battle-deaths 
per year. For resistance to be considered as efficient the stronger side should suffer at least 5 
percent of the causalities of the weaker side. Using a strict 1,000 annual criterion has two obvious 
advantages: Firstly, coding start and end dates will be fairly simple. The war starts the first year it 
reaches more than 1,000 battle-deaths and ends as soon as it decreases to less than 1000 battle-
deaths per year. Secondly it ensures some homogeneity in the database. A conflict that causes 50 
battle-deaths will be quite different from one that causes 2,000. Hence it is plausible that causes 
and consequences differ; accordingly it might be inappropriate to include them in the same 
analysis.  
While utilizing as strict a definition as the one offered by COW may be unproblematic in studies 
where the unit of analysis is the actual war, it is far more problematic in a study where the unit of 
analysis is post-conflict peace episodes. As the 1,000 annual battle-deaths threshold implies that a 
war is coded as ended the first year annual battle-death decreases to less than 1,000, a warlike 
situation that causes between 0 and 999 battle-deaths a year will be coded as a post-conflict 
peace. To illustrate consider the war between the Columbian government and Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). According to COW the war ended in 1993. At that point 
there were no peace agreement within reach and hundreds were killed in continuing battles. 
During the post-conflict peace period which lasted for four years 1,684 battle-deaths were 
reported.12 Few, if any would agree that this was in fact a post-conflict peace episode. By 
utilizing a strict annual criterion in studies of post-conflict societies the analysis will arguably 
suffer from low measurement validity.  
                                                 
12
 The COW project does not provide annual point estimates of the battle-deaths, and I therefore had to use the 
numbers estimated by Uppsala/Prio. 1,684 battle-deaths is according to the lowest battle-death estimate offered by 
Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). Data are available from: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-
Deaths/   
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3.1.2 The Lenient Annual Criterion 
An alternative to the COW database is the PRIO – Uppsala Armed Conflict Database (ACD). In 
the ACD database armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state” 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002: 618-619). By using a lenient annual criterion we avoid coding a war-like 
situation with somewhere between 25 and 999 battle-deaths a year as a post-conflict peace. This 
clearly improves measurement validity. 
A second advantage is as Strand (2006: 60) points out that lowering the threshold for inclusion 
will yield more conflicts and thus more flexibility for quantitative analysis. However by lowering 
the threshold too much we risk ending up concentrating on a clutter of small incidents unlikely to 
have much impact on political or economic life. Strand argues that the 25 battle-deaths threshold 
adopted in the ACD database should be high enough for the violence to represent a politically 
significant event, although the precise local and international impact may vary. I argue that there 
is a drawback from using the annual 25 battle-deaths threshold when defining post-conflict peace 
episodes. Take for example the conflict between the Mexican government and the Revolutionary 
People’s Army (EPR) in 1996. The conflict lasted three months and caused 25 battle-related 
deaths. The challenges the Mexican government had to meet in the wake of this conflict are 
clearly very different from the challenges left after a conflict that caused thousands of battle-
deaths. While a strict annual criterion makes it hard to justify that the unit of analysis is an actual 
peace, a lenient can make it hard to justify that it is in fact a post-conflict society. Both are 
problematic for measurement validity. 
3.1.3 A Cumulative Criterion 
An alternative in order to avoid both of the problems discussed in section  3.1.1 and  3.1.2 is to use 
a cumulative criterion. To be included in Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) dataset; “the conflict must 
have killed at least 1,000 over its course with a yearly average of at least 100”. The start year is 
set till the first year in which 100 were killed or in which a violent event that was followed by a 
sequence of action that came to satisfy the two criteria above. War ends are coded by observation 
of victory, wholesale demobilization, truce or peace agreement followed by at least two years of 
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peace (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 76). By using their definition of war, less severe post-conflict 
episodes as the one in Mexico will not be included in the dataset, and there will be no peace 
episode including hundreds of battle-deaths. A problem with Fearon and Laitin’s database is that 
they do not offer specific start and end dates; they just report the year. This will make the 
estimates less precise (see: Gates and Strand 2004: 13), and the problem will be more severe if 
post-conflict peace episodes are shorter. Take as an example of this the conflicts in Niger: 
According to the ACD Database the first conflict started the 1st of October 1992 and ended the 
31st of December 1992. The second conflict started the 16th of May 1994 and ended the 9th of 
October 1994.13  If we did not have the exact dates, the post-conflict peace episode between 
would have been estimated to two years. When using the exact dates we can see that it only lasted 
501 days, which is 31 percent less than the first estimate. One alternative is as I will do in chapter 
5 is to apply the cumulative criterion to the ACD database14. Thus for a conflict to be included it 
must have claimed at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 
1,000. 
3.2 THE SECRET LIFE OF COW(S) 
Both Sambanis (2004: 817) and Gleditsch (2004: 234) point out that it is not clear whether the 
1,000 battle-deaths threshold of COW continues to be an annual, or if it has become a cumulative 
criterion. Sambanis (2004: 817) claims that COW made use of an annual criterion in the 
beginning, but that it was later replaced by a cumulative one. However, he doubts that it has been 
corrected throughout the entire dataset. If Sambanis is correct we are left without the necessary 
knowledge of how a war’s start and end dates are coded. While an annual criterion by itself 
provide clear coding rules for start and end dates, a cumulative criterion does not. Take as an 
example of this a war which during the first three years accumulates to more than 1,000 battle-
deaths. The fourth year the conflict causes 1 battle-death, the fifth year 102 battle-deaths, the 
sixth year 3 battle-deaths and the seventh year there are no battle-deaths at all. Given a 
cumulative criterion it is not clear when this war stops. In order to code start and end dates when 
using a cumulative criterion, additional coding rules are needed. As Sambanis (2004: 817) 
                                                 
13
 Conflict dates are taken from the ACD database. 
14
 The start date is set to the date when a given episode of conflict activity reaches 25 battle-related deaths during one 
calendar year. A conflict is coded as ended if a conflict year is followed by at least one year of inactivity. The date is 
then set to the date the conflict stopped (Harbom et al. 2009: 8-9). 
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emphasizes these have not been provided by COW.15 Since the COW project neither provides 
annual point estimates of the battle-deaths or a description of its sources for individual 
observations (Gleditsch 2004: 241) it is not possible to deduce which coding rules have been used 
by looking at the dataset. Unlike Sambanis Gleditsch (2004: 241) claims that COW continues to 
use a strict annual criterion; “intra state wars must have at least 1,000 battle deaths per year”. 
Nevertheless, he claims that “it appears as if the data in many cases have been coded based on 
whether they involve more than 1,000 battle deaths over the duration of the entire conflict”. If the 
strict annual criterion is used in large part of the CHS dataset, as was argued in section  3.1.1, 
their analysis suffers from low measurement validity. 
While measurement validity pertains to whether the researchers successfully capture the 
phenomenon they claim to be studying, reliability concerns the consistency or repeatability of the 
findings. If findings remain the same when replicated, they are regarded as reliable. As both 
Sambanis and Gleditsch point out; it is unlikely that the same coding criterion have been used 
throughout the various COW dataset updates. This of course makes it hard for other scholars to 
replicate the data of any study that uses COW data, and get the same results. Based on this it 
should be clear that the CHS study by utilizing the updated COW database suffers from low 
reliability. In addition to this, based on which of the two scholars are mostly correct, the CHS 
study suffers from either a lack of knowledge of how start and end dates are coded or an invalid 
definition of post-conflict peace. This by itself should be sufficient reason to change to the ACD 
database and perform a replication study of the CHS results.  
3.3 CONSTRUCTING A SIMILAR DATASET 
There exist several methods for testing robustness. One way is to run the analysis on different 
datasets. When the unit of analysis in both datasets is an indicator of the same phenomena, effects 
should, if they are robust, remain substantially the same. Not knowing how the CHS dataset is put 
together I have had to make several “guesstimates” in order to construct a similar post-conflict 
dataset.  Based on the preceding discussion in section  3.2 I develop four criteria that are most 
likely to have been used in the COW database. Criteria one and two are based on Gleditsch. 
                                                 
15
 According to Kristian S. Gleditsch these questions will hopefully be answered in Sarkees and Wayman (2010). 
Personal communication with Gleditsch 30.04.2009. 
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Criterion number two is developed to avoid the problem of dips in battle-deaths, e.g. from 1,000 
to 800 and back to 1,000, to be coded as the end of a conflict.  Criteria three and four are based 
on Sambanis. If the cumulative criterion has been used we do not know how start and end dates 
are set. I have therefore developed a lenient; number three and a strict; number four, cumulative 
criterion. 
Criterion number 1:  The 1,000 battle-death threshold is an annual criterion. The conflict starts 
the first year with more than 1,000 battle-deaths and ends as soon as there are less than 1,000 
battle-deaths during one year.  
Criterion number 2: The 1,000 battle-deaths is still an annual criterion. The war starts the first 
year with more than 1,000 battle-deaths, but in order to end there must be at least two subsequent 
years with less than 1,000 battle-deaths. 
Criterion number 3: The 1,000 battle-death criterion is a cumulative criterion. There must be 
1,000 battle-deaths during subsequent active conflict years. A conflict year will be regarded as 
active if it includes more than 100 battle-deaths. 
Criterion number 4: The 1,000 battle death threshold is a cumulative, but stricter that number 3. 
There must be 1,000 battle-deaths during subsequent active conflict years. A conflict year will be 
regarded as active if it includes more than 500 battle-deaths.  
Unfortunately ACD only provides annual point estimates of the battle-deaths for the period 
between 2002 and 2007.16 They do however divide the conflict years into minor armed conflicts 
and wars. A minor armed conflict year implies between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths during 
one year, while a war implies at least 1,000 during the year (Harbom et al. 2009: 7). This gives 
sufficient information for constructing the dataset based on criterion number 1 or 2. When 
constructing the dataset based on criterion number 3 however, I make use of the Lacina and 
Gleditsch (2005) battle-deaths dataset. The Lacina and Gleditsch dataset provides annual point 
estimates for the conflict years in ACD from 1960 to 2005. As Lacina and Gleditsch make clear; 
counting battle-deaths is a highly complex task. The nature of war makes it very hard to 
reconstruct the course of events. Consequentially it is unlikely that two research groups will get 
                                                 
16
 Data are available from: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm 
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the very same results when counting the number of battle-deaths. As this is a general reliability 
problem, relevant for any conflict database it makes robustness checks even more important.  
In order to establish how serious this problem is I compare the ACD, and Lacina and Gleditsch 
battle-deaths estimates for the four concurrent years: 2002-2005. I find that the highest, best and 
lowest estimates correlate by 0.73, 0.8 and 0.74, respectively. When running a regression analysis 
I find that they are significant at the 0 percent level. This shows that the option is not perfect, but 
it is definitely the best (and only) one available.  
3.3.1 What we Know 
Fortunately other information regarding CHS’ dataset is not missing. Firstly, CHS focus on the 
state and not on the conflict. A civil war will last as long as there is an ongoing war within the 
state. The post-conflict peace episode will be counted as collapsed if a conflict breaks out within 
the borders of the state, independently of whether the conflict is new or old. Secondly, CHS have 
excluded all units of observations which lack GDP per capita data. Although GDP per capita data 
are available for three of their post-conflict years in Iraq, none are included. This is probably 
because there are no estimates for the year peace collapsed. Post-conflict episodes generated by 
colonial wars are also excluded. Excluding colonial wars in civil conflict studies is quite 
common; however it has been severely criticized by Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 568) and Fearon 
and Laitin (2003: 76). Fearon and Laitin argue that although it might seem reasonable to drop 
colonial wars from the list, it implies that the Russian-Chechen wars should be excluded at the 
(potential) moment when the Chechen people achieve their own state. Accordingly; whether or 
not it is a civil war will be based on the outcome, not on characteristics of the conflict. Clearly 
this is very problematic. Nevertheless, including colonial war will be a bit more complicated 
when studying post-conflict societies. A successful anti-colonial war implies that there is a 
fundamental change in the boundaries of the state. As a consequence there will be two possible 
states to study as the post-conflict society. One possible solution is to focus on the former colony; 
as this is where the war took place, and the one that inherits the typical post-conflict 
characteristics. 
Lastly it warrants discussion that CHS treat the post-conflict peace as never-ending. As long as 
peace does not collapse due to a new civil war outbreak, it will not be excluded from the dataset. 
One might argue that a post-conflict peace at some point ceases to exist and becomes simply a 
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“normal” peace. One example of this is the United States. Few would argue that the United States 
as a consequence of the American civil war (1861-1865) is still a post-conflict society. By 
treating the post-conflict peace as never ending one risk giving too much weight to countries 
where the post-conflict risk factors has in fact ceased to exist.  
I apply the three criteria to the ACD database and construct post-conflict datasets intending to be 
as similar to CHS’ as possible: The focus is on the state and not on the conflict,17 post-conflict 
peace episodes with missing GDP data are excluded, no colonial wars are included and given that 
no war breaks out the post-conflict peace is treated as never-ending.  
3.3.2 Comparing the Candidate Datasets 
Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) provide three estimates for battle-deaths; the highest, best and 
lowest.18 By applying all three on the third and fourth criterion I end up with eight candidate 
post-conflict datasets. Notice that although criteria 1 and 2, and 3 and 4 are quite different, when 
comparing the datasets with CHS, results are quite similar. The first column in Table 3-1 gives 
the number of countries included in each of the datasets. There are 45 countries included in CHS’ 
dataset, and the number of countries included in the candidate datasets goes from 40 to 51. The 
second column gives the portion of countries that are the same in CHS and the candidate dataset. 
The number is highest when using criterion 4 with the high estimate. Nevertheless, the results are 
very close in all of the other datasets; approximately three fourth of the countries are the same as 
in CHS. The third column gives the proportion of country years that are the same in CHS and the 
candidate dataset. None of the datasets scores above 50 percent, indicating that the differences 
between CHS and all of the candidate datasets are substantial. Criterion 4 with the best estimate 
gets the highest score (49.45), but is followed closely by criterion 4 high (49.04).  
The share of identical country years can be somewhat misleading. Imagine two datasets with 
almost identical country years: In the first dataset post-conflict peace episodes are (unlike in the 
second dataset), constantly erupted by short incidents of civil war episodes. Despite these 
eruptions the share of identical country years can be very high. Nevertheless, the longitude of the 
                                                 
17
 Notice that although the focus is on the state and not the conflict, in criterion 3 and 4 the same conflict must 
accumulate to 1,000 battle-deaths during subsequent active conflict years. 
18
 There were 34, 81 and 34 missing values for the lowest, best and highest estimate. I have not excluded the missing 
values, but replaced it with 25 and 500. For a more detailed description see the appendix page 92-93 
25 
 
post-conflict peace episodes will be very different. In order to control for these I report the 
number of peace collapses in the fourth column. This is 33 in CHS, and criterion 4 high comes 
closest with 28 post-conflict episodes. Criterion 4 best has 23. As this is decisive for results I 
chose to use criterion 4 with the highest battle-deaths data when running the analysis. 
Table  3-1    Comparing the Candidate Datasets   
 Number of 
countries 
Share of countries that 
are the same as in this 
dataset and CHS* 
Share of country-year 
that are the same as in 
this dataset and CHS** 
Number of peace 
collapses 
CHS 45   33 
     Criterion1 41 75.51 % 47.84 % 26 
     
Criterion 2 40 73.47 % 47.51 % 20 
     
Criterion3 43 72.55  % 47.13 % 19 
(low)     
Criterion 3 50 69.64 % 46.00 % 20 
(best)     
Criterion 3 51 71.43 % 45.77 % 26 
(high)     
Criterion 4 44 74.51  % 48.79 % 20 
(low)     
Criterion 4 48 75.47 % 49.45 % 23 
(best)     
Criterion 4 50 75.93  % 49.04 % 28 
(high)     
In the table 8 different post-conflict datasets, based on the four criteria are compared to CHS’ dataset. * Are 
calculated as  	 
      
 	 
  CHS  
  
   **is calculated likewise, but with country-years instead 
of years. 
3.3.3 The Independent Variables 
CHS include 17 independent variables in their analysis.19 These can be classified into 9 groups; 
(1) economy, (2) economic freedom, (3) regime type, (4) diasporas, (5) ethnicity, (6) time, (7) 
UN peacekeeping operations (8) regional autonomy elections and (9) elections. I have been able 
to collect the variables in the six first groups. The sixth variable time is a dummy which tells 
whether or not the post-conflict peace has lasted more or less than 4 years, and is part of their 
                                                 
19
 In order to deal with missingness they use the Modified Zero-Order Regression Method, and therefore include 6 
missing dummies as well. For a description of the method see section  5.4. 
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method; piecewise exponential model.20 I have not been able to obtain CHS’s UN peacekeeping 
operation data,21 instead I used the data collected by Hegre, Heir and Nygård (2009).22 I was not 
able to locate the variables in the two latter groups, nor did I find any substitute for these. When I 
exclude these variables a few changes occur; 23 in model 4 per capita income shifts from being 
significant at the 5 percent level to only be significant at the 10 percent level. The dummy “No 
UN peacekeeping operations” goes from being significant at the 5 percent level to being 
significant at the 10 percent level in model 1, 2 and 3. The “political regime type” variable goes 
from being significant at 10 percent level to being significant at the 5 percent level in all models. 
This is expected as political regime type and elections partially measure the same phenomena. 
Apart from this changes remain by and large the same. 
3.4 EFFECTS OF CHANGING THE DATASET 
Model 1 and 3 in Table  3-2 show the results when using my ACD post-conflict dataset, and 
model 2 and 4 shows the results with the CHS dataset. A piecewise exponential model is used in 
all models. As the table shows per capita income is not significant in CHS’ first model (column 
2), but is significant at the 10 percent level when economic freedom is included (column 4). The 
effect of per capita income is stronger in both of the ACD models, and it is significant at the 1 
percent level. This supports the existence of a relationship between per capita income and post-
conflict risk, and indicates that poor countries are more at risk of experiencing a peace collapse. 
A negative relationship between per capita income and post-conflict risk correspond to the third 
component of the conflict trap model: (1) poor countries are more at risk of experiencing civil 
war outbreak; (2) civil war increases poverty and (3) poor countries are more likely to experience 
a new civil war outbreak. Consequentially there is a reverse relationship between the need for 
risk reducing efforts and per capita income. 
 
                                                 
20
 A piecewise exponential model is a parametric model, assuming that the baseline hazard rate is flat within 
intervals of time (Blossfeld et al. 2007: 116). The intervals here are four years and less, or more than four years. To 
differentiate between the intervals a dummy 4+ is added to the analysis. 
21
 According to CHS the UN data can be made available upon request. However I have not succeeded in getting hold 
of them.  
22
 While CHS use data on UN expenditure, the Hegre, Heir and Nygård dataset contains information on UN 
appropriations.   
23
 For results se table A-4 in the appendix. 
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Table  3-2                   Changing From COW to the Armed Conflict Database 
 (ACD) (CHS) (ACD) (CHS) 
Per Capita Income -0.627** -0.340 -0.803** -0.511 
 (-2.81) (-1.48) (-3.08) (-1.91) 
Economic Growth -0.380 -3.246* -0.0623 -3.640* 
 (-0.18) (-2.08) (-0.03) (-2.08) 
Political regime 0.408 1.349** 0.300 1.534** 
 (0.95) (2.72) (0.69) (3.06) 
Regime Missing -0.305 1.737** -0.375 1.723** 
 (-0.35) (2.73) (-0.42) (2.68) 
Diaspora 0.0310 -0.382** 0.0533 -0.264* 
 (0.22) (-3.17) (0.38) (-2.12) 
Diaspora Missing 0.0929 3.653* -0.007 2.587 
 (0.07) (2.53) (-0.01) (1.78) 
Ethnic Diversity 1.076 -0.855 0.690 -1.342 
 (1.13) (-1.00) (0.71) (-1.58) 
Ethnic Missing  -13.80  -15.05 
  (-0.01)  (-0.01) 
UN Expenditure 0.212 -0.357* 0.137 -0.441* 
 (0.60) (-2.02) (0.41) (-2.43) 
UN missing 2.709 -3.074 2.358 -4.372* 
 (1.37) (-1.64) (1.26) (-2.27) 
No UN PKO 1.050 -3.142 0.630 -4.386* 
 (0.65) (-1.78) (0.41) (-2.35) 
Economic Freedom   0.101 -0.323 
   (0.32) (-1.17) 
EcoFree Missing   -0.314 -2.869* 
   (-0.20) (-2.14) 
4+ -0.416 -0.528 -0.427 -0.333 
 (-1.05) (-1.31) (-1.07) (-0.80) 
Constant -0.945 -7.650** 0.743 -2.255 
 (-0.37) (-2.86) (0.25) (-0.70) 
Log Likelihood -64.92 -71.21 -63.2 -66.2 
N 800 825 800 825 




While my analysis supports the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between per capita 
income and post-conflict risk, it does not support that economic growth reduces post-conflict risk. 
The effect of economic growth is negative and significant at 5 percent level in both CHS models. 
In the two ACD models it is highly insignificant, and the effect is close to zero when controlling 
for economic freedom (model 3). The findings correspond with the argument in chapter 2: there 
might not be a straightforward negative relationship between economic growth and post-conflict 
risk. Of course, in the end economic growth will reduce post-conflict risk by contributing to per 
capita income. However, we know little of the effect of economic growth in the short run, and it 
might be wise to consider other opportunities in order to reduce post-conflict risk.  
According to CHS such an opportunity is to spend more on UN peace keeping forces. A problem 
when estimating the effect of UN peace keeping expenditures is that expenditures are possibly 
biased according to the level of risk. To an extent they argue; they are able to control for this by 
including a dummy which take the value 1 if troops are not deployed. Doing this they find that 
post-conflict risk are lower where UN peace keeping troops are not deployed, but that 
peacekeeping expenditures reduce the risk of further conflict: “The effect is large: doubling 
expenditures reduces the risk from 40% to 31%” (Collier et al. 2008: 473). In contrast to this the 
results in my analysis are highly insignificant, weak and changes direction. However we only 
partially control for biasness and UN peace keeping forces in the wake of civil war was seldom 
deployed before the end of the cold war. Consequentially; this analysis does not provide much 
information regarding the effect of UN peacekeeping expenditures. CHS (2008: 470) conclude 
that post-conflict risk is significantly lower in highly authoritarian regimes: “If the polity is 
highly autocratic, the risk is only 24.6 %, whereas if it is not highly autocratic the risk more than 
doubles to 62%”. In the ACD models the effect is weak and highly insignificant. Based on this it 
should be clear that apart from per capita income the CHS findings are highly sensitive to 
changes in the dataset. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In order to test the robustness of CHS findings I change from the COW to the ACD database. 
Doing this I find that the effect of per capita income becomes stronger and more significant, 
indicating that post-conflict risks will be higher in poor countries. The effect of economic growth 
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however, becomes highly insignificant, and the size of the effect is close to zero when controlling 
for economic freedom. As was suggested in chapter two this might indicate that there does not 
exist a straight forward relationship between economic growth and post-conflict risk. 
Accordingly the idea that economic growth will reduce post-conflict risk, at least in the short run, 
is perhaps mistaken. As such a change is substantial should be of relevance for policy making, 
figuring out what causes the change should prove valuable. In the next chapter I investigate six 
possible explanations: (1) differences in the other independent variables, (2) differences in the 
dependent variable, (3) influential observations, (4) inconsistencies between COW and CHS (5) 




4 WHY THE BIG DIFFERENCE? 
In this chapter I examine why CHS’ findings indicate that faster economic growth “directly and 
significantly reduce risk in the year which it occurs” (Collier et al. 2008: 469), while my analysis 
does not support the existence of such a relationship. In order to explain the change in the effect I 
examine six plausible explanations: (1) differences in the other independent variables, (2) 
differences in the dependent variable, (3) influential observations, (4) inconsistencies between 
COW and CHS (5) differences regarding which conflicts are included in COW and ACD and (6) 
different start and end dates. I find that the change in the effect is partially caused by 
inconsistencies between COW and CHS and different conflicts being included. However, 
differences in start and end dates causes the main part of the change. This should demonstrate the 
importance of coding start and end dates in accordance to a valid definition of post-conflict peace 
as well as the importance of robustness tests. 
4.1.1 The Independent Variables  
My post-conflict dataset differs from the dataset used by Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom’s (CHS) 
on several aspects. Firstly, I was not able to locate the regional autonomy variable or the election 
variables. Secondly, I had to substitute the CHS’ UN expenditure data with a similar dataset 
collected by Hegre, Heir and Nygård (2009).24 Thirdly, when I introduce variables from the exact 
same sources as theirs, I find that some of these differ as well. One example of this is the 
economic freedom variable. Just like CHS’ I collected this variable from the Economic Freedom 
Network,25 and therefore expect it to be identical. Nevertheless, when I introduce the one I 
collected into their dataset, I find that the correlation between the two economic freedom 
variables is merely 0.83. In order to avoid spending too much time examining differences 
between the independent variables, I exclude all variables except: per capita income and 
economic growth, and plus four years in the analysis. The latter is included because it is part of 
the piecewise exponential method.  
Like CHS I collected the GDP per capita data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. While theirs are from 2005 and measured in 1995 dollars, mine are from 2007 and 
                                                 
24
 When introducing this one into CHS dataset I find that the two UN Expenditure variable correlate with 0.64.  
25
 See www.freetheworld.com 
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measured in 2000 dollars.26 To make sure that differences in the results are not caused by 
differences in the GDP data I replace their GDP data with the ones I have collected.27 Economic 
growth is calculated as the difference between log per capita year and year.28 The more 
similar results become when running the analysis without the other independent variables, the 
more it indicates that the divergence in the effect is caused by differences in the other 
independent variables. 
Table  4-1                              Excluding the other independent variables 
 (CHS) (CHS) (ACD) (ACD) 
Per Capita Income  -0.382*  -0.570** 
  (-1.97)  (-3.06) 
Economic Growth -2.799* -2.943* 0.462 0.342 
 (-2.28) (-2.39) (0.22) (0.18) 
4+ -0.892* -0.767* -0.681 -0.398 
 (-2.44) (-2.06) (-1.82) (-1.04) 
Constant -8.572*** -6.303*** -2.944*** 0.496 
 (-33.14) (-5.49) (-10.57) (0.45) 
Log Likelihood -86.21 -84.66 -73.02 -67.3 
N 819 819 800 800 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table  4-1 shows the effect of economic growth and per capita income when excluding the other 
independent variables. The effect of economic growth in CHS’ models continues to be significant 
at the 5 percent level, but the size of the effect is slightly reduced29. Looking at the ACD models 
in Table  4-1 the effect of economic growth is not only highly insignificant, but it also changes 
direction; suggesting that economic growth might increase post-conflict risk. Thus the size of the 
difference in the effects remains more or less the same, and we have to examine other 
possibilities to explain the change in the results.30 
                                                 
26
 Both are reported as log per capita income. 
27
 This might be somewhat superfluous: When merging the 2007 income variable into the CHS dataset I find that the 
two variables correlate with 0.998. 
28
 This is the same procedure that is used in CHS. 
29
 The N decreases in this model from 825 to 819. This is due to Serbia & Montenegro being missing in the 2007 
WDI, but not in the CHS dataset, I have run the CHS analysis with missing data for Serbia & Montenegro and this 
does not change the results.  
30




4.1.2 From Days till Years 
While CHS operate with exact dates, my ACD post-conflict dataset operates with year. As was 
argued in section  3.1.3 this will make the peace duration estimates less precise and might 
influence results. In order to examine the impact of differences in the measurement level; I 
convert the duration variable of CHS into years instead of days.  
Table  4-2                         Changing the measurement level from days till years 
 (Days) (Days) (Years) (Years) 
Per Capita Income  -0.382*  -0.415* 
  (-1.97)  (-2.14) 
Economic Growth -2.799* -2.943* -2.701* -2.857* 
 (-2.28) (-2.39) (-2.16) (-2.28) 
4+ -0.892* -0.767* -0.856* -0.689 
 (-2.44) (-2.06) (-2.34) (-1.84) 
Constant -8.572*** -6.303*** -2.697*** -0.245 
 (-33.14) (-5.49) (-10.42) (-0.21) 
Log Likelihood -86.21 -84.16 -80.27 -77.95 
N 819 819 819 819 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The two first columns in Table  4-2 show the results when the dependent variable in CHS is 
estimated by exact dates,31 and the two lasts show the results when it is transformed into an 
annual variable. Changing from days till years does not change the estimated effect of economic 
growth on peace duration. 
4.1.3 Influential Observations 
If the change is driven by a few influential observations this will not only explain the change in 
the result, but it might be appropriate to exclude these observations from the analysis. If results 
are driven by a few observations alone, basing policies on these can be risky. One way of 
examining the influence of individual observations on parameter estimates is to consecutively 
drop the observation from the dataset and re-estimate the model, repeating the procedure for each 
ith observation (Box-Steffenmeiser and Jones 2004: 127-128). However doing so is of course 
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 These are identical to model 1 and 2 in Table  4-1. 
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immensely time consuming when datasets are large. Instead, an alternative is to calculate efficient 
score residuals (Cleves et al. 2008: 217). These will be calculated by using the Cox model. As 
the influential observations are likely to be the same in Cox as in a piecewise exponential model, 
this should not be problematic. After identifying the influential observations I run the analysis, 
using the piecewise exponential model. 
By calculating the efficient score residuals I find that none of the CHS observations score above 
|0.5|. Accordingly, none of the observations are regarded as critical. In the ACD post-conflict 
dataset three post-conflict episodes have efficient score residuals above |0.5| and can be regarded 
as critical. In order to examine whether the change in results are driven by these post-conflict 
episodes, I add three dummies controlling for these to the analysis. This method gives the exact 
same result as if the pos-conflict episodes were excluded.  
Table  4-3   Excluding Influential Observations 










Economic Growth 0.462 0.126 0.587 0.472 0.324 
 (0.22) (0.07) (0.34) (0.22) (0.20) 
      
4+ -0.681 -0.650 -0.614 -0.618 -0.509 
 (-1.82) (-1.73) (-1.61) (-1.62) (-1.29) 
Constant -2.944*** -2.981*** -3.014*** -3.008*** -3.128*** 
 (-10.57) (-10.53) (-10.40) (-10.38) (-10.14) 
Log Likelihood -73.01   -72.5 -71.95 -72.22 -70.53 
N 800 800 800 800 800 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The first column in Table  4-3 shows the effect of economic growth when not controlling for any 
of the critical post-conflict episodes.32 The last column shows the effect when controlling for all 
three critical post-conflict episodes. Table  4-3 shows that the effect becomes stronger in two of 
the models, and weaker in two. However, controlling for these episodes does not alter the 
conclusion substantially; the effect of economic growth continues to be both positive and highly 
insignificant. As neither variation in the independent variables, differences in the measurement 
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 It is identical to column 3 in Table  4-1. 
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level or influential observations explain the change in the effect of economic growth, I have to 
examine features of the unit of observation; the post-conflict peace. 
4.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COW AND CHS 
Differences regarding the post-conflict peace both concern which post-conflict peace episodes are 
included, when they start and when they end. Such differences can be both systematic and 
unsystematic. While systematic differences can be debated and discussed theoretically, 
unsystematic differences are by and large due to questionable reliability and are thus best 
avoided. In order to investigate the systematic and unsystematic differences between CHS and 
the ACD post-conflict dataset it is necessary to look at the conflicts behind the post-conflict 
peace episodes. To do so I compare the COW database with the ACD conflict dataset. The ACD 
conflict dataset is like my post conflict dataset based on criterion 4, and the high battle deaths 
estimate of Lacina and Gleditsch. To recap this means that for a conflict to be included it must 
accumulate to 1000 battle-deaths during subsequent active conflict years. A year will be counted 
as active as long as there are more than 500 battle-deaths. The conflict starts and ends the first 
and last year with more than 500 battle-deaths.33 
Before I start comparing COW and the ACD conflict dataset I inspect whether there exists 
inconsistencies between CHS and COW. In order to do so I generate a post-conflict dataset based 
on COW’s conflict and start and end dates. I merge this together with CHS and investigate the 
observations that do not match. Doing so, I find that four conflicts included in COW are not 
reported in CHS, see Table  4-4. This means that the post-conflict episode of Morocco is excluded 
from the dataset and the duration of the post-conflict episodes in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) is overestimated. Two conflicts are reported in CHS, but are not to be found 
in the updated COW database, which means that the duration of the post-conflict episodes of both 
Chad and Sri Lanka are underestimated. CHS report that the 2nd Chechen conflict ended in 2001. 
Consequentially a post-conflict peace episode starts that year. According to COW, however, the 
conflict did not end until the 31st of December 2004. 
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 From here on this will be referred to as the ACD conflict dataset. 
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Table  4-4 
Conflicts that appear in COW only Conflicts that appear in CHS only 
Morocco: 11. 12 1975- 23.12 1983 Chad: 01.01 1998 - 31.12 2001 
Sri Lanka: 01.01 1995- 31.12 2001  Sri Lanka: 25.07 1987- 24.05 1990 
Indonesia: 07.12 1975- 04.07 1977  
Yug (Serbia): 01.01 1998-31.12 1999  
The first unit of observation in CHS’ peace periods is the year the conflict ends. The last is the 
year before conflict breaks out again. If no conflict breaks out the last observation is the year 
2002. Nevertheless, for 10 peace periods the last year of observation is the same year as conflict 
breaks out. In order to investigate whether results are affected by these errors I update the CHS 
dataset, and exclude these errors. Model 1 and 2 in Table  4-5 show the results when the analysis 
is run on the original CHS dataset. Model 3 and 4 show the results when using the updated CHS 
dataset. Model 5 and 6 show the effects when the peace duration variable of the updated CHS 
dataset is turned into years.  
Table  4-5                    Updating CHS’ dataset 












Per Capita Income -0.382*  -0.415*  -0.433*  
 (-1.97)  (-2.15)  (-2.25)  
       
Economic growth -2.943* -2.799* -2.738* -2.606* -2.597* -2.450 
 (-2.39) (-2.28) (-2.15) (-2.06) (-1.99) (-1.88) 
       
4+ -0.767* -0.892* -0.692 -0.852* -0.643 -0.824* 
 (-2.06) (-2.44) (-1.87) (-2.35) (-1.73) (-2.27) 
       
Constant -6.303*** -8.572*** -6.096*** -8.562*** -0.127 -2.697*** 
 (-5.49) (-33.14) (-5.34) (-33.58) (-0.11) (-10.56) 
Log Likelihood -84.16 -86.21 -79.3 -81.73 -76.01 -78.7 
N 819 819 802 802 801 801 
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
While the effect of per capita income becomes stronger as we move towards the right in Table 
 4-5, the effect of economic growth becomes weaker. In the last model economic growth is only 
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significant at the 10 percent level. When searching for the effect of changing from COW to ACD; 
it is necessary that everything else is as similar as possible. Thus the last to models are the ones to 
compare with the ACD results. In these two models there are no inconsistencies between COW 
and CHS, and the duration variable is as in ACD measured in years and not in days. The effect of 
economic growth is only significant at the 10 percent level when not controlling for per capita 
income. As everything else is the same, the remaining difference in result must be ascribed to 
differences regarding the COW and ACD conflict database.  
4.2.1 Which Conflicts are Included? 
In order to examine the effect of changing from COW to the ACD conflict dataset I start by 
comparing the contested incompatibilities registered in the two databases. I identify 91 contested 
incompatibilities that take place in 63 countries. Out of the 91 contested incompatibilities 57 
appear in both datasets, 11 and 17 are found only in the COW and ACD, respectively, and 6 of 
the conflicts might be the same, but I am not sure.34 These differences may be both systematic 
and unsystematic. This comparison however, has some weaknesses: The focus in ACD is on 
incompatibilities. All incompatibilities are given a unique id number. However, if two separate 
groups are both trying to take control over state power, these are given the same id number. The 
reason to do so is that the incompatibility is the same. To the extent that the conflict description 
of COW can be identified with one or more of the groups fighting during ACD’s conflict period, 
the conflicts are coded as the same. If the same id number breaks out several times, the other 
conflict periods do not necessarily correspond to the one in COW. In order for a conflict episode 
in ACD to be coded as the same as one in COW, the specific conflict episode must have 
connections to the one in COW. It is not sufficient that another conflict period with the same id 
corresponds to one or more conflict periods in COW. 
One example of this is id number 70, an internal war in Ethiopia. The conflict broke out for the 
first time in 1960 between the Ethiopian government and a military faction led by Mengistu 
Neway, and ended the same year. The second time it broke out was in 1976. This time it was 
between the Ethiopian government, and Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and 
Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). COW reports that a conflict between Ethiopia and 
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 For a table over the conflicts I assume are the same, see Table A-5 in the Appendix. 
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Tigrean Liberation Front started in 1978. This conflict then corresponds to the second conflict in 
the ACD, but not the first and I code the conflicts accordingly. During the second conflict period 
there are several years were only EPRP is active, and not TPLP. It might be a mistake to include 
these conflict years in the analysis when only comparing the conflicts that appear I both datasets. 
However, the alternative of excluding the conflict years with TPLP is both time consuming and 
implies that the conflict period is split into several smaller parts, making it less similar to COW. 
4.2.2 Systematic Differences 
There are three systematic differences between the two databases possibly causing discrepancies 
regarding which conflicts are included. Two concern differences in the definition of civil war and 
one regards which deaths are counted as battle-deaths. In their definition COW includes a 
resistance criterion “the stronger side should suffer at least 5 percent of the causalities of the 
weaker side”. As the ACD definition does not include any resistance criterion, conflicts that are 
excluded from COW might be included in ACD. As there is little information available about 
why specific conflicts are not included in the COW database, it is hard to tell whether any of the 
17 conflicts are excluded due to lack of resistance. The other systematic cause stems from ACD 
focusing on the contested incompatibility between organized actors. If incompatibility is unclear, 
or actors are not organized the conflict is not included in the database. Out of the 11 conflicts that 
only appear in COW, 6 are excluded from the ACD list due to unorganized actors or unclear 
incompatibilities (Gleditsch et al. 2001).  
Differences regarding which deaths are counted as battle-deaths can affect which conflict 
episodes are included in the database. Firstly, if the documentation criteria are stricter in Lacina 
and Gleditsch than in COW, battle-deaths will tend to be higher in COW. A conflict which 
accumulates to more than 1000 battle-deaths in Lacina and Gleditsch, might only accumulate to 
800 in COW, and will therefore be excluded. As there exist little information of how battle-
deaths are counted in COW,35 it is not possible to decide whether this affects the results. 
Secondly if the operationalization of battle-death differ from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) to 
COW, this will cause different battle-deaths estimates. Lacina and Gleditsch (2005: 148) define 
battle-death as “all people, soldiers and civilians, killed in combat”. Small and Singer (1982: 213) 
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 According  to Kristian S. Gleditsch. Personal communication with the author 30.04.2009. 
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claim that they have counted civilian as well as military deaths in civil war. However, it is not 
clear whether they have counted civilian deaths due to rebel attacks (Sambanis 2004: 822).  
4.2.3 Unsystematic Differences 
Unsystematic differences concern both the inconsistency in COW’s coding criteria and a general 
reliability problem in quantitative conflict studies. If COW has, as Sambanis (2004) suggests, 
used a cumulative criterion in most of the cases, but an annual criterion in others, it might explain 
the exclusion of some of the 17 conflicts that appear in the ACD conflict dataset only.36 Out of 
the 17 conflicts that occur in the ACD conflict database only, the high battle-deaths estimate in 
Lacina and Gleditsch imply that five of the conflicts never experienced a single year with more 
than 1,000 battle-deaths. Consequentially, almost one third of the conflicts are potentially 
excluded due to inconsistencies in the coding criteria. 
The second cause concerns a general reliability problem in quantitative conflict studies. Lacina 
and Gleditsch (2005) argue that reconstructing the course of event during war, is a hard task to 
fulfil. Unlike in interstate wars one of the groups is not representing the government. Identifying 
who is and is not a member of the rebel army is often difficult (Gates and Strand 2004: 3). This 
might lead one research group to draw the conclusion that the deaths occurred during combats 
between the government and rebels groups, while the other group concludes that battles were not 
related to the conflict. This makes it plausible that two research groups adopting the same coding 
criteria could reach different results. Accordingly changes regarding which conflicts are included 
do not necessarily comply with differences regarding the definition of civil war or inconsistencies 
in the COW coding criteria.  Differences might be caused by two research groups not reaching 
equal battle-deaths number. The nature of war makes it very difficult to count battle-deaths. 
Consequentially the reliability problem might be greater than in e.g. voting studies. If so is 
correct, robustness tests become even more important. 
4.2.4 Does the Inclusion of Conflicts Matter? 
In order to examine whether differences in which conflicts are included cause the change in the 
effect, I construct two post-conflict datasets based only on the conflicts that appear in both COW 
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and ACD conflict dataset. When coding the start and end years in the post-conflict datasets I use 
the start and end years from COW and the ACD conflict dataset. Like CHS I focus on the state, 
and not on the conflict. The conflict ends when there is no war within the state, and the peace 
collapses if war breaks out again, no matter if the incompatibility is the same or a new one. I 
exclude the post-conflict years with missing GDP data. This leaves me with 49 contested 
incompatibilities occurring in 42 countries. I run the analysis using a piecewise exponential 
model, to test whether results are more similar this time.  
Table  4-6  The effect when only including the same conflicts 
 (COW) (COW) (ACD) (ACD) 
Per Capita Income  -0.229  -0.310 
  (-1.06)  (-1.24) 
Economic Growth -1.838 -1.922 1.920 1.554 
 (-1.32) (-1.40) (0.97) (0.82) 
4+ -1.325** -1.276** -0.979* -0.919* 
 (-3.12) (-2.98) (-2.13) (-1.98) 
Constant -2.515*** -1.103 -2.946*** -1.036 
 (-9.82) (-0.82) (-9.03) (-0.67) 
Log Likelihood -68.67 -68.10 -51.79 -50.99 
N 588 588 576 576 
The analysis is based only on the contested incompatibilities that appear in both datasets.  
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table  4-6 shows the differences in the results when only including the contested incompatibilities 
that appear in both datasets. Model 1 and 2 are based on the updated COW database and model 3 
and 4 are based on the ACD conflict dataset. The effect of economic growth is no longer 
significant in the two CHS models, making results more similar. Nevertheless when looking at 
the ACD models it becomes clear that the effect of economic growth has become stronger, and 
results are less insignificant than they were in Table  4-1. While the substantial difference is 
reduced, the size of the distance remains more or less the same.  
Before examining the differences regarding start and end years, I want to test whether it is the 
exclusion of a particular group of COW’s post-conflict episodes that causes the shift in 
significance. The conflicts which are excluded from COW can be split into three groups; (1) four 
which I do not know whether are the same as any of the ACD conflicts, (2) six which are 
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excluded from ACD due to unorganized actors or unclear incompatibilities and (3) five which I 
am not sure why are excluded. I run the analysis and include these groups one by one. 
Table  4-7             Including the excluded COW wars-one by one group 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per Capita Income  -0.279  -0.256  -0.319 
  (-1.39)  (-1.30)  (-1.57) 
Economic growth -1.876 -1.936 -2.190 -2.296 -2.082 -2.197 
 (-1.38) (-1.43) (-1.66) (-1.76) (-1.53) (-1.65) 
4+ -1.153** -1.087** -1.096** -1.029** -0.975* -0.878* 
 (-3.03) (-2.83) (-2.88) (-2.68) (-2.54) (-2.25) 
Constant -2.520*** -0.830 -2.583*** -1.036 -2.611*** -0.646 
  (-10.40) (-0.68) (-10.29) (-0.87) (-10.12) (-0.52) 
Log Likelihood -77.6 -76.6 -77.6 -76.75 -73.68 -72.42 
N 665 665 712 712 659 659 
The table shows the results when the three groups are included one by one: Model 1 and 2 gives the results when 
the four conflicts that might be included in the ACD dataset are included. Model 3 and 4 gives the results when 
the groups that are excluded due to unorganized or unclear incompatibility are included. Model 5 and 6 gives the 
results when the five conflicts which I do not know why have been excluded are included. 
 
 
Table 4-7 shows that results are significant at the 10 percent level only in model 4; when including 
the conflicts that are excluded due to unclear incompatibility or unorganized actors. It might be 
argued that post-conflict risk will be the same independently of whether the actors are organized 
or incompatibility is unclear. Comparing model 3 and 4 with model 5 and 6 differences are quite 
small. Thus it might seem that the reduction in effect and significance is not caused by the 
exclusion of one particular group, but rather the exclusion of all 15 incompatibilities.  
4.3 START AND END DATES 
As the main of the difference remain, this must be ascribed to differences in start and end dates. 
If it is correct that COW has used a cumulative criterion on most of their database, we are left 
without the necessary knowledge of how start and end dates are coded (Sambanis 2004). If 
conflict episodes tend to last longer with COW’s start and end dates it might be wise to 
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reconsider the annual part of criterion 4; 500 battle-deaths.37 However, when checking the mean 
duration of the conflict episodes I find that it is approximately the same in both datasets; 7.1 and 
6.8 in ACD and COW, respectively. If I estimate the mean duration of the incompatibilities I find 
that it is slightly higher with ACD’s start and end dates; 11.1 vs. 9.6. Nevertheless the differences 
in start and end dates are rather unsystematic: 23 of the incompatibilities last longer with COW’s 
start and end dates, 20 last longer with ACS’s and 14 lasts just as long in both.38 As differences in 
start and end dates are not systematic they can have three plausible sources: (1) if different 
criteria have been used when coding battle-deaths, this will affect start and end dates. (2)  A 
general reliability problem implying that different research groups get different results when 
counting the number of battle-deaths. And (3) Inconsistencies in COW’s coding criteria. It should 
be clear that not only are these the causes behind different start and end dates, but also the main 
reason why the effect of economic growth on post-conflict risk differs when changing to the ACD 
dataset. 
Figure 4-1 shows the differences in start and end dates of COW and ACD. In total there are 136 
post-conflict peace years that only appear in one of the two datasets, and 514 peace years that 
appear in both.39 The blue line refers to the conflict years with COW’s start and end dates, and 
the pink line refers to the conflict years with ACD’s start and end dates. The most similar 
countries can be found at the bottom, and the most different at the top. Thailand stands out were 
none of the conflict years are the same. In fact it takes three years from it ends in COW till it 
starts in ACD.40 By comparing the conflicts I find that 18 conflict episodes start earlier in COW, 
7 start earlier in ACD, 16 end earlier in COW and 13 end earlier in ACD. There are 63 conflict 
episodes in COW and 62 in ACD. Based on this it should be clear that differences in start and 
end dates are rather unsystematic.  
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Based on this it should be clear that the effect of economic growth depends on when start and end 
dates are set. The importance of valid start and end dates does not only apply to the study of the 
effect of economic growth on post-conflict risk, but to any study of the duration of the post-
conflict peace. When start and end dates are based on battle-deaths estimates they both depend 
on the accuracy of the estimates and the battle-death threshold criterion. Battle-deaths estimates 
will always include uncertainties; this should advocate the importance of robustness tests. One 
alternative then is as done here to run the analysis on different datasets. As was argued in section 
 3.1 the battle-death threshold should be set in accordance with a valid definition of post-conflict 
peace.  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
When applying the analysis on my post-conflict risk dataset, the size of the effect of economic 
growth becomes weak and highly insignificant. In order to explain the change in the effect I have 
examined differences regarding the other independent variables, influential observations, 
differences in the measurement level of peace duration, inconsistencies between COW and CHS, 
which conflicts are included in COW and ACD, and differences regarding start and end dates. I 
find that the difference can partially be explained by inconsistencies between COW and CHS, 
and different conflicts being included. However, the main change comes from differences in start 
and end dates. This should demonstrate both the need for robustness tests, and the importance of 
start and end dates being set in accordance with a valid definition of post-conflict peace. The 
definition of conflict used in my ACD post-conflict dataset implies that the peace starts as soon 
as there are less than 500 battle-deaths occurring in one year. Applying a strict definition of 
conflict implies that the definition of becomes wide, and maybe too wide. In order to increase the 
validity of the study, in the next chapter I change to what I consider to be a more valid definition 
of post-conflict peace. I also change to an alternative GDP database to avoid the problem of 
missingness, include alternative control variables to reduce biasness and change to a method that 
better accounts for repeated events. 
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5 POST CONFLICT RISKS 
The aim of this chapter is to improve the validity of post-conflict peace, reduce biasness caused 
by missing data, change the control variables to better control for endogeneity and spuriousity, 
and change to a method that better accounts for repeated events. Doing this I find that low per 
capita income levels are associated with higher post-conflict risk. The effect is strong and 
significant. The effect of economic growth however, continues to be both weak and insignificant. 
Accordingly the analysis does not support that increasing economic growth will reduce post-
conflict risk, at least not in the short run. As the effect of per capita income on post-conflict risk 
is strong and negative, economic growth will in the long run reduce post-conflict risk by 
contributing to the income level. Nevertheless, as post-conflict risk tends to be highest when war 
ends, the crux is normally how to make it though the first decade. The lack of significant result is 
either due to (1) that no such relationship exists, (2) noise in the data or (3) that economic growth 
affects conflict risk in both directions. I argue that to get a more nuanced picture of the role of 
economic growth in post-conflict societies we need to develop testable theories. 
5.1 DEFINING POST-CONFLICT PEACE 
What is the rationale for studying post-conflict peace episodes? After months, or years of 
fighting, the belligerents have finally put their weapons aside. This might be just a breathing 
space, before fighting breaks out again. But it can also be the end of the war, and hopefully the 
beginning of something better. Based on this it should make sense to examine whether there is 
something generalizable about the peace episodes that collapse and the ones that endure. When 
utilizing a strict cumulative definition, the definition of post-conflict peace becomes too wide. 
One risks including societies where these fragile opportunities have not yet emerged. A “post 
conflict peace” where hundreds (though less than 500) are killed in battles, might not even be the 
beginning of a peace. It is just as likely to be a small reduction in the intensity of the civil war, 
which is soon to rise again. In order to avoid including elements of conflict intensity into the 
study of the duration of the post-conflict peace, I alter the definition of armed conflict: For a 
conflict to be included it must have claimed at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an 
accumulated total of at least 1,000.  
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When doing so I use the start and end dates from the Armed Conflict Database (ACD). The start 
date is given as the date, as precise as possible, when a given episode of conflict activity reaches 
25 battle-deaths in a year. The end date is given as the date when the conflict activity ended 
(Harbom et al. 2009: 4). In order for a conflict episode to be included in the analysis, subsequent 
active conflict years (more than 25 battle-deaths) must accumulate to 1,000 battle-deaths.41 If 
there are two ongoing conflicts within the state at the same time which alone accumulates to less 
than 1,000, but in total to more than 1,000 these will not be included. If there are two ongoing 
conflicts42 within the state that overlaps I will use the start date of the first conflict to break out 
and the end date of the last conflict to end. As data are available until 2007 I expand the time 
frame of the analysis from 1960 to 2007.  This yields a dataset which includes 81 post-conflict 
episodes in 59 countries. Out of the 81 post-conflict episodes 34 (42 percent), collapse before the 
31st of December 2007. When excluding observations with missing GDP data the number of post-
conflict episodes reduces to 67, and the number of countries to 52. Out of the 67 peace episodes 
24 (35.8 percent), collapse.  
5.2 WHICH MODEL TO CHOOSE? 
In their analysis Collier Hoeffler and Söderbom (CHS) utilize a parametric model; the piecewise 
exponential model. Parametric models refer to all survival models that include assumptions of the 
effect of the passage of time; the baseline hazard rate (Golub 2008: 530). CHS for example 
assume that the baseline hazard rate is the same within intervals of four years and less, or more 
than four years. The benefit of using a parametric model is that if the effect of time is correctly 
specified a parametric model will yield slightly more precise estimates and reveal information 
about predicted survival times (Box-Steffenmeiser and Jones 2004: 21, 86). Box-Steffenmeiser 
and Jones argue that it is appropriate to apply parametric models when there exist a strong 
theoretical expectation about the “shape” of the hazard rate. A problem is that sufficiently strong 
expectations rarely exist in political science (Golub 2008: 534).43 As the choice of shape 
                                                 
41
 As the focus of the thesis no longer is to replicate CHS study, in order to reduce uncertainty I utilize the best 
instead of the highest battle-death estimate of Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).  
42
 Assuming that both meet the battle-death criteria. 
43
 Instead, researchers often employ graphical and other diagnostic techniques to justify their choice of a particular 
parametric model, especially plots of the hazard function and the residuals. However, relying on raw hazard or 




fundamentally affects the estimated coefficients, fitting a possibly erroneous baseline to the data 
can impart enormous bias to the results (Golub 2008: 534).44  
Consequentially “a particular shape should only be chosen on strong theoretical grounds, and 
never simply because it proves convenient” (Golub 2008: 534). The question then becomes 
whether there are sufficiently strong and valid theoretical reasons to expect that the post-conflict 
baseline hazard takes a particular shape? In the long run post-conflict risk is likely to decrease 
(Collier et al. 2003: 104). After a certain amount of time it is probable that civil war risk 
converges to be the same as for a state that scores the same on every other conflict affecting 
parameter, but which has not endured a civil war. However, we do not know how long it takes, 
nor what happens in between. Although post-conflict risk is likely to decrease in the long run, 
there is not necessarily a linear risk reducing trend from the day war ends. It might just as well be 
increasing in the start before it slowly starts to decrease. It might also look like a laterally 
inversed N, decreasing the first years, before it starts to increase and reaches a top before it starts 
to decrease again. We have few, if any, sufficiently strong theoretical reasons to expect any sorts 
of regularities regarding the baseline hazard shape of post-conflict societies.45 The alternative 
then is to use the semi-parametric Cox-model: “For a Cox model, the baseline hazard rate does 
not have a parametric form but instead can be estimated from the data” (Golub 2008: 531). The 
downside of using a Cox model is that estimates become slightly more imprecise; however it 
does not lead to biased, incorrect results.  
5.2.1 Repeated Events 
A problem with most duration models, the Cox model included, is that they do not account for 
repeated events. An important feature of post-conflict peace episodes is their repeatability. If a 
post-conflict peace collapses, it will be repeated as soon as the new civil war ends. Out of the 57 
countries in the dataset, 16 experience two or more post-conflict episodes.46 When applying a 
model that does not account for repeated events; the first, second and third post-conflict peace 
episodes are treated as completely independent of each other.  
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Box-Steffenmeiser and Zorn (2002: 1071) suggests that this might yield misleading results for at 
least two reasons: “Firstly, the presence of correlated events presents a problem similar to 
autocorrelation in conventional regression analysis: by treating such observations as independent, 
we overstate the amount of information each observation provides, leading to incorrect estimates 
of standard errors. Secondly, such models implicitly restrict the influence of covariates to be the 
same across events when, in fact, there might be varying effects from one event occurrence to the 
next.” In order to test whether repeated events affect the results I also run the analysis using the 
Conditional Elapsed Time model. In this model event k cannot find place unless event k-1 has 
already emerged. Time restarts when a new post-conflict peace episode starts, independently of 
how long the preceding episode lasted  (Box-Steffenmeiser and Zorn 2002: 1075). The 
Conditional Elapsed Time model is a variance correcting method. Hence, if correctly specified, 
results should have some resemblance to the once estimated by Cox. 
5.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
The focus in this analysis, unlike CHS’, is only on the effect of per capita income and economic 
growth. I try to isolate post-conflict risk by controlling for two variables known to increase 
general civil war risk population size (see: Hegre and Sambanis 2006) and civil war in 
neighbourhood countries (see: Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008).47 I also include five variables that 
can provide additional information of the relationship between the two economic variables and 
post-conflict risk; political regime type, per capita income change during war, aid and two UN 
Peace Keeping Operation variables. 
The effect of economic growth might depend on the regime type. Both Lipset (1959) and Lenski 
(1966) claim that mechanisms inherent in democratic regimes will facilitate economic 
distribution (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990: 135). In section 2.3 I argued that economic growth is 
likely to reduce post-conflict risk through four mechanisms regarding the rebels’ opportunity 
costs, lootability of the economy, and the state’s military apparatus. It is however likely to 
increase post-conflict risk through the size of the possible reward. Economic growth centred at 
the top and not benefitting the lower strata of the population; will only affect the size of the 
possible reward, and possibly the state’s military apparatus. If this is the case economic growth 
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will not generate new job opportunities, nor modernize the economy, and the risk reducing effect 
will be marginal. Thus, given that the distribution of economic growth differs from democracies 
to authoritarian regimes; the effect will be clearer when controlling for political regime type.48 
CHS utilize the political regime variable constructed by the Polity IV project (Gleditsch 2003). 
According to Gates et al. (2006: 897) it is problematic to use this variable in a conflict study, 
since violence is included as a part of the coding criteria. Consequentially, when using the polity 
variable in a conflict study; violence appears on both sides of the equation mark. One solution is 
to use the polity variable provided by Gates et al. (2006).49 This is a combination of the executive 
constraint and executive recruitment part from Gleditsch’ (2003) polity variable, and the 
participation dimension from Vanhanen (2000). None of these include any information about 
violence. The problem is that data are only available till 2000. The variable is only included in 
the two last models. 
5.3.1 Spuriousity and reversed causality 
So far my analysis has not supported the claim that there is a strong negative relationship 
between economic growth and post-conflict risk. In fact it has even suggested the reverse; that 
economic growth might increase post-conflict risk. There are two reasons to suspect that results 
might be biased, and therefore make it hard to discover a negative and significant relationship 
between economic growth and post-conflict risk.  
Firstly, it might be a result of a “spring mechanism”: If the economy has been severely damaged 
during the war, growth might jump when peace finally arrives; if for no other reason than that the 
effect of going back to normality will be substantial. In order to test whether this is correct I run a 
regression analysis estimating the effect of change in GDP per capita during wartime on 
economic growth the two first years of the peace period.50 I find that the effect is negative and 
significant at the 0.001 percent level. The finding suggests that reducing economic growth during 
wartime with a 1 percentage point, increases economic growth the two first years of the peace 
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episode with 0.09 percentage points. Accordingly, economic growth is expected to rise in 
correspondence to the damage on the economy. The damage on the economy can be seen as an 
indicator of the intensity of the war. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Hartzell et al. (2001: 202) 
measuring the intensity of the war as number of battle-deaths, find that intense war periods are 
followed by fragile peace episodes. Thus, the lack of a negative relationship between economic 
growth and post-conflict risk might be caused by spuriousity: War intensity affecting both 
economic growth and post-conflict risk. In order to control for biasness I introduce change in 
GDP capita during the war into the analysis. Secondly, it might be an incident of reversed 
causality. A significant part of post-conflict economic growth is aid driven. It is plausible that aid 
increases when post-conflict risk is high, causing biasness to results. Unfortunately I was not able 
to find any reliable aid data. However, a similar, but opposite mechanisms might also be 
operating. If post-conflict risk is low it is likely to (1) reduce capital flight and (2) attract foreign 
investors. This has the potential of increasing economic growth.51  
In order to control for endogeneity CHS gives per capita income and economic growth a two and 
a one year lag, respectively. Miguel et al. (2004: 730) claim that “this approach implicitly 
assumes that economic actors do not anticipate the incidence of civil war and adjust economic 
activity (e.g., investment) accordingly. Since this is a very strong assumption, simply lagging 
economic variables is not a convincing solution to the endogeneity problem”. Therefore in 
addition to giving per capita income and economic growth a two and a one year lag, I include the 
two UN variables: No UN Peace Keeping Operations and UN Expenditures. According to Fortna 
(2008) peace keepers are sent where the risk is highest.52 Consequentially by including the UN 
variable I am partially able to control for variations in post-conflict risk. One problem with this is 
that UN Peace Keeping Operations were seldom deployed before the end of the cold war. Thus it 
only serves its function in the later part of the analysis. An alternative is to control for Foreign 
Direct Investment, but such data are also readily available only from the 80’s.  
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Missing values is a common, but often neglected problem in quantitative research (Gleditsch 
2002; Hug 2003). Gelman and Hill (2007: 530-531) differentiate between four groups of missing 
data: (1) missing completely at random, (2) missing at random, (3) missingness that depends on 
unobserved predictors and (4) missingness that depends on the missing value itself. If values are 
missing completely at random; if the probability of missingness is the same for all units, then 
throwing out cases with missing data does not make results biased. In the second group data are 
not missing completely at random, but all variables influencing missing probability are controlled 
for in the analysis. If this is done, missingness should not cause biasness. The third group is more 
severe, and implies that missing probability depends on variables that are not included in the 
analysis. Finally, a particularly difficult situation arises if the probability of missingness depends 
on the (potentially missing) variable itself. As mentioned in section  5.1, due to missing GDP data 
14 post-conflict episodes are excluded.53  
Gleditsch (2002: 712) argues that GDP data is often lacking for developing countries. If poor 
countries are the most likely to have missing GDP data, missingness depends on the missing 
value itself.54 This corresponds to Gelman and Hill’s fourth group. Accordingly missingness 
should be regarded as rather serious. The problem becomes more severe if there are systematic 
differences in the duration of the post-conflict peace episodes and the probability of having 
missing GDP data. When comparing the duration of the post-conflict peace of the excluded and 
non-excluded episodes, I find that mean duration is 4172 and 10378 days, respectively.55 If poor, 
short lasting peace episodes are excluded from the analysis, this will introduce biasness in the 
results. The problem becomes even more serious if these are low growth economies as well. 
Apart from Egypt and Yugoslavia (Serbia) there are few reasons to believe that economic growth 
is higher than average in these countries.  
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When data are missing systematically, it may be better to perform some best guesses with high 
uncertainty, than to exclude the post-conflict peace episodes all together. In his dataset Carl-
Henrik Knutsen (2008) includes PPP adjusted GDP data estimated by the economic historian 
Angus Maddison (2006).56 For the period 1960-2003 data are available for all country years in 
the dataset. While uncertainty is likely to be higher, this will reduce biasness. Model 6-10 in table 
5-2 are based on Maddison’s data.  
Missingness also appears in the control variables. The proportion of missingness is quite small 
for all control variables apart from GDP Change During War, see Table 5.1. To handle 
missingness on the control variables, I do as CHS and use the modified zero-order regression 
method (MZOR). When using MZOR missing data is replaced by a score of 0 and a dummy 
variable is added to the dataset. The dummy is coded 1 if data is missing and 0 if we know its real 
value. The effect of the specific independent variable will be the same as if the incomplete data 
had been dropped (Greene 2003: 60). The advantage of MZOR is that the unit of observation 
continues to be included in the dataset. If the value of one unit of observation is missing on the 
covariate X, it might all the same contain information on the covariate X. Accordingly, when 
using the MZOR, the unit of observation will add information regarding X. Of course, if 
missingness is systematic, this can cause biased results as well. In order to test whether 
differences are systematic I run a Cox analysis estimating peace duration by the missing dummy 
variables. I find that none are significant, not even at the 10 percent level.  
Table  5-1    Missing Data: Control Variables 
 GDP missing excluded GDP missing Included 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
GDP change 121 13.43 % 1 0.11 % 
UN Expenditure 10 1.11 % 10 1.10 % 
Population 25 2.77 % 33 3.63 % 
Neighbour at War 22 2.44 % 29 3.19 % 
Polity Gates et al.   37 5.07 % 
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5.5 DIAGNOSING THE DATASET 
The Cox model presupposes that hazards are proportional. Proportional hazards (PH) implies that 
the hazard ratio of the independent variables do not depend on time. Hence the effect of the 
independent variable should be the same at any time in the analysis. Divergences from the PH 
assumption can lead to biased coefficients and decrease the power of significance test (Box-
Steffenmeiser and Zorn 2001). In order to test whether the PH assumption holds I calculate 
Schoenfeld residuals and check these. The idea is to retrieve the residuals, fit a smooth function 
of time to them, and then test whether there is a relationship (Cleves et al. 2008: 200). When 
doing this I find no indications of violations of the PH assumption. In order to test whether there 
are any influential observations I calculate efficient score residuals. I do find influential 
observations. When controlling for these, the results remain substantially the same.  
5.6 THE ANALYSIS 
Models 1 to 8 in table 5-2 are based on the Cox model. Models 9 to 11 are based on the 
Conditional Elapsed Time model, accounting for repeated events. Column 1 to 5 shows the 
results when using the World Banks’ GDP data. The analysis goes from 1960-2007, and the 
observations with missing GDP data are not included in the analysis. Model 6 to 11 are based on 
Maddison’s (2008) income data. As no observations have missing income data, all are included.  
These data only goes till 2003 and since per capita income and economic growth are given a 2 
and a 1 years lag, the timeframe of the analysis is limited to 2004. Model 7, 8 and 11 includes 
Gates et al. (2006)’s polity variable. For these models the time frame of the analysis is limited to 
the period from 1960 to 2002. 
5.6.1 Does Money Seal The Deal? 
When applying the Cox model the negative effect of per capita income is significant at the 1 and 
5 percent level. The effect increases as we shift from the World Bank’s to Maddison’s data. 
When controlling for regime type there is also an increase in the size and significance of the 
effect. The effect and significance is at its greatest when including all control variables in model 
8. However, when changing to the Conditional Elapsed Time Model, the size of the effect 







In model 10 the effect is significant at the 5 percent level. In model 9 and 11, the significance 
level is reduced to the 10 percent level. As the level of significance is close to 5,57 I argue that the 
analysis supports the thesis that there exists a negative relationship between per capita income 
and post-conflict risk.  
The analysis indicates, as is argued in Breaking The Conflict Trap (Collier et al. 2003), that poor 
countries are not only more likely to experience a civil war in the first place, but when war finally 
comes to an end, peace is also more likely to collapse. Thus risk reducing efforts should be 
inversely proportional to the level of income. One disadvantage with using the Cox Model is that 
it does not include information about when events occur, only the ordering of events (Cleves et 
al. 2008: 145). Consequentially the Cox model is not able to predict when events are likely to 
occur, nor the risk that it will. The Cox model only estimates the effect of the independent 
variables on the hazard rate. 58 The effect can be interpreted through the coefficients in the Table 
5-2. In order to secure continuity with the rest of this analysis I use the Cox estimated model 8 in 
Table 5-2. A coefficient of -0.955 indicates that by increasing PPP adjusted log per capita income 
by one unit, the hazard rate decreases by 61.5 percent. I compare the distribution of per capita 
income, and find that the 25th and 75th percentiles correspond to $1018 and $4100, respectively.59 
Thus increasing per capita income from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile reduces the 
hazard rate by 73.56 percent.60 
The effect of per capita income is illustrated in Figure  5-1, by estimating the cumulative hazard 
function. The cumulative hazard function gives the estimated number of peace collapses before 
time t (Cleves et al. 2008: 13). The control variable economic growth, GDP change during war, 
No UN PKO, UN Expenditures, Population, Neighbour at War, Political Regime and their 
Missing Dummies are all set to their mean value. The blue and pink lines represent situations 
where per capita income is set at their 25th and 75th percentile, respectively. Figure  5-1 shows that 
for any point in time the cumulative hazard function of the 25th percentile is more than twice the 
one of the 75th percentile. Based on this it should be clear that everything else held constant; post-
conflict risk is substantially higher in poor than in middle or high income states.   
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 More precisely, they are significant at the 5.2 and 6.7 percent level.  
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 The hazard rate gives the rate at which peace fails by one year given that the unit had survived until then (Box-
Steffenmeiser and Jones 2004: 14) 
59
 Measured in US 1990 dollars. 
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Figure  5-1 
 
 
5.6.2 Does More Money Seal The Deal? 
As per capita income is negatively related to post-conflict risk, economic growth will in the long 
run reduce risk, by contributing to the level of per capita income. However, as post-conflict risk 
tends to be highest just after war has ended, the crux is often seen as getting through the first 
decade. Consequentially, we need to know whether economic growth by itself reduces post-
conflict risk. As can be seen from Table 5-2, my analysis does not find that economic growth 
reduces post-conflict risk.  
The effect is weak and insignificant in all models. In the Cox models, as expected, when moving 
from the World Bank’s GDP data to Maddison’s PPP adjusted GDP data the negative effect of 
economic growth becomes stronger. The effect almost doubles, and there is also a considerable 
increase in the t-value, -reducing the insignificance of the results. In model 4 and 5 the effect is 
significant at the 20 percent level. Although this is commonly regarded as an insufficient level, 
the level is relatively high compared to the significance level in the other models. This should 
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some best guesses will yield more correct estimates. However, when shifting from the Cox to the 
Conditional Elapsed Time Model, the level of significance is once again reduced.  
Apart from controlling for regime type, controlling for the other independent variables does not 
affect the effect of economic growth to large degree.61 When moving from model 6 to 7, and 10 
to 11, and introducing regime type, the effect of economic growth becomes considerably weaker. 
More strikingly, in model 11 it changes direction, suggesting a positive relationship between 
economic growth and post-conflict risk. This might be due to the time frame of the analysis being 
limited to 1960-2000. However, when running the analysis on these years, and not including 
regime type, results are by and large the same as in model 6 and 10.  In order to test whether there 
is an interaction effect between political regime type and economic growth I divide the 
continuous variable regime type into three categories and create interaction variables. When 
running this model results are highly insignificant. In contrast to what is often assumed this 
analysis does not support the hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between economic 
growth and post-conflict risk. 
5.6.3 Why Are results insignificant? 
The absence of a significant negative relationship between economic growth and post-conflict 
risk has three potential sources. Firstly, it might be that there is no link between economic growth 
and post-conflict risk. If so is the case, there are no reasons not to provide economic growth. 
However, one should be aware that as a risk reducing method in the short run, it is not efficient. 
Secondly, it might be due to disturbances in the data-material. Both battle-deaths and economic 
growth estimates are noisy and uncertain data, - probably beyond what is common in statistical 
analysis. The focus of this analysis has been on post-conflict countries. As civil war is 
predominately a problem of the poor, most of the countries in this analysis have GDP levels 
below average. This makes it harder to estimate the level of GDP per capita and economic 
growth. The certainty of the estimates will always depend on the level of bureaucracy in the 
specific country. As bureaucracies are likely to be less developed in poor post-conflict 
economies, GDP and economic growth estimates will contain higher uncertainties than it would 
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 Regime Type is the only variable generating significant results. Although significant, the effect is estimated to be 
too small to be substantially interesting. Moving from being a highly totalitarian regime to be a highly democratic 
regime only reduces post-conflict risk with 0.11 percent. 
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if the focus was on more developed economies. While estimating the effect of the country is 
difficult, estimating the change from year to year might be even harder.  
A similar argument can be made about the battle-deaths data. These are estimates of the number 
of battle-deaths, and will always contain uncertainties. According to Strand (2006: 147-148) the 
number of battle-deaths might be underreported from specific parts of the world, generating 
systematically too low estimates. Thus a peace period might start one year too early, or end one 
too late. It might also be that a peace collapse is not reported because the battle-deaths estimates 
of the subsequent war do not accumulate to 1,000. This leads us to a possible weakness of the 
definition: Imagine that during the post-conflict peace there is a conflict outbreak causing 900 
battle-deaths. As the number of battle-deaths does not accumulate to 1,000, the peace episode is 
not coded as collapsed. Nevertheless arguing that the peace has in fact collapsed is not 
unreasonable. One can claim that there is a qualitative difference between peace episodes that do 
not include combats and one that does. The solution might be to lower the accumulate part of the 
threshold criterion. As argued in section  3.1.2, if this threshold is lowered too much one risks 
ending up focusing on countries where the armed conflict has not been severe enough to leave the 
country with the typical post-conflict risks. Nevertheless one might consider reducing the 
cumulative part to around 500 instead of 1,000. In addition to this it may be problematic that I 
have mixed Lacina and Gleditsch’ and PRIO-Uppsala’s battle deaths data. I did so because this 
was the only way I could use my preferred definition with exact dates. However, this might lead 
to inconsistencies in the dataset. Based on this it should be clear that it is possible that post-
conflict risk is significantly related to economic growth, but the effect is not detected due to noise 
in the data. 
Thirdly, as was argued in chapter two, the effect of economic growth on post-conflict risk might 
go in both directions. The focus of this analysis has been on testing a correlation expected to go 
in a specific direction, not on testing a theory. One advantage of using testable theories is that 
plausible mechanisms are identified, and based on these indicators, possibly less rough than 
economic growth, are developed. If economic growth decreases post-conflict risk by reducing 
rebel organization’s income opportunities¸ increasing potential soldiers’ opportunity costs and 
state’s intelligence, but also increases post-conflict risk through the size of the possible reward, 
we need indicators that can differentiate between these effects. This can lead to increased insight 
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into what determines post-conflict risk, and hopefully better policy advices in order how to 
reduce risk. In order to get a more nuanced picture of the effect of economic growth on post-
conflict risk it is perhaps an idea to do as Morton (1999) suggests; namely to go back to the 
theoretical drawing board, and develop testable theories  
5.7 CONCLUSION 
In order to analyse the relationship between per capita income and economic growth, and post-
conflict risk, I have changed to what I consider to be a more valid definition of post-conflict 
peace. To avoid biasness caused by missing data I have run the analysis using Maddison’s PPP 
adjusted GDP data. In order to account for repeated events; in the three lasts models I run the 
analysis using the Conditional Elapsed Time Model. Doing this I find that post-conflict risk is 
substantially lower in poor than in middle or high income states. The finding supports the third 
assumption in the Conflict Trap; (1) poor countries are more likely to experience civil war 
outbreak, (2) civil war increases poverty and (3) which again makes poor countries more likely to 
experience a new civil war. Accordingly risk reducing efforts should be inversely proportional to 
the level of per capita income. 
My analysis does not support that economic growth reduces post-conflict risk. Of course in the 
long run it reduces risk by contributing to the level of per capita income. However, in the short 
run, when risk is highest; economic growth is not shown to have a significant impact on post-
conflict risk. The lack of a significant relationship has three possible explanations: (1) there is no 
link between economic growth and post-conflict risk. If so is the case, there are no reasons not to 
provide economic growth. However, one should be aware that as a risk reducing method in the 
short run, it is not efficient. (2) Economic growth reduces post-conflict risk, but noise in the data 
makes us unable to capture the effect. Or (3) as was argued in chapter 2, economic growth might 
work through a whole string of mechanisms, that both increase and decrease post-conflict risk. In 
order to get a more nuanced picture of how economic growth affects post-conflict risk I argue 




In 1972 and 1973 the civil wars in Chad and Chile ended. During the 36 years that have passed 
since then, Chile has experienced nothing but peace. Chad on the other hand has experienced four 
new civil war outbreaks. Although the history of Chad is extreme, post-conflict peace collapse is 
not uncommon. With the acknowledgment of the fragility of the post-conflict peace, several 
researchers have started to focus upon post-conflict risks. The questions being asked concerns 
which post-conflict societies are most at risk of experiencing a peace collapse, and what can be 
done in order to reduce these risks. The idea that economic recovery can reduce post-conflict risk 
has been appreciated by researchers (see: Flores and Nooruddin 2009) as well as the president of 
the World Bank Robert B. Zoellick and the UN (see: Ohiorhenuan and Stewart 2008). In 
accordance with this Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) find that poor countries are more 
likely to experience a peace collapse, and economic growth will effectively reduce risks. These 
findings should have releveance for policy making. Consequentially it is important to know 
whether the findings are robust. In order to test the robustenss I change to the ACD dabase. 
Doing this I find that per capita income is negatively related to post-conflict risks. However, my 
thesis does not supprt that economic growth reduces post-conflict risks. 
6.1 THE FINDINGS 
As there exists little theory on the relationship between economy and post-conflict risk, I start 
chapter two by outlaying the two main theories explaining civil war occurrence in poor countries; 
the opportunity theory and state capacity theory. I argue that the mechanisms inherent in the two 
theories in most situations are likely to be operable in post-conflict societies as well as pre-war 
societies. Both theories lead to the conclusion that post-conflict risk is expected to be higher in 
poor countries. The mechanisms in the opportunity theory implies that economic growth should, 
although it might take some time, exclusively reduce post-conflict risk. In contrast the 
implication of the state capacity theory is that economic growth might increase post-conflict risk 
in the short run by increasing the size of the possible award.  
In chapter three I test the robustness of CHS findings to changes in the database; from COW to 
the Armed Conflict Database (ACD). As I want everything else to be as similar as possible I try 
60 
 
to apply the coding criteria that have been used in COW to the ACD database. Problem is that 
important parts of coding information are missing. Based on Sambanis (2004) and Gleditsch 
(2004) discussion on the COW dataset, I construct eight candidate datasets which I compare with 
CHS’. When running the analysis on the most similar dataset I find that the effect of per capita 
income becomes stronger, and is now significant at the 1 percent level. The effect of economic 
growth becomes weaker, and is now highly insignificant. Accordingly the negative effect of 
economic growth on post-conflict risk is not robust to changes in the database. 
In chapter four I try to explain the change in the effect of economic growth. I argue that the 
change in the effect is most likely to have been caused by (1) differences in the other independent 
variables, (2) differences in the dependent variable, (3) influential observations, (4) 
inconsistencies between COW and CHS (5) differences regarding which conflicts are included in 
COW and ACD or (6) different start and end dates. I find that inconsistencies between COW and 
CHS and differences in which conflicts are included explain parts of the change in the effect. 
However the main change is caused by differences in start and end dates. The sensitivity of the 
result to changes in start and end dates demonstrate the importance of these being set correctly. 
Start and end dates depend on the definition of post-conflict peace and in most cases battle-death 
estimates. This advocates the need for a valid definition of post-conflict peace, and robustness 
tests.  
In chapter five I continue to use the Armed Conflict Dataset, and change to what I consider to be 
a more valid definition of post-conflict peace. In order to better account for missingness I shift to 
Maddison’s (2006) per capita income data. I change to the Conditional Elapsed Time model, to 
better account for repeated events. Doing this I find that per capita income continues to be 
significant, though only at the 10 percent level in two of the models. However, as the significance 
level is close to 5 I argue that my analysis to large degree supports that per capita income is 
negatively related to post-conflict risk. The effect of economic growth continues to be highly 
insignificant, and is even positive in one of the models. I maintain that the lack of a significant 
relationship between economic growth and post-conflict risk can either be due to (1) noise in the 
data, making it hard to capture the effect. (2)  Economic growth affecting post-conflict risk in 
both directions. Or (3) that there does not exist a relationship between the two. In order to get a 
more nuanced picture of the effect of economic growth on post-conflict risk; we need to develop 
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a testable theory, that precisely states through which mechanisms economic growth is expected to 
affect post-conflict risk.  
6.2 IMPLICATIONS OF MY FINDINGS 
My findings indicate that economic growth does not reduce post-conflict risk in the short run. 
Thereagainst, the relationship between per capita income and post-conflict risk seems to be both 
strong and significant. Consequentially in the long run economic growth will reduce post-conflict 
risk by moving the economy from being a low income country to become a middle or high 
income country. However, when conflict has finally come to an end, post-conflict risk tends to be 
exceptionally high. Accordingly the main focus is not on reducing post-conflict risk in the long 
run, but rather on how to get through the first risky decade. The fact that my analysis does not 
support the existence of a significant relationship between economic growth and post-conflict 
risks begs two questions: Firstly, it should make us worry about whether economic growth 
includes some risk increasing elements. This of course does not imply that post-conflict societies 
should be left in poverty. However, one should ask when the appropriate time to promote 
economic growth is, and whether it is possible to avoid the risk increasing elements? Secondly if 
economic growth does not reduce post-conflict risk in the short run, we need to be aware of this 
and keep searching for other risk reducing methods. 
The field has already come a long way with collecting data, even from separate sources. However 
in order to answer questions about the effect of economic growth on post-conflict risk, we need to 
develop testable theories. We need a theory that explicitly states through which mechanisms 
economic growth is expected to affect post-conflict risk. Based on these mechanisms we can 
develop indicators, and test these on the data. Hopefully then we can achieve a better 




7 APPENDIX 1 
Table A-1  CHS’ results as presented in Collier et al (2008: 468-469) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic     
Per capita income  ̶ 0.427 
(1.72) 
 ̶ 0.431 
(1.72) 
 ̶ 0.423 
(1.70) 
 ̶ 0.551 
(2.01)∗ 
Per capita income growth  ̶ 3.548 
(2.21)∗ 
 ̶ 3.716 
(2.29)∗ 
 ̶ 3.613 
(2.24)∗ 
 ̶ 4.184 
(2.37)∗ 

















Regional autonomy  ̶ 1.561 
(1.43) 
 ̶ 1.619 
(1.46) 
 ̶ 1.538 
(1.41) 
 ̶ 1.148 
(0.99) 
Regional autonomy missing (dummy)  ̶ 0.253 
(0.50) 
 ̶ 0.253 
(0.49) 




Election shift  ̶ 0.709 
(1.97)∗ 
   ̶ 0.754 
(2.05)∗ 
1st election   ̶ 0.495 
(0.65) 
  
Year following 1st election  0.997 
(1.70) 
  
Subsequent elections   ̶ 0.318 
(0.42) 
  
Year following sub. elections  0.787 
(1.34) 
  
1st election shift    ̶ 0.820 
(1.72) 
 
Subsequent elections shift    ̶ 0.593 
(1.21) 
 
ln Economic freedom     ̶ 0.336 
(1.19) 
Economic freedom missing (dummy)     ̶ 2.757 
(1.99)∗ 
Social     
ln Diaspora  ̶ 0.333 
(2.82)∗∗ 
 ̶ 0.345 
(2.86)∗∗ 
 ̶ 0.337 
(2.83)∗∗ 
 ̶ 0.259 
(2.10)∗ 








Ethnic diversity  ̶ 1.038 
(1.24) 
 ̶ 1.068 
(1.27) 
 ̶ 1.035 
(1.24) 
 ̶ 1.439 
(1.70) 
Ethnic diversity missing (dummy)  ̶ 15.198 
(0.01) 
 ̶ 14.263 
(0.01) 
 ̶ 14.209 
(0.01) 
 ̶ 16.206 
(0.01) 
Peacekeeping     
ln UN peacekeeping expenditure  ̶ 0.405 
(2.38)∗ 
 ̶ 0.414 
(2.42)∗ 
 ̶ 0.407 
(2.40)∗ 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No UN PKO  ̶ 3.714 
(2.16)∗ 
 ̶ 3.842 
(2.21)∗ 
 ̶ 3.738 
(2.18)∗ 
 ̶ 4.735 
(2.50)∗ 
UN data missing (dummy)  ̶ 3.886 
(2.09)∗ 
 ̶ 3.992 
(2.13)∗ 
 ̶ 3.915 
(2.11)∗ 
 ̶ 4.919 
(2.49)∗ 
 
Time     
Years 4+ of peace  ̶ 0.475 
(1.12) 
 ̶ 0.464 
(1.03) 
 ̶ 0.454 
(1.06) 
 ̶ 0.392 
(0.89) 
Log likelihood  ̶ 66.821  ̶ 66.539  ̶ 66.759  ̶ 63.041 
Number of episodes 74 74 74 74 
Number of failures 33 33 33 33 





Table A-2                              The results when running CHS’ do-file on their dataset 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Per Capita Income -0.392 -0.398 -0.387 -0.544* 
 (-1.57) (-1.58) (-1.56) (-1.97) 
Economic Growth -3.528* -3.709* -3.588* -4.234* 
 (-2.21) (-2.29) (-2.24) (-2.39) 
Democracy 1.287* 1.247* 1.281* 1.557** 
 (2.51) (2.41) (2.49) (2.93) 
Democracy Missing 1.780** 1.750** 1.782** 1.818** 
 (2.69) (2.64) (2.70) (2.75) 
Autonomy -1.543 -1.614 -1.522 -1.114 
 (-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.40) (-0.96) 
Autonomy Missing -0.279 -0.279 -0.267 0.123 
 (-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.52) (0.24) 
Election Shift -0.721*   -0.763* 
 (-1.98)   (-2.06) 
1st election  -0.477   
  (-0.62)   
Year following 1st election  1.012   
  (1.72)   
Subsequent elections  -0.291   
  (-0.38)   
Year following sub. elections  0.832   
  (1.41)   
1st election shift   -0.824  
   (-1.72)  
Subsequent elections shift   -0.611  
   (-1.23)  
ln Economic freedom    -0.342 
    (-1.21) 
Economic freedom missing     -2.869* 
    (-2.07) 
Diaspora -0.342** -0.355** -0.346** -0.261* 
 (-2.88) (-2.92) (-2.89) (-2.10) 
Diaspora Missing 3.497* 3.628* 3.533* 2.610 
 (2.48) (2.53) (2.49) (1.82) 
Ethnic -0.970 -1.007 -0.966 -1.425 
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 (-1.15) (-1.19) (-1.15) (-1.67) 
Ethnic Missing -13.62 -13.70 -13.64 -14.78 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
UN Expenditures -0.409* -0.419* -0.411* -0.486** 
 (-2.42) (-2.46) (-2.43) (-2.67) 
No UN PKO -3.739* -3.877* -3.759* -4.840* 
 (-2.19) (-2.24) (-2.20) (-2.55) 
UN Missing -3.891* -4.006* -3.917* -5.009* 
 (-2.11) (-2.14) (-2.12) (-2.54) 
4+ -0.530 -0.524 -0.511 -0.413 
 (-1.25) (-1.17) (-1.19) (-0.94) 
Constant -6.092* -6.103* -6.145* -1.422 
  (-2.11) (-2.09) (-2.12) (-0.42) 
N 825 825 825 825 






Table A-3      The Effect of Transforming Polity to 3 Categories 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Per Capita Income -0.279 -0.290 -0.277 -0.408 
 (-1.19) (-1.22) (-1.18) (-1.57) 
Economic Growth -4.182** -4.366** -4.253** -4.600** 
 (-2.78) (-2.86) (-2.80) (-2.73) 
Democracy 0.778 0.718 0.774 1.129 
 (1.32) (1.21) (1.32) (1.84) 
Democracy Missing 0.891 0.847 0.891 1.111* 
 (1.87) (1.76) (1.86) (2.25) 
Autonomy -1.557 -1.629 -1.547 -0.986 
 (-1.44) (-1.49) (-1.43) (-0.87) 
Autonomy Missing -0.397 -0.397 -0.380 0.0202 
 (-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.75) (0.04) 
Election Shift -0.705*   -0.734* 
 (-1.96)   (-2.02) 
1st Election  -0.396   
  (-0.52)   
Year following 1st election  1.064   
  (1.83)   
Subsequent elections  -0.276   
  (-0.37)   
Year following sub. elections  0.797   
  (1.35)   
1st election shift   -0.824  
   (-1.72)  
Year following 1st election   -0.580  
   (-1.18)  
ln Economic freedom    -0.314 
    (-1.16) 
Economic Freedom Missing    -2.705* 
    (-2.06) 
Diaspora -0.323** -0.336** -0.326** -0.252* 
 (-2.71) (-2.77) (-2.72) (-2.00) 
Diaspora Missing 3.519* 3.636* 3.548* 2.762 
 (2.46) (2.50) (2.47)   (1.88) 
Ethnic Diversity -0.522 -0.548 -0.518 -0.940 
 (-0.67) (-0.70) (-0.67) (-1.20) 
Ethnic Missing -13.59 -13.99 -13.57 -14.32 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
UN Expenditures -0.355* -0.368* -0.357* -0.410* 
 (-2.01) (-2.06) (-2.02) (-2.16) 
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No UN PKO -3.339 -3.495 -3.353 -4.227* 
 (-1.86) (-1.93) (-1.87) (-2.16) 
UN Missing -3.825* -3.943* -3.845* -4.636* 
 (-1.98) (-2.02) (-1.99) (-2.26) 
4+ -0.592 -0.576 -0.572 -0.529 
 (-1.43) (-1.31) (-1.37) (-1.24) 
Constant -6.771* -6.756* -6.820* -2.792 
 (-2.33) (-2.30) (-2.35) (-0.86) 
N 825 825 825 825 




Table A-4 Column 1 and 4 when election and autonomy variables are excluded 
  (1) (4) 
Per Capita Income -0.340 -0.511 
 (-1.48) (-1.91) 
Economic Growth -3.246* -3.640* 
 (-2.08) (-2.08) 
Democracy 1.349** 1.534** 
 (2.72) (3.06) 
Democracy Missing 1.737** 1.723** 
 (2.73) (2.68) 
Diaspora -0.382** -0.264* 
 (-3.17) (-2.12) 
Diaspora Missing 3.653* 2.587 
 (2.53) (1.78) 
Ethnic Diversity -0.855 -1.342 
 (-1.00) (-1.58) 
Ethnic Missing -13.80 -15.05 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) 
No UN PKO -3.142 -4.386* 
 (-1.78) (-2.35) 
UN Expenditures -0.357* -0.441* 
 (-2.02) (-2.43) 
UN Missing -3.074 -4.372* 
 (-1.64) (-2.27) 
4+ -0.528 -0.333 
 (-1.31) (-0.80) 
Economic Freedom  -0.323 
  (-1.17) 
Freedom Missing  -2.869* 
  (-2.14) 
4+ -0.528 -0.333 
 (-1.31) (-0.80) 
Constant -7.650** -2.255 
  (-2.86) (-0.70) 
N 825 825 









Description in Gleditsch (2004) Mutual ID War starts War Ends 
Dominican Republic COW Dominican Republic vs. Leftists 1 1965 1965 
Dominican Republic ACD 93  1 1965 1965 
Guatemala COW Guatemala vs. Leftists of 1978 2 1978 1984 
Guatemala COW Guatemala vs. Leftists of 1970 2 1970 1971 
Guatemala ACD 36  2 1990 1992 
Guatemala ACD 36  2 1968 1988 
El Salvador COW 
El Salvador vs. Salvadorean Democratic 
Front 3 1979 1992 
El Salvador ACD 120  3 1981 1991 
Nicaragua COW Nicaragua vs. Sandinistas 4 1978 1979 
Nicaragua COW Nicaragua vs. Contras 4 1982 1990 
Nicaragua ACD 140  4 1983 1988 
Nicaragua ACD 140  4 1978 1979 
Colombia COW Colombia vs. M-19/Farc & Drug Lords 5 1984 1993 
Colombia COW Colombia vs. M-19/Farc & Drug Lords 5 1998 2002 
Colombia ACD 92  5 1985 2002 
Peru COW Peru vs. Shining Path 6 1982 1995 
Peru ACD 95  6 1981 1993 
Chile COW Chile vs. Pinochet Led Rebels 7 1973 1973 
Chile ACD 125  7 1973 1973 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) COW Yugoslavia/Serbia vs. Croatians 8 1991 1992 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) ACD 190  8 1991 1991 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) COW Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 9 1998 1999 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) ACD 218  9 1998 1999 
Bosnia and 




Herzegovina ACD 194 
 
10 1992 1995 
Russia COW Russia vs. Chechens 11 1998 2002 
Russia COW Russia vs. Chechens 11 1994 1996 
Russia ACD 206  11 1994 1996 
Russia ACD 206  11 1999 2002 
Georgia COW Georgia vs. Gamsakurdia & Abkaz 12 1991 1994 
Georgia ACD 197  12 1992 1993 
Azerbaijan COW Azerbaijan vs. Nagorno-Karabakh 13 1991 1994 
Azerbaijan ACD 193  13 1992 1994 
Guinea Bissau COW Guinea-Bissãu (1998) 14 1998 1998 
Guinea Bissau ACD 216  14 1998 1999 
Liberia COW Liberia vs. NPFL & ULIMO 15 1992 1995 
Liberia COW Liberia vs. Anti-Doe Rebels 15 1989 1990 
Liberia COW Liberia vs. National Patriotic Forces 15 1996 1996 
Liberia ACD 146  15 2002 2002 
Liberia ACD 146  15 1990 1995 
Sierra Leone COW Sierra Leone vs. RUF 16 1991 1996 
Sierra Leone COW Sierra-Leone (1998-2000) 16 1998 2000 
Sierra Leone ACD 187  16 1994 1996 
Sierra Leone ACD 187  16 1998 1999 
Cameroon ACD 158  17 1960 1960 
Cameroon COW Cameroon (1959-1961) 17 1960 1961 
Nigeria COW Nigeria vs. Biafrans 18 1967 1970 
Nigeria ACD 107  18 1967 1970 
Congo COW Congo vs. Denis Sassou Nguemo 19 1997 1999 
Congo ACD 214  19 1997 1999 
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Uganda COW Uganda vs. National Resistance Army 20 1980 1988 
Uganda ACD 118  20 1978 1991 
Uganda ACD 118  20 1998 2002 
Burundi COW Burundi vs. Hutu of 1993 21 1993 1998 
Burundi COW Burundi vs. Hutu of 1993 21 2000 2002 
Burundi COW Burundi vs. Tutsi Supremacists 21 1991 1992 
Burundi ACD 90  21 1997 2002 
Burundi ACD 90  21 1991 1992 
Rwanda COW Rwanda (2001) 22 2001 2001 
Rwanda COW Rwanda vs. Patriotic Front 23 1994 1994 
Rwanda COW Rwanda (1998) 23 1998 1998 
Rwanda COW Rwanda vs. Tutsi 23 1990 1993 
Rwanda ACD 179  23 1990 1994 
Rwanda ACD 179  23 1997 2001 
Somalia COW Somalia vs. Clan Factions 24 1982 1997 
Somalia ACD 141  24 1988 1996 
Ethiopia COW Ethiopia vs. Tigrean Liberation Front 25 1978 1991 
Ethiopia ACD 70  25 1976 1991 
Ethiopia COW Ethiopia vs. Eritrean Rebels 26 1974 1991 
Ethiopia ACD 78  26 1974 1991 
Angola COW Angola vs. UNITA of 1975 27 1975 1991 
Angola COW Angola vs. UNITA of 1992 27 1998 2001 
Angola COW Angola vs. UNITA of 1992 27 1992 1994 
Angola ACD 131  27 1998 2001 
Angola ACD 131  27 1975 1995 
Mozambique COW Mozambique vs. Renamo 28 1979 1992 
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Mozambique ACD 136  28 1981 1992 
Zimbabwe COW Zimbabwe vs. Patriotic Front 29 1972 1979 
Zimbabwe ACD 122  29 1976 1979 
South Africa COW Namibian 30 1975 1988 
South Africa ACD 101  30 1979 1988 
South Africa COW South Africa (1989-1993) 31 1989 1993 
South Africa ACD 150  31 1985 1988 
Morocco COW Western Sahara 32 1975 1983 
Morocco ACD 135  32 1976 1987 
Algeria COW Algeria vs. Islamic Rebels 33 1992 2000 
Algeria ACD 191  33 1992 2001 
Sudan COW Sudan vs. SPLA-Garang Faction 34 1995 2002 
Sudan COW Sudan vs. SPLA-Garang Faction 34 1983 1992 
Sudan COW Sudan vs. Anya Nya 34 1963 1972 
Sudan ACD 85  34 1963 1972 
Iran COW Iran vs. Anti-Shah Coalition 35 1978 1979 
Iran ACD 144  35 1979 1980 
Iran ACD 143  36 1979 1982 
Iran ACD 143  36 1986 1988 
Iran COW Iran vs. Mujaheddin 36 1981 1982 
Turkey COW Turkey vs. Kurds 37 1991 2002 
Turkey ACD 159  37 1988 1999 
Iraq COW Iraq vs. KDP Kurds 38 1996 1996 
Iraq COW Iraq vs. Kurds of 1974 38 1974 1975 
Iraq COW Iraq vs. Kurds & Shiites 38 1985 1993 
Iraq COW Iraq vs. Kurds of 1961 39 1961 1963 
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Iraq ACD 74  39 1996 1996 
Iraq ACD 74  39 1961 1970 
Iraq ACD 74  39 1973 1991 
Lebanon COW Lebanon vs. Leftists of 1975 40 1975 1990 
Lebanon ACD 63  40 1989 1990 
Lebanon ACD 63  40 1983 1984 
Lebanon ACD 63  40 1976 1976 
Afghanistan COW Afghanistan vs. Mujahedin 41 1978 2001 
Afghanistan ACD 137  41 1978 2001 
Tadsjikistan COW Tadzhikistan vs. Popular Democratic Army 42 1992 1997 
Tadsjikistan ACD 200  42 1992 1995 
India COW India vs. Sikhs & Kashmiris 43 1999 2002 
India COW India vs. Sikhs & Kashmiris 43 1985 1993 
India ACD 156  43 1984 1984 
India ACD 156  43 1986 1993 
India ACD 169  43 1990 2002 
Pakistan COW Pakistan vs. Bengalis 44 1971 1971 
Pakistan ACD 116  44 1971 1971 
Pakistan COW Pakistan vs. Baluchi Rebels 45 1973 1977 
Pakistan ACD 129  45 1974 1977 
Pakistan COW Pakistan vs. Mohajir 46 1994 1995 
Pakistan ACD 209  46 1995 1996 
Sri Lanka COW Sri Lanka (Tamils and JVP) 48 1995 2001 
Sri Lanka COW Sri Lanka (Tamils and JVP) 48 1983 1986 
Sri Lanka COW Sri Lanka vs. Janatha Vimukthi-JVP 48 1971 1971 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) ACD 117  48 1971 1971 
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Sri Lanka (Ceylon) ACD 117  48 1989 1989 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) ACD 157  48 1984 2001 
Thailand COW Thailand vs. Communists 49 1970 1973 
Thailand ACD 43  49 1976 1980 
Cambodia COW Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge of 1978 50 1978 1991 
Cambodia COW Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge of 1993 50 1993 1997 
Cambodia COW Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge of 1970 50 1970 1975 
Cambodia ACD 103  50 1967 1975 
Cambodia ACD 103  50 1978 1998 
Laos COW Laos vs. Pathet Lao of 1963 51 1963 1973 
Laos COW Laos vs. Pathet Lao of  1960 51 1960 1962 
Laos ACD 65  51 1963 1973 
Laos ACD 65  51 1960 1961 
Laos ACD 65  51 1989 1990 
Republic of Vietnam COW Republic of Vietnam vs. NLF 52 1960 1965 
Republic of Vietnam ACD 52  52 1960 1964 
Philippines COW Philippines vs. NPA 53 1972 1992 
Philippines ACD 10  53 1981 1989 
Philippines ACD 10  53 1991 1993 
Philippines COW Philippines vs. Moros 54 1972 1980 
Philippines COW Philippines vs. Moros 54 2000 2001 
Philippines ACD 112  54 1970 1990 
Philippines ACD 112  54 1993 1993 
Philippines ACD 112  54 2000 2002 
Indonesia COW Indonesia vs. Leftists 55 1956 1960 
Indonesia ACD 46  55 1960 1961 
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Indonesia COW East Timor (Fretilin) 56 1975 1977 
Indonesia ACD 134  56 1975 1978 
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8 APPENDIX 2 




*/What happens when I run the CHS analysis with their do-file*/ 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS1.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", replace 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS do-fil.do" 
 
*/How does converting the polity-variable to a three-category variable affect 
the results?*/ 
*/I adjust the polity variable to three categories and merge it into CHS*/ 




run "M:\Master\Battledeaths\comparing battle-deaths.do" 
 
*/I compare the four datasets with CHS*/ 
run "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\sammenlikne datasettene1.do" 
 
*/I run the analysis with criterion 4-bdeadhigh*/ 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Analyse kriterie4-bdeadhig.do" 
 
*/Chapter 4*/ 
*/does excluding the other (not GDP-related) independent variables affect the 
results*/ 
run "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\Drop independent variables.do" 
 
*/From dates till year*/ 
run "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\From dates till years.do" 
 
*/does excluding influential observations affect the results?*/ 
run "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\influential observations.do" 
 
*/removing discrepancies between CHS and COW*/ 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\removing mistakes.do" 
 
*/do the effects differ when only including conflicts that apear in both 
datasets?*/ 
*/with COW's start and end dates*/ 
run "M:\Master\Cummulative\COW\post-conflict felles COW500.do" 
*/with ACD criterion 4 start and end dates*/ 
run "M:\Master\Cummulative\ACD\post-conflict ACD.do" 
 
*/including the excluded groups*/ 
run "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\including the excluded.do" 
 






run "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\Comparing warduration.do" 
 
*/comparing the conflicts that appear in both datasets*/ 
run "M:\Master\Tabell\warduration-enhet stat.do" 
 
*/Chapter 5*/ 
*/I change the cummulative criterion to be 1000 battle-deaths during the span 
of the conflict, but 25 per year. Then I can use the date variables*/ 
run "M:\Master\My own analysis\med datovariabler.do" 
 
 
*/CHS do-file: M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS do-fil.do*/ 
 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
save, replace 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/column 1*/ 
eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  poldum p_m auton auton_m ebox ldiaspc diaspc_m 
ethnic ethnic_m lexpend absent no_un_data d2, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  poldum p_m auton auton_m E1st E1st_1 E2etc 




eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  poldum p_m auton auton_m ebox1st ebox2etc ldiaspc 
diaspc_m ethnic ethnic_m lexpend absent no_un_data d2, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
 
/* ref model with efw added: column 4 */ 
eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  poldum p_m auton auton_m ebox Iefw Iefw_m ldiaspc 
diaspc_m ethnic ethnic_m lexpend absent no_un_data d2, nohr dist(exponential) 
esttab 
esttab using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\replisere CHS med Stata11.rtf", 
replace 
 
*/CHS results w/ a 3 cathegorical polity variable:*/CHS resultatene med 
polity-3kategori.do"*/ 
*/I convert CHS polity variable into three cathegories*/ 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/ I merge in the polity data,- to do that I need a primkey*/ 
run "M:\Master\Nøkler\name til gwno.do" 





merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\Polity.dta", keep 
(politytot polityaut politydem polity polity2) _merge (politymerge) 
tab politymerge 






*/I run the analysis, but use polityaut and politydem instead of using their 
polity variable*/ 
*/ column 1*/ 
eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  politydem polityaut auton auton_m ebox ldiaspc 
diaspc_m ethnic ethnic_m lexpend absent no_un_data d2, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
/* column 2 */ 
eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  politydem polityaut auton auton_m E1st E1st_1 
E2etc E2etc_1 ldiaspc diaspc_m ethnic ethnic_m lexpend absent no_un_data d2, 
nohr dist(exponential) 
 
/* column 3 */ 
eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  politydem polityaut auton auton_m ebox1st 
ebox2etc ldiaspc diaspc_m ethnic ethnic_m lexpend absent no_un_data d2, nohr 
dist(exponential) 
 
/* ref model with efw added: column 4 */ 
eststo: streg lpcgdp_2 dy_1  politydem polityaut auton auton_m ebox Iefw 
Iefw_m ldiaspc diaspc_m ethnic ethnic_m lexpend absent no_un_data d2, nohr 
dist(exponential) 
esttab 
esttab using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\changingthepolityvar.rtf", replace 
save, replace 
 
*/Lacina & Gle. vs. ACD: "M:\Master\Battledeaths\comparing battle-deaths.do"*/ 
*/I open Lacina and Gleditsch' data*/ 
use "M:\Master\Battledeaths\Battledeaths.dta", clear 




*/I open Uppsala-Prio's*/ 
use "M:\Master\Battledeaths\UCD-Prios battle-deaths.dta", clear 
gen idprimkey=(conflictid*10000)+year 
sort idprimkey 
merge idprimkey using "M:\Master\Battledeaths\Battledeaths.dta", keep( 
bdeadhig bdeadbes bdeadlow) 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
 
*/how much do they correlate?*/ 
corr  bdlow bdeadlow 
corr bdbest bdeadbes 
corr  bdhigh bdeadhig 
 
reg  bdlow bdeadlow 
reg bdbest bdeadbes 
reg  bdhigh bdeadhig 
clear all 
 
*/ I construct and compare the 8 candidate datasets with CHS: 
"M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\sammenlikne datasettene1.do"*/ 




run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 1.do" 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 2.do" 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadlow.do" 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadbest.do" 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\kriterie 3, bdeadhig.do" 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4 bdeadlow.do" 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadbest.do" 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\criterie 4, bdeadhig.do" 
 







*/I test how the country years match with CHS'*/ 
*/criterion 1*/ 


















*/criterion 3 bdeadlow*/ 

















*/criterion 3 bdeadhig*/ 










*/criterion 4 bdeadlow*/ 








*/criterion 4 bdeadbest*/ 








*/criterion 4 bdeadhigh*/ 









*/To test how many of states are the same I prefer having one obs pr state*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert år.dta", 
replace 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 





use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 1, del 2.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\Kriterie1.dta", replace 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 




use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 2, del 2.dta", clear 
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save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\Kriterie 2.dta", replace 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 




use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadlow_del2.dta", clear 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 
år.dta", _merge (gwnomerge) 
tab gwnomerge 
 
*/criterion 3 bdeadbes*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadbest_del2.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\kriterie 3-best.dta", replace 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 
år.dta", _merge (gwnomerge) 
tab gwnomerge 
 
*/criterion 3 bdeadhig*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\kriterie 3-high.dta", replace 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 
år.dta", _merge (gwnomerge) 
tab gwnomerge  
 
*/criterion 4 bdeadlow*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadlow_del2.dta", clear 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 
år.dta", _merge (gwnomerge) 
tab gwnomerge  
 
*/criterion 4 bdeadbest*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadbest_del2.dta", clear 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 




merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 
år.dta", _merge (gwnomerge) 
tab gwnomerge  
 
*/criterion 4 bdeadhigh*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\gwno-match\CHS-kun en obs hvert 
år.dta", _merge (gwnomerge) 
tab gwnomerge  
clear all 
 
*/criterion 1*:"M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 1.do"*/ 
insheet using "M:\Master\Sources\MainConflictTable.csv", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 1.dta", replace 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\del 1 fokus stat.do" 
 
*/Only the conflict years that scores 2 on the intensity variable are of 
interest*/ 




by primkey: gen dobbel=_n 
drop if dobbel>1 
drop dobbel 




*/I expand the dataset; each post-conflict year has one obs*/ 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 1, del 2.dta", replace 
sort gwno 
drop n 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
drop n 
 
keep  gwno year  
expandcl 43, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace n=n-1 
replace year=year+n 
drop if year>2002 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+year 




merge primkey using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 1.dta", keep (location 







*/fill in the gaps*/ 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Del 4, fokus stat.do" 
save, replace 
 
*/Criterion 2: "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 2.do"*/ 
insheet using "M:\Master\Sources\MainConflictTable.csv", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 2.dta", replace 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\del 1 fokus stat.do" 
 
*/Only the conflict years that scores 2 on the intensity variable are of 
interest*/ 
keep if intensity==2 
 




*/I expand the dataset; each post-conflict year has one obs*/ 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 2, del 2.dta", replace 
sort gwno 
drop n 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
drop if n>1 
drop n 
 
keep  gwno year  
expandcl 43, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace n=n-1 
replace year=year+n 
drop if year>2002 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+year 




merge primkey using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 2.dta", keep (location 





*/Del 4: Fill the Gaps*/ 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Del 4, fokus stat.do" 
save, replace 
 
*/KRITERIE 3-bdeadlow: M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadlow.do */ 
insheet using "M:\Master\Sources\MainConflictTable.csv", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadlow.dta", replace 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\del 1 fokus stat.do" 
 
*/I generate a warperiod variable; the war must accumulate to more than 1,000 
battle-deaths during subsequent active years. A year is active as long as 





*/I merge in Lacina and Gleditsch battle-deaths dataset*/ 
run "M:\Master\Missing\Battle-death with no missing GDP.do" 
drop if bdeadlow<100 
 
*/WARPERIOD*/ 
*/Based on the obs included I generate a warperiod variable*/ 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\War-Period, kriterie 3.do" 
 
*/TOTALT ANTALL BATTLE-DEATHS*/ 
*/I generate a bdeadlowsum telling how many dies during the period*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod: egen bdeadlowsum = sum(bdeadlow) 
 
*/I drop conflict years accumulating to less than 1000 during subsequent 
active conflict years*/ 
drop if bdeadlowsum<1000 
 
*/CHS do not differ between different conflicts within the same country. Thus 
it is not necessary to include two conflict years from the same countryd i 
samme land på samme sted*/ 
replace bdeadlowsum=bdeadlowsum*-1 
sort primkey bdeadlowsum 
by primkey: gen dobbel=_n 




*/after deleting several of the observations the warperiod variable I have 
does not work anymore. Thus I have to generate a new one*/ 
drop add2 firstyear warmissing2 warmissing n warperiod 




save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadlow_del2.dta", replace 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 




keep  gwno year  
expandcl 43, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace n=n-1 
replace year=year+n 
drop if year>2002 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+year 







merge primkey using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 3, bdeadlow.dta", keep 
(warperiod location firstwaryear lastwaryear peacends peacecensored warperiod) 





*/Fill the Gaps*/ 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Del 4, fokus stat.do" 
save, replace 
 
*/Criterion 3-bdeadbest and bdeadhigh are constructed the exact same way, but 
instead of using the low battle-deaths estimate I use the best and high. 
Criterion 4-low-best and high are constructed after the same model, but 
conflict years with less that 500 battle-deaths are droped, instead of less 
than 100*/ 
 
*/ Part 1: focus state: "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\del 1 fokus stat.do"*/ 
*/Preparing the dataset*/ 
*/I remove all obs that are not civil conflicts*/ 
keep if type>=3 
 
*/I remove all obs before 1960*/ 
drop if year<1960 
 
*/I remove all obs after 2002*/ 
drop if year>2002 
 
*/I remove Hyderabad*/ 
drop if id==19 
save, replace 
 





rename gwnoa gwno 









merge id using "M:\Master\Helga\keepiftype=3.dta", keep(sideb)_merge 
(sidebmerge) 
tab sidebmerge 
drop if sidebmerge==2 
 
*/This leads to a few doble obs which must be removed*/ 
sort idprimkey 
by idprimkey: gen n=_n 
tab n 




*/I generate a warperiod variable: "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\del 2, kriterie 
1.do"*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen nextyear2=year[_n-1] 
replace nextyear2=1960 if nextyear2==. 
gen nextyear=year-nextyear2 
replace nextyear=100 if nextyear==1 
replace nextyear=0 if nextyear<100 
replace nextyear=1 if nextyear==100 
label var nextyear "krigen er aktiv kontinuerlig" 
save, replace 
 
sort gwno year 
gen samecountry2=gwno[_n-1] 
replace samecountry=1 if samecountry2==. 
gen samecountry=samecountry2-gwno 
replace samecountry=10000 if samecountry==0 
replace samecountry=0 if samecountry<10000 
replace samecountry=1 if samecountry==10000 




*/I generate a counting variable based on war2*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen warperiod = 1 
replace warperiod = _n if war2 != war2[_n-1] 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if war2 == war2[_n-1] 
list war2 warperiod 
 
*/The warperiod variable does not succeed in differentiating between all 
warperiods; I therefore have to add some numbers*/ 
replace war2=5 if war2==0 
 
*/I identify the waryear in a period that lasts min two years*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen warsum2=war2[_n+1] 
replace warsum2=5 if warsum2==. 
gen ws3=warsum2+war2 
gen firstyear=ws3+war2 
replace firstyear=50 if firstyear==11 
replace firstyear=0 if firstyear<50 
replace firstyear=1 if firstyear==50 
 
*/I generate a variable that identifies singelwars that follow singelwars,- 
conflict periods that only last one year*/ 
gen warsumII=war2[_n-1] 
replace warsumII=1 if warsumII==. 
gen warsumIII=war2[_n+1] 
replace warsumIII=1 if warsumIII==. 
gen middle=warsumII+warsumIII+war2 
replace middle=100 if middle==15 
replace middle=0 if middle<100 
replace middle=1 if middle==100 
 
*/I generate a counting variable based on warperiod*/ 
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sort warperiod  
by warperiod: gen n2=_n 
replace n2=n2-1 if middle==1 
gen add2=0 
replace add2=n2 if firstyear==1 
replace add2=n2 if middle==1 
generate Warperiod=warperiod+add2 
*/Each of the warperiods have their unique number*/ 
drop  middle n2 nextyear2 nextyear samecountry2 samecountry warsum2 war2 ws3 
warsumII warsumIII warperiod 
rename Warperiod warperiod 
save, replace 
 
*/I generate a variable telling which year was the last one in the period*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod:  egen lastwaryear = max(year)  
label var lastwaryear "siste året med krig i denne warperiod" 
 
*/I generate a variable telling which year was the first in the period*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod:  egen firstwaryear = min(year)  
label var firstwaryear "første året med krig i denne warperiod" 
 
*/I generate a dummy telling whether the obs was the last one in the period*/ 
gen dumlastwaryear=lastwaryear-year 
replace dumlastwaryear=500 if dumlastwaryear==0 
replace dumlastwaryear=0 if dumlastwaryear<=50 
replace dumlastwaryear=1 if dumlastwaryear==500 
 
*/I drop all obs that are not the last on in the warperiod*/ 
drop if dumlastwaryear==0 
 
*/I generate a variable which tells when peace ends*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen samecountry2=gwno[_n+1] 
gen samecountry=samecountry2-gwno 
replace samecountry=500 if samecountry==0 
replace samecountry=0 if samecountry<499 
replace samecountry=1 if samecountry==500 
label var samecountry "Dummy 1=krigen foregår i samme land som neste obs" 
drop samecountry2 
 
*/I generate a variable which tells whether peace ends this year*/ 
gen peacends=firstwaryear[_n+1] 
replace peacends=peacends*samecountry 
label var peacends "=0 betyr at freden varer til 2002" 
 
*/Is the peace right censored?*/ 
gen peacecensored=1 
replace peacecensored=0 if peacends>0 
label var peacecensored "Dummy 1=freden er høyresensurert" 
 
*/I remove the wars that lasts til 2002. They do not generate any post-
conflict episode in the dataset. If they involve that a peace period ends I 
have the necessary information*/ 
drop if year==2002 





by wp: gen nn=_n 
drop wp 
drop warperiod 




*/Filling the gaps: "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Del 4, fokus stat.do"*/ 
*/Del 4; Fill the gaps*/ 
*/Hasd merging led to any doble obs?*/ 
sort primkey 
by primkey: gen n=_n 
tab n 
 
*/To keep things in order*/ 
rename warperiod pcperiod 
 
*/after sorting on gwno and year the gap shall have the same value as the 
first non-missing value above*/ 
sort gwno year 
replace pcperiod = pcperiod[_n-1] if missing(pcperiod) 
replace peacecensored= peacecensored[_n-1] if missing(peacecensored) 
replace peacends = peacends[_n-1] if missing(peacends) 
replace firstwaryear = firstwaryear[_n-1] if missing(firstwaryear) 
replace lastwaryear = lastwaryear[_n-1] if missing(lastwaryear) 
replace location = location[_n-1] if missing(location) 
save, replace 
 
*/War number 2-3-4 are included in the dataset, I identify and drop these*/ 
gen exclude=peacends 
gen D=year-exclude 
replace exclude=0 if D<0 
drop if exclude>0 
drop exclude D 
save, replace 
 
*/I generate a duration variable telling how long peace has lasted. Just like 
CHS (though they do it in days) the peace is counted as having lated 1 year 
when peace starts*/ 
sort pcperiod 
by pcperiod: gen pduration=_n 
 
*/Does peace end this year?*/ 
gen peacefailed=year-peacends 
replace peacefailed=-500 if peacefailed==-1 
replace peacefailed=0 if peacefailed>-500 
replace peacefailed=1 if peacefailed==-500 
save, replace 
 
*/I identify the year peace ends*/ 
gen lastpyeardum=peacends-year 
replace lastpyeardum=9999 if lastpyeardum==1 
replace lastpyeardum=0 if lastpyeardum<9999 






*/The obs missing GDP data are removed*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\GDP\GDP Capita WorldBank.dta", keep( logGDPCap2  
gdpgrowth1) 
drop if _merge==2 
drop _merge 
 
*/All peace years of Iraq are excluded, I believe it is due to the fact that 
GDP data are missing the year peace ends, and not only in the beginning*/ 
drop if gwno==645 
drop if logGDPCap2==. 
drop if gdpgrowth1==. 
 
*/Part 2 criterion 2: Peace must last 2 years at least in order to start*/ 
*/"M:\Master\Replicating CHS\del 2, kriterie 2.do"*/ 
 
*/As CHS does not differ between different conflicts in the state doble obs 
are unnecessary*/ 




by primkey: gen dobbel=_n 
drop if dobbel>1 
drop dobbel 
 
*/I generate a warperiod variable based on criterion 2*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen nextyear2=year[_n-1] 
replace nextyear2=1950 if nextyear2==. 
gen nextyear=year-nextyear2 
replace nextyear=100 if nextyear==1 
replace nextyear=100 if nextyear==2 
replace nextyear=0 if nextyear<100 
replace nextyear=1 if nextyear==100 
 
sort gwno year 
gen samecountry2=gwno[_n-1]  
replace samecountry2=1 if samecountry2==. 
gen samecountry=samecountry2-gwno 
replace samecountry=10000 if samecountry==0 
replace samecountry=0 if samecountry<10000 




*/I generate a counting variable based on war2*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen warperiod2 = 1 
replace warperiod2 = _n if war2 != war2[_n-1] 
replace warperiod2 = warperiod2[_n-1] if war2 == war2[_n-1] 
list war2 warperiod2 
 
*/I must add some inf. for this one to be correct*/ 




*/I identify the conflict year that is the first on in a period that lasts at 
least 2 years*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen warsum2=war2[_n+1] 
replace warsum2=1 if warsum2==. 
gen ws3=warsum2+war2 
gen firstyear=ws3+war2 
replace firstyear=50 if firstyear==11 
replace firstyear=0 if firstyear<50 
replace firstyear=1 if firstyear==50 
 
*/I generate a variable identifying singelyears that follow singelyears*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen warsumII=war2[_n-1] 
replace warsumII=1 if warsumII==. 
gen warsumIII=war2[_n+1] 
replace warsumIII=1 if warsumIII==. 
gen middle=warsumII+warsumIII+war2 
replace middle=100 if middle==15 
replace middle=0 if middle<100 
replace middle=1 if middle==100 
 
*/I generate a counting variable based on warperiod2*/ 
sort warperiod2  
by warperiod2: gen n2=_n 
replace n2=n2-1 if middle==1 
gen add2=0 
replace add2=n2 if firstyear==1 
replace add2=n2 if middle==1 
generate warperiod=warperiod2+add2 
*/Each of the warperiod have their uniqe number*/ 
drop  middle n2 nextyear2 nextyear samecountry2 samecountry warsum2 war2 ws3 
warsumII warsumIII warperiod2 
save, replace 
 
*/I generate a variable telling which year is the last in the warperiod*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod:  egen lastwaryear = max(year)  
label var lastwaryear "siste året med krig i denne warperiod2" 
 
*/I generate a variable telling which year is the first in the warperiod*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod:  egen firstwaryear = min(year)  
label var firstwaryear "første året med krig i denne warperiod-en" 
 
*/Is the obs the last in the warperiod?*/ 
gen dumlastwaryear=lastwaryear-year 
replace dumlastwaryear=500 if dumlastwaryear==0 
replace dumlastwaryear=0 if dumlastwaryear<=50 
replace dumlastwaryear=1 if dumlastwaryear==500 
 
*/drop all ons that do not take place the last warperiod year*/ 
drop if dumlastwaryear==0 
 
*/Dummy: When does peace end?*/ 





replace samecountry=500 if samecountry==0 
replace samecountry=0 if samecountry<499 
replace samecountry=1 if samecountry==500 
label var samecountry "Dummy 1=krigen foregår i samme land som neste obs" 
drop samecountry2 
 
*/Which year is the last*/ 
gen peacends=firstwaryear[_n+1] 
replace peacends=peacends*samecountry 
label var peacends "=0 peace lasts til 2002" 
 
*/Is the peacepåeriod rightcensored?*/ 
gen peacecensored=1 
replace peacecensored=0 if peacends>0 
 
*/ I remove all conflicts that lasts till 2002. I already have the necessary 
inf.*/ 
drop if year==2002 
 
*/I give the warperiod variable lower values*/ 
gen wp=0 
sort wp 
by wp: gen nn=_n 
drop wp 
drop warperiod 




*/ Battle-deaths: "M:\Master\Missing\Battle-death with no missing GDP.do"*/ 
*/Battle-deaths*/ 
 
*/As Uppsala Prio do not provide exact battle-death data I have to use the 
numbers provided by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005)*/ 




merge idprimkey using "M:\Master\Battledeaths\Battledeaths.dta", keep 
(bdeadlow bdeadhig bdeadbes year gwno id) _merge(battlemerge)      
tab battlemerge 
drop if battlemerge==2 
save, replace 
 
*/Unfortunately there are 54 bdeadhig, 101 bdeadbbest and 54 bdeadlow missing 
values*/ 
 
*/I use the intensity variable of Uppsala-Prio. If this one scores 2, there 
have been more than 1,000 battle-deaths this year.*/ 
*/Thus if bdeadbest or bdeadhig is missing and this one scores 2 I replace the 
missing value with 1000*/ 
 
gen warmissing=1 if bdeadbes==. 
replace warmissing=0 if intensity==1 




gen warmissing2=1 if bdeadhig==. 
replace warmissing2=0 if intensity==1 
replace bdeadhig=1000 if warmissing2==1 
 
gen warmissing3=1 if bdeadlow==. 
replace warmissing3=0 if intensity==1 
replace bdeadlow=1000 if warmissing3==1 
 
*/The problem is reduced to 34(bdeadhig and bdeadlow) and 81*/ 
*/For the 47 bdeadbest that are only missing in bdeadbes and not in bdeadhig 
or bdeadlow I take the mean of bdeadlow and bdeadhig and give it to 
bdeadbest*/ 
gen bdeadmean=(bdeadhig+bdeadlow)/2 
replace bdeadbes = bdeadmean if bdeadbes==. 
 
*/There are now 34 missing values in both datasets*/ 
*/If missing values (max 3) appear in the middle of a conflict period(the none 
missing values must accumulate to more than 500) I replace missingness with 
500. If not I replace it with 25*/ 
replace bdeadlow=500 if idprimkey==1181980 
replace bdeadbes=500 if idprimkey==1181980 
replace bdeadhig=500 if idprimkey==1181980 
 
replace bdeadlow=500 if idprimkey==1131993 
replace bdeadbes=500 if idprimkey==1131993 
replace bdeadhig=500 if idprimkey==1131993 
 
replace bdeadlow=500 if idprimkey==1131994 
replace bdeadbes=500 if idprimkey==1131994 
replace bdeadhig=500 if idprimkey==1131994 
 
*/The 31 lasts are replaced by 25*/ 
replace bdeadlow=25 if bdeadlow==. 
replace bdeadbes=25 if bdeadbes==. 
replace bdeadhig=25 if bdeadhig==. 
 
*/WAR-PERIOD: M:\Master\Replicating CHS\War-Period, kriterie 3.do */ 
sort gwno id year 
gen nextyear2=year[_n-1] 
replace nextyear2=1950 if nextyear2==. 
gen nextyear=year-nextyear2 
replace nextyear=100 if nextyear==1 
replace nextyear=0 if nextyear<100 
replace nextyear=1 if nextyear==100 
label var nextyear "krigen er aktiv kontinuerlig" 
save, replace 
 
sort gwno id year 
gen sameid2=id[_n-1] 
replace sameid2=1 if sameid2==. 
gen sameid=sameid2-id 
replace sameid=10000 if sameid==0 
replace sameid=0 if sameid<10000 
replace sameid=1 if sameid==10000 





*/I generate a counting variable based on war2*/ 
sort gwno id year 
gen warperiod = 1 
replace warperiod = _n if war2 != war2[_n-1] 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if war2 == war2[_n-1] 
list war2 warperiod 
 
*/I must add some inf*/ 
replace war2=5 if war2==0 
 
*/Which is the first waryear in a period that lasts a min of 2 year*/ 
sort gwno id year 
gen warsum2=war2[_n+1] 
replace warsum2=5 if warsum2==. 
gen ws3=warsum2+war2 
gen firstyear=ws3+war2 
replace firstyear=50 if firstyear==11 
replace firstyear=0 if firstyear<50 
replace firstyear=1 if firstyear==50 
 
*/I generate a variable that identifies single waryears that follows 
singlewaryears*/ 
gen warsumII=war2[_n-1] 
replace warsumII=1 if warsumII==. 
gen warsumIII=war2[_n+1] 
replace warsumIII=5 if warsumIII==. 
gen middle=warsumII+warsumIII+war2 
replace middle=100 if middle==15 
replace middle=0 if middle<100 
replace middle=1 if middle==100 
 
*/I generate a coutning variable based on warperiod*/ 
sort warperiod  
by warperiod: gen n2=_n 
replace n2=n2-1 if middle==1 
gen add2=0 
replace add2=n2 if firstyear==1 
replace add2=n2 if middle==1 
generate Warperiod=warperiod+add2 
*/Each warperiod has its own unique number*/ 
drop  middle n2 nextyear2 nextyear sameid2 sameid warsum2 war2 ws3 warsumII 
warsumIII warperiod 




*/Comparing the results to CHS: "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Analyse kriterie4-
bdeadhig.do"*/ 
 
*/I run the same analysis as CHS. To the extent that it is possible I make use 
of the same variables*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
 






*/This time I do it identical to CHS, at least how they described it in their 
article*/ 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\Polity.dta", keep(polity) 
tab _merge 
drop if _merge==2 
drop _merge 
 
*/I tarnsform it into a dummy variable equivalent to CHS*/ 
capture drop poldum 
gen poldum=0 if polity>=-10 & polity<=-6 
replace poldum=1 if polity>=-5 
replace poldum=0 if polity<=-66 
 
capture drop p_m 
gen p_m=1 if polity<=-66 




*/I collect the diaspora data from the US, divide it on the pop number and log 
transform them*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\Diaspora.dta", keep 
(logdiaspop) _merge (diasporamerge) 
tab diasporamerge 
drop if diasporamerge==2 
drop diasporamerge 
 
*/I generate a logdiaspora missing variable*/ 
gen diaspora_m=1 if logdiaspop==. 
replace diaspora_m=0 if diaspora_m==. 
 
*/I give the logdiaspora missing value the value 0 if data are not missing*/ 
replace logdiaspop=0 if logdiaspop==. 
 
*/Has merging led to any double observations?*/ 
save, replace 
gen x=1 
collapse (count) x, by(primkey) 
drop if x==1 
list 
clear all 
*/Det er ingen doble obs*/ 
 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
 
*/Has the peace episode lasted four years?*/ 
gen plussfour=1 if pduration>=5 









drop if UNmerge==2 
 
gen noUNpeaceop=1 if  UNpeaceop==. 
replace noUNpeaceop=0 if UNpeaceop==1 
*/UNexp er gjort om til en logit variabel*/ 
gen lUNexp = log(UNexp) 
 
*/UNexp missing*/ 
gen UNexp_m=0 if noUNpeaceop==1 
replace UNexp_m=UNexp if noUNpeaceop==0 
replace UNexp_m=-5 if UNexp_m==. 
replace UNexp_m=0 if UNexp_m>0 
replace UNexp_m=1 if UNexp_m==-5 
drop UNpeaceop UNmerge UNexp 




*/This is supposed to be logit transformed, but a short look at CHS data shows 
that it has not been*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\ecofreedom.dta", keep 
(iecofreedom) _merge(ecofreemerge) 
tab ecofreemerge 




gen ecofree_m=1 if iecofreedom==. 
replace ecofree_m=0 if ecofree_m==. 




use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
 
*/This variable only has one observation per country; I therefore use gwno to 
merge it in*/ 
sort gwno 
merge gwno using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\Ethnic.dta", keep(ethnic) 
_merge(ethnicmerge) 
tab ethnicmerge 




gen ethnic_m=1 if ethnic==. 
replace ethnic_m=0 if ethnic_m==. 
replace ethnic=0 if ethnic_m==1 
 
*/Has merging datasets led to any doble observation*/ 
save, replace 
gen x=1 
collapse (count) x, by(primkey) 





*/Det er ingen doble obs*/ 
 
 
*/As I lack two of the independent variable groups I start by running the 
analysis on CHS but excluding the variables I am missing in every second 
column*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
 
*/In order to be able to compare results in the same model I give CHS the same 
names as mine*/ 
rename lpcgdp_2 logGDPCap2 
rename dy_1 gdpgrowth1 
rename Iefw iecofreedom 
rename Iefw_m ecofree_m 
rename lexpend lUNexp 
rename no_un_data UNexp_m 
rename absent noUNpeaceop 
rename d2 plussfour 
rename ldiaspc logdiaspop 
rename diaspc_m diaspora_m 
save, replace 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/column 1*/ 
*/With all of the variables*/ 
eststo:streg  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m auton auton_m ebox logdiaspop 
diaspora_m  ethnic ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop plussfour, nohr 
dist(exponential) 
*/Without the variables I am missing*/ 
eststo:streg  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m logdiaspop diaspora_m  ethnic 
ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
esttab 





use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/with*/ 
eststo:streg  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m auton auton_m E1st E1st_1 E2etc 
E2etc_1 logdiaspop diaspora_m  ethnic ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop 
plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
*/without*/ 
eststo:streg  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m logdiaspop diaspora_m  ethnic 
ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
esttab 




use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 





eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m auton auton_m ebox1st ebox2etc 




eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m logdiaspop diaspora_m  ethnic 
ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
esttab 




use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/with*/ 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m auton auton_m ebox iecofreedom 
ecofree_m logdiaspop diaspora_m  ethnic ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop 
plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
*/without*/ 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m  iecofreedom ecofree_m 




esttab using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\replisere CHS med CHS4.rtf", replace 
 
*/I run the analysis (without the data I am missing) on my dataset as well. 
This gives us only two different models*/ 
 
*/column 1*/ 
*/my dataset -CHS' model 1 without election and autonomy data*/ 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
*/I start by stsetting the dataset*/ 
stset  pduration, id(pcperiod) f( peacefailed) 
save, replace 
eststo: streg  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m logdiaspop  diaspora_m  ethnic 
lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
*/CHS dataset -CHS' model 1 without election and autonomy data 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
save, replace 
eststo:streg  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m logdiaspop diaspora_m  ethnic 
ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
*/column 3*/ 
*/my dataset -CHS' model 4 without election and autonomy data*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
98 
 
eststo: streg  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m iecofreedom ecofree_m 




*/CHS' dataset -CHS' model 4 without election and autonomy data*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 poldum p_m  iecofreedom ecofree_m 
logdiaspop diaspora_m  ethnic ethnic_m lUNexp UNexp_m noUNpeaceop plussfour, 
nohr dist(exponential) 
esttab 
esttab using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\replisere CHS med kriterie4-
bdeadhigminedataog1.rtf", replace 
 
*/ Drop the other independent variables: "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\Drop 
independent variables.do"*/ 
*/Chapter 4: why do results differ?*/ 
clear all  
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
 
*/I introduce the poldum, economic freedom, gdp per capita and economic growth 
variables that I have collected*/ 
sort primkey 
 
*/ ECONOMIC FREEDOM*/ 
rename iecofreedom  iecofreedomCHS 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\ecofreedom.dta", keep 
(iecofreedom) _merge (efreemerge) 
tab efreemerge 
drop if efreemerge==2 
replace iecofreedom = 0 if efreemerge==1 





rename poldum poldumCHS 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\Polity.dta", keep(polity) 
tab _merge 
drop if _merge==2 
drop _merge 
 
*/I have to tranfer it to a polity-dummy variable, likewise CHS'*/ 
gen poldum=0 if polity>=-10 & polity<=-6 
replace poldum=1 if polity>=-5 
replace poldum=0 if polity<=-66 
 
corr poldum poldumCHS 
clear all 
 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
*/I  have to give their GDP variables different names to seperate them*/ 
rename logGDPCap2 logGDPCap2CHS 





merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\GDPcapita World Bank.dta", 
keep( logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1) _merge(ecomerge) 
tab ecomerge 
drop if ecomerge==2 
 
corr logGDPCap2  logGDPCap2CHS 
corr gdpgrowth1 gdpgrowth1CHS 
reg logGDPCap2  logGDPCap2CHS 
reg gdpgrowth1 gdpgrowth1CHS 
save, replace 
 
*/column 1 CHS*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 3, criterion 4 bdeadhigh*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\Kriterie 4, bdeadhig del2.dta", clear 
stset pduration, id(pcperiod) f(peacefailed) 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 4*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
esttab 




*/running the analysis with their GDP data*/ 
*/column 1 CHS*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear  
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2CHS gdpgrowth1CHS plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1CHS plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/setting the GDP data to missing for Serbia & Montenegro for 1995-2000*/ 
replace logGDPCap2CHS=. if primkey==3451995 
replace logGDPCap2CHS=. if primkey==3451996 
replace logGDPCap2CHS=. if primkey==3451997 
replace logGDPCap2CHS=. if primkey==3451998 
replace logGDPCap2CHS=. if primkey==3451999 
replace logGDPCap2CHS=. if primkey==3452000 
 
replace gdpgrowth1CHS=. if primkey==3451995 
replace gdpgrowth1CHS=. if primkey==3451996 
replace gdpgrowth1CHS=. if primkey==3451997 
replace gdpgrowth1CHS=. if primkey==3451998 
replace gdpgrowth1CHS=. if primkey==3451999 







eststo: streg logGDPCap2CHS gdpgrowth1CHS plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 4*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1CHS plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
esttab 
esttab using "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\GDPdata2.rtf", replace 
clear all 
 
*/From days till years:"M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\From dates till years.do"*/ 
*/From dates till years*/ 
 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
 
*/column 1*/ 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
sort warnumb year 
by warnumb: gen peaceduration=_n 
stset peaceduration, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
 
*/column 3*/ 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 4*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
esttab 









use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS.dta", clear 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
save, replace 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/column 1*/ 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\CHS rettet opp i feil3.dta", clear 







rename logGDPCap2 logGDPCap2CHS 
rename gdpgrowth1 gdpgrowth1CHS 
 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\GDPcapita World Bank.dta", 
keep(gdpgrowth1 logGDPCap2) _merge(gdpmerge) 
tab gdpmerge 
drop if gdpmerge==2 
 
capture drop plussfour 
gen plussfour=1 if pdur>= 1825 
replace plussfour=0 if plussfour==. 
 
stset pdur, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
 
*/column 3*/ 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
*/column 4*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
*/from dates til year*/ 
sort warnumb year 
by warnumb: gen pduration=_n 
stset pduration, id(warnumb) f(pcens) 
 
*/column 5*/ 
eststo: streg logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
 
*/column 6*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist(exponential) 
esttab  
esttab using "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\removing smallerrors.rtf", replace 
 
*/Does the effect differ when only including the conflicts that appear in both 
datasets?: run "M:\Master\Cummulative\COW\post-conflict felles COW500.do"*/ 
 
*/Comparing the post-conflict periods that are generated by conflict that 
appear in both datasets. Start and end dates are the same as in ACD*/ 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Cummulative\COW\felles COW ingen doble.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\post-conflict:felles COW", replace 
 
rename firstwaryear warstarts 
rename lastwaryear peacestarts 
 
*/I identify when the peace ends*/ 
sort gwno warstarts 
gen peacends=warstarts[_n+1] 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==. 
 
gen samegwno=gwno[_n+1] 
replace samegwno=1000 if samegwno==. 
replace samegwno=samegwno-gwno 
replace samegwno=50000 if samegwno==0 
replace samegwno= 0 if samegwno<50000 
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replace samegwno=1 if samegwno==50000 
 
replace peacends=peacends*samegwno 
rename samegwno pcpcensored 
replace pcpcensored=5 if pcpcensored==0 
replace pcpcensored=0 if pcpcensored==1 
replace pcpcensored=1 if pcpcensored==5 
 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==0 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==. 
 
gen a=1 
sort a gwno year 




drop if peacestarts>=2002 
save, replace 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\post-conflict2fellesiCOW.dta", replace 
 
sort gwno warstarts 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
tab n 
keep if n==1 
keep gwno peacestarts location 
expandcl 48, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
rename peacestarts year 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace year=year+n-1 




merge primkey using "M:\Master\Cummulative\post-conflict:felles COW", keep(id 
warperiod warstarts peacestarts peacends pcpcensored) 
tab _merge 
 
*/I must fill in the empty spaces*/ 
sort gwno year 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if missing(warperiod) 
replace id = id[_n-1] if missing(id) 
replace warstarts = warstarts[_n-1] if missing(warstarts) 
replace peacestarts = peacestarts[_n-1] if missing(peacestarts) 
replace peacends = peacends[_n-1] if missing(peacends) 
replace pcpcensored = pcpcensored[_n-1] if missing(pcpcensored) 
 
*/I remove the waryears*/ 
gen D=year-peacends 
replace D=-1 if D==. 
replace D=-1 if pcpcensored==1 




*/I generate a duration variable*/ 
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rename warperiod pcperiod 
sort pcperiod year 
by pcperiod: gen pduration=_n 
 
*/I generate a dummy which tells whether peace ends this year*/ 
gen peacefailed=year-peacends 
replace peacefailed=-500 if peacefailed==-1 
replace peacefailed=0 if peacefailed>-500 
replace peacefailed=1 if peacefailed==-500 
replace peacefailed=0 if pcpcensored==1 
save, replace 
 
*/ I merge in GDP data*/ 
*/Fredsperiodene som ikke har fullstednig BNP-data må fjernes*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\GDP\GDP Capita WorldBank.dta", keep( logGDPCap2  
gdpgrowth1)_merge(ecomerge) 
drop if ecomerge==2 
drop ecomerge 
drop if logGDPCap2==. 
drop if gdpgrowth1==. 
drop if gwno==645 
gen dataset=1 
 
*/I make a fourpluss variable, a dummy telling if the war has lasted more than 
four years*/ 
gen plussfour=1 if pduration>=5 
replace plussfour=0 if pduration<5 
 
*/"stsetting" the dataset*/ 
drop if gwno==600 
stset pduration, id(pcperiod) f(peacefailed) 
save, replace 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/column 1*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1  logGDPCap2 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/The same conflicts, but with ACD's start and end dates: 
"M:\Master\Cummulative\ACD\post-conflict ACD.do"*/ 
*/Comparing the post-conflict periods that are generated by conflict that 
appear in both datasets. Start and end dates are the same as in COW*/A 
use "M:\Master\Cummulative\ACD\postconflictfellesACD.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\post-conflict:ACD felles", replace 
 
rename firstwaryear warstarts 
rename lastwaryear peacestarts 
 
*/I identify when the peace ends*/ 







replace samegwno=50000 if samegwno==0 
replace samegwno= 0 if samegwno<50000 
replace samegwno=1 if samegwno==50000 
 
replace peacends=peacends*samegwno 
rename samegwno pcpcensored 
replace pcpcensored=5 if pcpcensored==0 
replace pcpcensored=0 if pcpcensored==1 
replace pcpcensored=1 if pcpcensored==5 
 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==0 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==. 
 
gen a=1 
sort a gwno year 
by a: gen warperiod=_n 
drop a 
capture drop primkey 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+peacestarts 
sort primkey 
drop if peacestarts>=2002 
save, replace 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\post-conflict:2ACD felles", replace 
 
sort gwno warstarts 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
tab n 
keep if n==1 
keep gwno peacestarts location 
expandcl 48, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
rename peacestarts year 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace year=year+n-1 




merge primkey using "M:\Master\Cummulative\post-conflict:ACD felles", keep(id 
warperiod warstarts peacestarts peacends pcpcensored) 
tab _merge 
 
*/I must fill in the empty spaces*/ 
sort gwno year 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if missing(warperiod) 
replace id = id[_n-1] if missing(id) 
replace warstarts = warstarts[_n-1] if missing(warstarts) 
replace peacestarts = peacestarts[_n-1] if missing(peacestarts) 
replace peacends = peacends[_n-1] if missing(peacends) 
replace pcpcensored = pcpcensored[_n-1] if missing(pcpcensored) 
 
*/I remove the waryears*/ 
gen D=year-peacends 
replace D=-1 if D==. 
replace D=-1 if pcpcensored==1 






*/I generate a duration variable*/ 
rename warperiod pcperiod 
sort pcperiod year 
by pcperiod: gen pduration=_n 
 
*/I generate a dummy which tells whether peace ends this year*/ 
gen peacefailed=year-peacends 
replace peacefailed=-500 if peacefailed==-1 
replace peacefailed=0 if peacefailed>-500 
replace peacefailed=1 if peacefailed==-500 
replace peacefailed=0 if pcpcensored==1 
save, replace 
 
*/ I merge in GDP data*/ 
*/Fredsperiodene som ikke har fullstednig BNP-data må fjernes*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\GDP\GDP Capita WorldBank.dta", keep( logGDPCap2  
gdpgrowth1)_merge(ecomerge) 
drop if ecomerge==2 
drop ecomerge 
drop if logGDPCap2==. 
drop if gdpgrowth1==. 
drop if gwno==645 
 
*/I make a fourpluss variable, a dummy telling if the war has lasted more than 
four years*/ 
gen plussfour=1 if pduration>=5 
replace plussfour=0 if pduration<5 
 
*/"stsetting" the dataset*/ 
stset pduration, id(pcperiod) f(peacefailed) 
adopath + "M:\Stata" 
 
*/column 1*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1  logGDPCap2 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
esttab 




*/Including the excluded groups in COW: "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding 
COWwars\including the excluded.do"*/ 
clear all 
*/testing the effect of excluding groups*/ 
*/5=unsure, 3=excluded due to missing incompatibility/unorganized actors, 
1=not sure*/ 
*/including group 5*/ 
use "M:\Master\Cummulative\COW\Alle i COW, men ingen doble.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\gropu 5 included.dta", replace 
drop if COWonly==1 




rename firstwaryear warstarts 
rename lastwaryear peacestarts 
 
*/I identify when the peace ends*/ 





replace samegwno=50000 if samegwno==0 
replace samegwno= 0 if samegwno<50000 
replace samegwno=1 if samegwno==50000 
 
replace peacends=peacends*samegwno 
rename samegwno pcpcensored 
replace pcpcensored=5 if pcpcensored==0 
replace pcpcensored=0 if pcpcensored==1 
replace pcpcensored=1 if pcpcensored==5 
 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==0 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==. 
 
gen a=1 
sort a gwno year 
by a: gen warperiod=_n 
drop a 
capture drop primkey 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+peacestarts 
sort primkey 
drop if peacestarts>=2002 
save, replace 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\group 5_del2.dta", replace 
 
sort gwno warstarts 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
tab n 
keep if n==1 
keep gwno peacestarts location 
expandcl 48, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
rename peacestarts year 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace year=year+n-1 





merge primkey using "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\gropu 5 
included.dta", keep(id warperiod warstarts peacestarts peacends pcpcensored) 
tab _merge 
 
*/I must fill in the empty spaces*/ 
sort gwno year 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if missing(warperiod) 
replace id = id[_n-1] if missing(id) 
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replace warstarts = warstarts[_n-1] if missing(warstarts) 
replace peacestarts = peacestarts[_n-1] if missing(peacestarts) 
replace peacends = peacends[_n-1] if missing(peacends) 
replace pcpcensored = pcpcensored[_n-1] if missing(pcpcensored) 
 
*/I remove the waryears*/ 
gen D=year-peacends 
replace D=-1 if D==. 
replace D=-1 if pcpcensored==1 




*/I generate a duration variable*/ 
rename warperiod pcperiod 
sort pcperiod year 
by pcperiod: gen pduration=_n 
 
*/I generate a dummy which tells whether peace ends this year*/ 
gen peacefailed=year-peacends 
replace peacefailed=-500 if peacefailed==-1 
replace peacefailed=0 if peacefailed>-500 
replace peacefailed=1 if peacefailed==-500 
replace peacefailed=0 if pcpcensored==1 
save, replace 
 
*/ I merge in GDP data*/ 
*/Fredsperiodene som ikke har fullstednig BNP-data må fjernes*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\GDP\GDP Capita WorldBank.dta", keep( logGDPCap2  
gdpgrowth1)_merge(ecomerge) 
drop if ecomerge==2 
drop ecomerge 
drop if logGDPCap2==. 
drop if gdpgrowth1==. 
drop if gwno==645 
 
*/I make a fourpluss variable, a dummy telling if the war has lasted more than 
four years*/ 
gen plussfour=1 if pduration>=5 
replace plussfour=0 if pduration<5 
 
*/"stsetting" the dataset*/ 
stset pduration, id(pcperiod) f(peacefailed) 




eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1  logGDPCap2 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
esttab 






*/including group 3*/ 
use "M:\Master\Cummulative\COW\Alle i COW, men ingen doble.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\gropu 3 included.dta", replace 
drop if COWonly==1 
drop if COWonly==5 
 
rename firstwaryear warstarts 
rename lastwaryear peacestarts 
 
*/I identify when the peace ends*/ 





replace samegwno=50000 if samegwno==0 
replace samegwno= 0 if samegwno<50000 
replace samegwno=1 if samegwno==50000 
 
replace peacends=peacends*samegwno 
rename samegwno pcpcensored 
replace pcpcensored=5 if pcpcensored==0 
replace pcpcensored=0 if pcpcensored==1 
replace pcpcensored=1 if pcpcensored==5 
 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==0 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==. 
 
gen a=1 
sort a gwno year 
by a: gen warperiod=_n 
drop a 
capture drop primkey 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+peacestarts 
sort primkey 
drop if peacestarts>=2002 
save, replace 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\group 3_del2.dta", replace 
 
sort gwno warstarts 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
tab n 
keep if n==1 
keep gwno peacestarts location 
expandcl 48, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
rename peacestarts year 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace year=year+n-1 





merge primkey using "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\gropu 3 





*/I must fill in the empty spaces*/ 
sort gwno year 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if missing(warperiod) 
replace id = id[_n-1] if missing(id) 
replace warstarts = warstarts[_n-1] if missing(warstarts) 
replace peacestarts = peacestarts[_n-1] if missing(peacestarts) 
replace peacends = peacends[_n-1] if missing(peacends) 
replace pcpcensored = pcpcensored[_n-1] if missing(pcpcensored) 
 
*/I remove the waryears*/ 
gen D=year-peacends 
replace D=-1 if D==. 
replace D=-1 if pcpcensored==1 




*/I generate a duration variable*/ 
rename warperiod pcperiod 
sort pcperiod year 
by pcperiod: gen pduration=_n 
 
*/I generate a dummy which tells whether peace ends this year*/ 
gen peacefailed=year-peacends 
replace peacefailed=-500 if peacefailed==-1 
replace peacefailed=0 if peacefailed>-500 
replace peacefailed=1 if peacefailed==-500 
replace peacefailed=0 if pcpcensored==1 
save, replace 
 
*/ I merge in GDP data*/ 
*/Fredsperiodene som ikke har fullstednig BNP-data må fjernes*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\GDP\GDP Capita WorldBank.dta", keep( logGDPCap2  
gdpgrowth1)_merge(ecomerge) 
drop if ecomerge==2 
drop ecomerge 
drop if logGDPCap2==. 
drop if gdpgrowth1==. 
drop if gwno==645 
 
*/I make a fourpluss variable, a dummy telling if the war has lasted more than 
four years*/ 
gen plussfour=1 if pduration>=5 
replace plussfour=0 if pduration<5 
 
*/"stsetting" the dataset*/ 
stset pduration, id(pcperiod) f(peacefailed) 









eststo: streg gdpgrowth1  logGDPCap2 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
esttab 




*/including group 1*/ 
use "M:\Master\Cummulative\COW\Alle i COW, men ingen doble.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\gropu 1 included.dta", replace 
drop if COWonly==5 
drop if COWonly==3 
 
rename firstwaryear warstarts 
rename lastwaryear peacestarts 
 
*/I identify when the peace ends*/ 





replace samegwno=50000 if samegwno==0 
replace samegwno= 0 if samegwno<50000 
replace samegwno=1 if samegwno==50000 
 
replace peacends=peacends*samegwno 
rename samegwno pcpcensored 
replace pcpcensored=5 if pcpcensored==0 
replace pcpcensored=0 if pcpcensored==1 
replace pcpcensored=1 if pcpcensored==5 
 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==0 
replace peacends=2002 if peacends==. 
 
gen a=1 
sort a gwno year 
by a: gen warperiod=_n 
drop a 
capture drop primkey 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+peacestarts 
sort primkey 
drop if peacestarts>=2002 
save, replace 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\group 1_del2.dta", replace 
 
sort gwno warstarts 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
tab n 
keep if n==1 
keep gwno peacestarts location 
expandcl 48, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
rename peacestarts year 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace year=year+n-1 







merge primkey using "M:\Master\Cummulative\Excluding COWwars\gropu 1 
included.dta", keep(id warperiod warstarts peacestarts peacends pcpcensored) 
tab _merge 
 
*/I must fill in the empty spaces*/ 
sort gwno year 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if missing(warperiod) 
replace id = id[_n-1] if missing(id) 
replace warstarts = warstarts[_n-1] if missing(warstarts) 
replace peacestarts = peacestarts[_n-1] if missing(peacestarts) 
replace peacends = peacends[_n-1] if missing(peacends) 
replace pcpcensored = pcpcensored[_n-1] if missing(pcpcensored) 
 
*/I remove the waryears*/ 
gen D=year-peacends 
replace D=-1 if D==. 
replace D=-1 if pcpcensored==1 




*/I generate a duration variable*/ 
rename warperiod pcperiod 
sort pcperiod year 
by pcperiod: gen pduration=_n 
 
*/I generate a dummy which tells whether peace ends this year*/ 
gen peacefailed=year-peacends 
replace peacefailed=-500 if peacefailed==-1 
replace peacefailed=0 if peacefailed>-500 
replace peacefailed=1 if peacefailed==-500 
replace peacefailed=0 if pcpcensored==1 
save, replace 
 
*/ I merge in GDP data*/ 
*/Fredsperiodene som ikke har fullstednig BNP-data må fjernes*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\GDP\GDP Capita WorldBank.dta", keep( logGDPCap2  
gdpgrowth1)_merge(ecomerge) 
drop if ecomerge==2 
drop ecomerge 
drop if logGDPCap2==. 
drop if gdpgrowth1==. 
drop if gwno==645 
 
*/I make a fourpluss variable, a dummy telling if the war has lasted more than 
four years*/ 
gen plussfour=1 if pduration>=5 
replace plussfour=0 if pduration<5 
 
*/"stsetting" the dataset*/ 
stset pduration, id(pcperiod) f(peacefailed) 




eststo: streg gdpgrowth1 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
 
*/column 2*/ 
eststo: streg gdpgrowth1  logGDPCap2 plussfour, nohr dist (exponential) 
esttab 




*/Checking the mean: "M:\Master\Cummulative\mean.do"*/ 
use "M:\Master\Cummulative\comparing the wars500.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\comparing the wars500_2.dta", replace 
gen conflictduration=lastwaryear-firstwaryear 
gen conflictfailed=0 if lastwaryear==2002 
replace conflictfailed=1 if conflictfailed==. 
 
stset conflictduration, fail(conflictfailed) 
stci, by(dataset) rmean 
stci, by(dataset) emean 
 
gen fellesid= (felleskrigsnummer*10000)+dataset 
sort fellesid 
by fellesid: egen incompdur=sum(conflictduration) 
 
replace firstwaryear=firstwaryear*-1 
sort fellesid firstwaryear 
by fellesid:gen n=_n 
keep if n==1 
replace firstwaryear=firstwaryear*-1 
 
stset incompdur, fail(conflictfailed) 
stci, by(dataset) rmean 
stci, by(dataset) emean 
 




replace distance=. if dataset==2 
 
gen distance2=1 if distance>0 
replace distance2=2 if distance<0 
replace distance2=0 if distance==0  
replace distance2=. if dataset==2 
tab distance2 
 
replace distance = distance*-1 if distance<0 
gen x=1 
sort x 
by x: egen distancesum=sum (distance) 
codebook distancesum 
 
*/comparing warduration: "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\Comparing 
warduration.do"*/ 
*/comparing warduration*/ 




*/I add 0.5 to the duration variable, in order to avoid that conflict that 
start and end same year lasts 0 years*/ 
drop warduration 
gen warduration= peacestarts- warstarts 
replace warduration=warduration+0.5 
 
stset  warduration, fail( warfailes) 
stci, by(dataset) rmean 
 




by idataset:  egen wardursum = sum(warduration) 
stset  wardursum, fail( warfailes) 
stci, by(dataset) rmean 
 
sort idataset 
by idataset: gen n=_n 
keep if n==1 
 
sort id dataset 
gen wardursum2=wardursum[_n+1] 




replace difference=1 if difference>0 
replace difference=-1 if difference<0 
replace difference=. if dataset==2 
tab difference 
 
*/Table 5-1 comparing the conflicts that appear in both datasets: 
"M:\Master\Tabell\warduration-enhet stat.do"*/ 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Tabell\warduration3med inte.civilwars.dta" 
save "M:\Master\Sammenlikne data\konflikter i begge datasett, state 
focus2.dta", replace 
rename firstwaryear war1starts 
rename lastwaryear war1ends 
drop if gwno==775 
drop if gwno==520 
drop if gwno==678 
drop if gwno==680 
drop if gwno==775 
drop if gwno==700 
drop if gwno==645 
 
sort dataset gwno war1starts 
gen war2starts=war1starts[_n+1] 
 
*/do the observations belong to the same country*/ 
gen samewar=gwno[_n+1] 
replace samewar=samewar-gwno 
replace samewar=5000 if samewar==0 
replace samewar=0 if samewar<5000 
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replace samewar=1 if samewar==5000 
replace samewar=0 if samewar==. 
replace war2starts=2002 if samewar==0 
 
replace war2starts=2002 if war2starts==. 
gen dur1=war1starts-1960 
gen dur2=war1ends-war1starts 
replace war2starts=. if samewar==0 
 
*/ some wars start and end the same year. This gives the a duration equal to 
0. In order to account these conflict I replace 0 with 0.5*/ 
replace dur2=0.5 if dur2==0 
 
*/Which countries experience multiple civil wars, and how many?*/ 
gen gwnodataset=(dataset*10000)+gwno 
sort gwnodataset war1starts 
by gwnodataset: gen n=_n 
tab n 
by gwnodataset:  egen n2 = max(n) 
 
gen war2ends=war1ends[_n+1] 
replace war2ends=0 if war2ends==. 
replace war2ends=0 if samewar==0 
 
*/I generate a duration variable*/ 
gen dur3=war2starts-war1ends 
replace dur3=2002-war1ends if samewar==0 
gen dur4=war2ends-war2starts 
replace dur4=0 if samewar==0 
 
*/some values must be replaced by 0.5*/ 
gen a=0 if war2starts<10000 
replace a=1 if a==. 
replace a=a+dur4 
replace dur4=0.5 if a==0 
 
*/I can now remove the second war period*/ 
drop if n==2 
drop samewar  
sort gwnodataset war1starts 
gen samewar=gwno[_n+1] 
replace samewar=samewar-gwno 
replace samewar=5000 if samewar==0 
replace samewar=0 if samewar<5000 
replace samewar=1 if samewar==5000 
replace samewar=0 if samewar==. 
 
sort gwnodataset war1starts 
gen war3starts=war1starts[_n+1] 
replace war3starts=0 if samewar==0 
 
gen war3ends=war1ends[_n+1] 
replace war3ends=0 if samewar==0 
 
gen dur5=war3starts-war2ends 
replace dur5=0 if samewar==0 





replace dur6=0 if samewar==0 
 
*/some values must be replaced bu 0.5 here as well 0.5*/ 
drop a 
gen a=0 if war3starts>0 
replace a=1 if a==. 
replace a=a+dur6 
replace dur6=0.5 if a==0 
 
drop if n==3 
drop samewar a 
sort gwnodataset war1starts 
gen samewar=gwno[_n+1] 
replace samewar=samewar-gwno 
replace samewar=5000 if samewar==0 
replace samewar=0 if samewar<5000 
replace samewar=1 if samewar==5000 
replace samewar=0 if samewar==. 
 
sort gwnodataset war1starts 
gen war4starts=war1starts[_n+1] 
replace war4starts=0 if samewar==0 
 
gen war4ends=war1ends[_n+1] 
replace war4ends=0 if samewar==0 
 
gen dur7=war4starts-war3ends 
replace dur7=0 if samewar==0 
replace dur7=2002-war3ends if n2==3 
 
gen dur8=war4ends-war4starts 
replace dur8=0 if samewar==0  
gen dur9=2002-war4ends 
replace dur9=0 if samewar==0 
drop if n==4 
tab n 
 
gen a=0 if war4starts>0 
replace a=1 if a==. 
replace a=a+dur8 
replace dur8=0.5 if a==0 
 
gen x=1 
sort x location dataset 




gen location2 =location 
graph hbar (asis) dur1 dur2 dur3 dur4 dur5 dur6 dur7 dur8 dur9, over 
(idataset, sort(s) descending) stack 
save, replace 
 
*/Chapter 5's analysis:"M:\Master\My own analysis\med datovariabler.do"*/ 




insheet using "M:\Master\Sources\MainConflictTable.csv", clear 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25", replace 
*/Del 1, fokus stat: klargjøre datasettet*/ 
*/Fjerner alle observasjoner som ikke er borgerkriger¨. inkludert 
kolonikriger*/ 
keep if type>=3 
 
*/I remove all obs before 1960*/ 
drop if year<1960 
 
*/Fjern Hyderbad*/ 
drop if id==19 
save, replace 
 





rename gwnoa gwno 









merge id using "M:\Master\Helga\keepiftype=3.dta", keep(sideb)_merge 
(sidebmerge) 
tab sidebmerge 
drop if sidebmerge==2 
 
*/this generates some doble obs which must be taken away*/ 
sort idprimkey 
by idprimkey: gen n=_n 
tab n 
 
drop if n>1 
 
*/I generate a warperiod variable; the war must accumulate to more than 1,000 
battle-deaths during subsequent active years. A year is active as long as 
there are more than 100 battle-deaths*/ 
 
*/BATTLE-DEATHS*/ 
*/I merge in Lacina and Gleditsch battle-deaths dataset*/ 
run "M:\Master\Missing\Battle-death with no missing GDP.do" 
 
*/WARPERIOD*/ 
*/Based on the obs now included I generate a warperiod variable*/ 
run "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\War-Period, kriterie 3.do" 
 
*/TOTALT ANTALL BATTLE-DEATHS*/ 
*/I generate bdeabessum informing how many died during that period*/ 
sort warperiod  
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by warperiod: egen bdeadbessum = sum(bdeadbes) 
codebook bdeadbessum 
 
*/I drop all warperiods that accumulate to less than 1,000 during subsequent 
active conflict years*/ 
drop if bdeadbessum<1000 
 
*/CHS do not differ between different conflicts within the same country. Thus 
it is not necessary to include two conflict years from the same countryd i 
samme land på samme sted*/ 
replace bdeadbessum=bdeadbessum*-1 
sort primkey bdeadbessum 
by primkey: gen dobbel=_n 




*/after deleting several of the observations the warperiod variable I have 
does not work anymore. Thus I have to generate a new one*/ 
drop add2 firstyear warmissing2 warmissing n warperiod 
 
*/I generate a warperiod variable*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen nextyear2=year[_n-1] 
replace nextyear2=1960 if nextyear2==. 
gen nextyear=year-nextyear2 
replace nextyear=100 if nextyear==1 
replace nextyear=0 if nextyear<100 
replace nextyear=1 if nextyear==100 
label var nextyear "krigen er aktiv kontinuerlig" 
save, replace 
 
sort gwno year 
gen samecountry2=gwno[_n-1] 
replace samecountry=1 if samecountry2==. 
gen samecountry=samecountry2-gwno 
replace samecountry=10000 if samecountry==0 
replace samecountry=0 if samecountry<10000 
replace samecountry=1 if samecountry==10000 




*/I generate a "xounting" variable based on war2*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen warperiod = 1 
replace warperiod = _n if war2 != war2[_n-1] 
replace warperiod = warperiod[_n-1] if war2 == war2[_n-1] 
list war2 warperiod 
 
*/This does not acount the warperiods correctly, therefore I have to add some 
information*/ 
replace war2=5 if war2==0 
 
*/I identify the first waryear in a warperiod that lasts at least two years*/ 




replace warsum2=5 if warsum2==. 
gen ws3=warsum2+war2 
gen firstyear=ws3+war2 
replace firstyear=50 if firstyear==11 
replace firstyear=0 if firstyear<50 
replace firstyear=1 if firstyear==50 
label var firstyear "Dummy=1 hvis obs er den første i en krigsperiode på min 2 
år" 
 
*/I create a variable that identifies "singel" wars(only last one year) that 
follow "singel"wars*/ 
gen warsumII=war2[_n-1] 
replace warsumII=1 if warsumII==. 
gen warsumIII=war2[_n+1] 
replace warsumIII=1 if warsumIII==. 
gen middle=warsumII+warsumIII+war2 
replace middle=100 if middle==15 
replace middle=0 if middle<100 
replace middle=1 if middle==100 
label var middle "Dummy=1 dersom en singelkrig følger en singelkrig" 
 
*/I generate a counting variable "n" based on the incorrect warperiod 
variable*/ 
sort warperiod  
by warperiod: gen n2=_n 
replace n2=n2-1 if middle==1 
gen add2=0 
replace add2=n2 if firstyear==1 
replace add2=n2 if middle==1 
generate Warperiod=warperiod+add2 
*/Now each of the warperiods has its own unique number*/ 
 
drop  middle n2 nextyear2 nextyear samecountry2 samecountry warsum2 war2 ws3 
warsumII warsumIII warperiod 
rename Warperiod warperiod 
save, replace 
 
*/I generate a variable telling which year was the last in the warperiod*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod:  egen lastwaryear = max(year)  
label var lastwaryear "siste året med krig i denne warperiod" 
 
*/I generate a variable informing which was the first year in the warperiod*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod:  egen firstwaryear = min(year)  
label var firstwaryear "første året med krig i denne warperiod" 
 
*/I generate a dummy telling whether this is the last obs in the warperiod*/ 
gen dumlastwaryear=lastwaryear-year 
replace dumlastwaryear=500 if dumlastwaryear==0 
replace dumlastwaryear=0 if dumlastwaryear<=50 
replace dumlastwaryear=1 if dumlastwaryear==500 
 
*/I  formate start and end dates*/ 
generate newstartdate2 = date( startdate2, "MDY") 




generate newependdate = date( ependdate, "MDY") 
format newependdate %td 
 
drop ependdate startdate2 
rename newstartdate2 startdate2 
rename newependdate ependdate 
 
*/I generate a warperiod startvariabel*/ 
sort warperiod 
by warperiod: egen warperiodstarts=min (startdate2) 
 
*/I generate a warperiod ends variable*/ 





sort warperiod year 
by warperiod: egen warperiodends=max(ependdate) 
replace ependdate=. if ependdate==0 
replace warperiodends=17531 if warperiodends==0 
 
*/I remove all conflict years that are not the lasts in the warperiod*/ 
drop if dumlastwaryear==0 
 
*/I generate a variable telling when peace ends*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen samecountry2=gwno[_n+1] 
gen samecountry=samecountry2-gwno 
replace samecountry=500 if samecountry==0 
replace samecountry=0 if samecountry<499 
replace samecountry=1 if samecountry==500 





replace peacends=0 if peacends==. 
label var peacends "=0 betyr at freden varer til 2007" 
 
gen peacendyear=firstwaryear[_n+1] 
replace peacendyear= peacendyear*samecountry 
replace peacendyear=0 if peacendyear==. 
 
*/I generate a variable telling whether the peace period is right censored*/ 
gen peacecensored=1 
replace peacecensored=0 if peacends>0 
label var peacecensored "Dummy 1=freden er høyresensurert" 
 
*/I remove the conflicts that lasts till 2007. They do not generate any post-
conflict episodes. Some of them puts an end to a post-conflict episode. This 
information is included in the dataset*/ 
drop if year==2007 
 






by wp: gen nn=_n 
drop wp 
drop warperiod 




*/Expanding the dataset*/ 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2", replace 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 




keep  gwno year  
expandcl 48, cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
sort gwno 
by gwno: gen n=_n 
replace n=n-1 
replace year=year+n 
drop if year>2007 
gen primkey=(gwno*10000)+year 





merge primkey using "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25", keep ( peacends 
peacendyear warperiodends warperiodstarts warperiod location firstwaryear 





rename warperiodends peacestarts 
 
*/Closing the Gaps*/ 
*/Sjekk om sammenslåingene har ført til doble observasjoner*/ 
sort primkey 
by primkey: gen n=_n 
tab n 
 
*/(To make things correct)*/ 
rename warperiod pcperiod 
 
*/After soring on gwno year, the gaps shall have the same value as the first 
non-missing value above*/ 
sort gwno year 
replace pcperiod = pcperiod[_n-1] if missing(pcperiod) 
replace peacecensored= peacecensored[_n-1] if missing(peacecensored) 
replace peacends = peacends[_n-1] if missing(peacends) 
replace firstwaryear = firstwaryear[_n-1] if missing(firstwaryear) 
replace lastwaryear = lastwaryear[_n-1] if missing(lastwaryear) 
replace location = location[_n-1] if missing(location) 
replace warperiodstarts = warperiodstarts[_n-1] if missing(warperiodstarts) 
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replace peacestarts = peacestarts[_n-1] if missing(peacestarts) 




*/War number 2-3-4 are included in the dataset. These must be removed*/ 
replace peacendyear=2007 if peacendyear==0 
gen exclude=peacendyear 
gen D=year-exclude 
replace exclude=0 if D<0 
replace exclude=0 if peacendyear==2007& peacends==0 
drop if exclude>0 
drop exclude D 
save, replace 
 
*/I need to create a dummy which tells wehther peace collapses this year*/ 
gen pcperiodends=peacendyear if peacends>0 
replace pcperiodends=pcperiodends-year if peacends>0 
replace pcperiodends=0 if pcperiodends>1 
drop n 
 
*/I generate a peaceduration variable*/ 
sort pcperiod 
by pcperiod: gen pduration=_n 
replace pduration=pduration*365 
replace peacends=17531 if peacends==0 
replace pduration=peacends-peacestarts if pcperiodends==1 
replace pduration=peacends-peacestarts if year==2007 
save, replace 
format peacestarts %td 
format peacends %td 
 
*/I also want to generate a peaceduration variable in years*/ 
sort pcperiod 
by pcperiod: gen pdur=_n 
 
*/INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
*/GDP per Capita*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\GDP\GDP Capita WorldBank.dta", keep( logGDPCap2  
gdpgrowth1) 




*/Polity-sip: Gates et al*/ 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige 
variabler\PolityGatesHegreStrand.dta", keep(sip2) _merge (sipmerge) 
tab sipmerge 
drop if sipmerge==2 
drop sipmerge 
 
gen demozip=1 if sip2>=0.67 
replace demozip=0 if demozip==. 
 
gen totzip=1 if sip<=0.33 
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replace totzip=0 if totzip==. 
 
*/sipmissing*/ 
gen sip_m=1 if sip2==. 
replace sip_m=0 if sip_m==. 
replace sip2=0 if sip_m==1 
replace demozip=0 if sip_m==1 




merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\nabo+pop.dta", keep(nc2_1 
lpop) _merge (popmerge) 
tab popmerge 
drop if popmerge==2 
 
*/neighbor war*/ 
gen nc2_1_m=1 if nc2_1==. 
replace nc2_1_m=0 if nc2_1_m==. 
replace nc2_1=0 if nc2_1_m==1 
 
gen lpop_m=1 if lpop==. 
replace lpop_m=0 if lpop_m==. 




merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\UN.dta", keep ( UNexp 
UNpeaceop) _merge(UNmerge) 
tab UNmerge 
drop if UNmerge==2 
drop UNmerge 
 
gen noUNpeaceop=1 if  UNpeaceop==. 
replace noUNpeaceop=0 if UNpeaceop==1 
*/UNexp er gjort om til en logit variabel*/ 
gen lUNexp = log(UNexp) 
 
*/UNexp missing*/ 
gen UNexp_m=0 if noUNpeaceop==1 
replace UNexp_m=UNexp if noUNpeaceop==0 
replace UNexp_m=-5 if UNexp_m==. 
replace UNexp_m=0 if UNexp_m>0 
replace UNexp_m=1 if UNexp_m==-5 





by primkey: gen n=_n 
tab n 
*/there are no doble obs*/ 
save, replace 
 
*/I will delete the missing GDP data, but when adding Maddison's data I need 
this information. Therefore I save one version where obs are not deleted*/ 
save "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2nomissing.dta", replace 
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use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2.dta", clear 
 
*/Comparing the means of the episodes soon to be excluded due to missing GDP 
data and the rest of the observations*/ 
*/I generate a variable which tells whether the enitre period is missing*/ 
gen missing=1 if logGDPCap2==. 
replace missing=1 if gdpgrowth==. 
replace missing=0 if missing==. 
 
sort pcperiod 
by pcperiod: egen allmissing=min(missing) 
label var allmissing "dum 1=all years in peacepisode=missing" 
replace allmissing=1 if gwno==645 
*/As democratic repluclic of Yemen cease to exist in 1994 I exclude this from 
the analysis*/ 
drop if gwno==680 
 
*/for the mean analysis I only want to keep the last obs*/ 
sort pcperiod 
by pcperiod: egen maxyear=max(year) 
replace maxyear=maxyear-year 
replace maxyear=1000 if maxyear>0 
replace maxyear=1 if maxyear==0 
replace maxyear=0 if maxyear==1000 
keep if maxyear==1 
 
*/stset dataset*/ 
stset pduration, fail(pcperiodends) 
stci, by(allmissing) rmean 
stci, by(allmissing) emean 
clear all 
 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2.dta", clear 
*/repeated events before missing GDP excluded*/ 
sort pcperiod year 
drop n 
by pcperiod: gen n=_n 
keep if n==1 
 
sort gwno  




*/I drop the obs with missing values. I also drop Iraq. Although there are two 
obs at the middle of the peace period, there are no ones at the end when it 
collapses*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2.dta", clear 
drop if logGDPCap2==. 
drop if gdpgrowth1==. 
drop if gwno==645 
save, replace 
 
*/repeated events after missing GDP excluded*/ 
sort pcperiod year 
drop n 
by pcperiod: gen n=_n 
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keep if n==1 
 
sort gwno  
by gwno: gen a=_n 
tab a 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2.dta", clear 
 
*/does more harmed economies generate more growth when war has come to an 
end?*/ 






merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\GDPcapita World Bank.dta", 
keep(loggdpcap) _merge (amerge) 
tab amerge 
drop if amerge==2 
drop amerge 
rename loggdpcap gdpfirstwary 
 






merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\GDPcapita World Bank.dta", 
keep(loggdpcap) _merge (amerge) 
tab amerge 
drop if amerge==2 
drop amerge 






gen gdpchangewar_m=1 if gdpchangewar==. 
replace gdpchangewar_m=0 if gdpchangewar_m==. 
tab gdpchangewar_m 
 
*/I generate a variable which tells how much gdp capita changes during the two 
first years of peace*/ 
replace primkey=primkey+2 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Uavhengige variabler\GDPcapita World Bank.dta", 
keep(loggdpcap) _merge (amerge) 
tab amerge 
drop if amerge==2 
drop amerge 
rename loggdpcap gdppluss2 
 
gen growth2=gdppluss2-gdplastwary 
reg growth2 gdpchangewar 
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replace gdpchangewar=0 if gdpchangewar_m==1 
 
*/I generate a high income dummy-to test interaction*/ 
egen loggdpc_66pct = pctile( logGDPCap2) , p(67) 
egen loggdpc_33pct = pctile( logGDPCap2) , p(33) 
gen highincome=1 if  logGDPCap2>=7.3277807 
replace highincome =0 if highincome==. 
 
gen lowincome=1 if logGDPCap2<=6.1047931 





*/There might be some obs for which the last year of the peaceperiod has the 
same duration as the year before.*/ 
*/If this is the case they do not add any information*/ 
gen x=(pcperiod*100000)+pduration 
sort x year 
drop n 
by x: gen n=_n 
tab n 
*/there is only one doble obs*/ 
drop if n==2 
save, replace 
 






stset pduration, failure( pcperiodends) id(pcperiod) 
stcox lpop_m, nohr  
stcox nc2_1_m, nohr  
stcox UNexp_m, nohr  




*/stset the dataset*/ 
stset pduration, failure( pcperiodends) id(pcperiod) 
eststo: stcox  gdpgrowth1 logGDPCap2, nohr  
eststo: stcox  gdpgrowth1 logGDPCap2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m, nohr  
stcox  gdpgrowth1 logGDPCap2, nohr  
stcox  gdpgrowth1 logGDPCap2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop lUNexp 
UNexp_m, nohr  
eststo: stcox  gdpgrowth1 logGDPCap2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop 
lUNexp UNexp_m lpop lpop_m nc2_1 nc2_1_m, nohr  








run "M:\Master\My own analysis\influential obs World Bank.do" 
 
 
*/Maddison_Knutsen PPP adjusted GDP data*/ 
clear 
run "M:\Master\Missing\Maddison-Knutsen.do" 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2nomissing.dta", clear 
 
*/Maddison-Knutsen's data only goes to 2003, but with the lagged variables it 
goes to 2004-I therefore delete observations occuring after this*/ 
drop if year>2004 
 
*/Now I have to "fix" the last year of the peaceduration observation*/ 
replace peacends=16436 if peacends>16436 
sort pcperiod 
by pcperiod: egen maxyear=max(year) 
replace maxyear=maxyear-year 
replace pduration=peacends-peacestarts if maxyear==0 
 
sort primkey 
merge primkey using "M:\Master\Missing\Maddison-Knutsen.dta", keep( 
Maddgrowth1 Madd2) _merge(Maddmerge) 
tab Maddmerge 
drop if Maddmerge==2 
drop Maddmerge 
 




merge primkey using "M:\Master\Missing\Maddison-Knutsen.dta", keep(logMadd) 
_merge(Maddmerge) 
tab Maddmerge 
drop if Maddmerge==2 
drop Maddmerge 






merge primkey using "M:\Master\Missing\Maddison-Knutsen.dta", keep(logMadd) 
_merge(Maddmerge) 
tab Maddmerge 
drop if Maddmerge==2 






gen gdpchangewar_m=1 if gdpchangewar==. 
replace gdpchangewar_m =0 if gdpchangewar_m==. 
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by primkey: gen n=_n 
tab n 
*/there are no doble obs*/ 
 
*/Interaction between income and growth?*/ 
egen Madd2_66pct = pctile( Madd2) , p(67) 
*/8.0479565*/ 
egen Madd2_33pct = pctile( Madd2) , p(33) 
*/7.1054683*/ 
 
gen highMadd=1 if Madd2>=8.0479565 
replace highMadd=0 if highMadd==. 
gen highMaddgrowth=highMadd*Maddgrowth1 
 
gen lowMadd=1 if Madd2<=7.1054683 










stset pduration, failure( pcperiodends) id(pcperiod) 
stcox sip_m, nohr  
stcox lpop_m, nohr  
stcox nc2_1_m, nohr  
stcox UNexp_m, nohr  
stcox gdpchangewar_m, nohr  
 
*/there might be a few observations that must be excluded because 
peaceduration is the same in both (they belong to the same post-conflict 
period) 
gen x=(pcperiod*100000)+pduration 
sort x year 
by x: gen a=_n 
tab a 
*/there are no "duplicates"*/ 
drop if a==2 
 
*/stset the dataset*/ 
stset pduration, failure( pcperiodends) id(pcperiod) 
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2, nohr  
stcox  Maddgrowth1 lowMadd highMadd highMaddgrowth lowMaddgrowth, nohr   
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m, nohr  
stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop lUNexp 
UNexp_m, nohr  
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop 









run "M:\Master\My own analysis\influential obs Maddison.do" 
 
save "M:\Master\Cummulative\med Gates et al.dta", replace 
drop if year>2000 
tab sip_m 
stcox sip_m, nohr 
replace sip2=sip2*100 
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m sip2 sip_m, nohr  
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop 
lUNexp UNexp_m lpop lpop_m nc2_1 nc2_1_m sip2 sip_m, nohr 
 stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m demozip totzip sip_m, 
nohr  
 stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m, nohr  
 
esttab 






stcox Maddgrowth1 demozip totzip sip_m demgrowth totgrowth, nohr 
 
*/The PH-assumtion*/ 
drop sch* sca* 
stcox sip2, schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*) 
stphtest, detail 
save, replace  
 
run "M:\Master\Cummulative\Hazardfunksjon\hazard.do" 
run "M:\Master\Repeated Events\Repeated Events2.do" 
 
*/ Influential observations?:"M:\Master\My own analysis\influential obs World 
Bank.do"*/ 
clear 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2.dta", clear 
stset pduration, failure( pcperiodends) id(pcperiod) 
stcox logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1, efron esr(esr*) 
set matsize 10000 
mkmat esr1 esr2, matrix(esr) 
mat V=e(V) 
mat Inf=esr*V 
svmat Inf, names(s) 
scatter s1 _t, mlab(pcperiod) s(i) 
scatter s2 _t, mlab(pcperiod) s(i) 
*/obs 5-15-21-35-38-46-54 scores above 0.5. I control for these*/ 
 
gen dum5=1 if pcperiod==5 
replace dum5=0 if dum5==. 
 stcox  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 dum5, nohr 
 
gen dum15=1 if pcperiod==15 
129 
 
replace dum15=0 if dum15==. 
 stcox  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 dum15, nohr 
 
gen dum21=1 if pcperiod==21 
replace dum21=0 if dum21==. 
 stcox  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 dum21, nohr 
 
gen dum35=1 if pcperiod==35 
replace dum35=0 if dum35==. 
 stcox  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 dum35, nohr 
 
gen dum38=1 if pcperiod==38 
replace dum38=0 if dum38==. 
 stcox  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 dum38, nohr 
 
gen dum46=1 if pcperiod==46 
replace dum46=0 if dum46==. 
 stcox  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 dum46, nohr 
 
gen dum54=1 if pcperiod==54 
replace dum54=0 if dum54==. 
 stcox  logGDPCap2 gdpgrowth1 dum54, nohr 
 
*/Changing to Maddison's dataset: "M:\Master\Missing\Maddison-Knutsen.do"*/ 
*/Carl Henrik Knutsen's data*/ 
use "M:\Master\Missing\Madd-knutsen1.dta" 
save "M:\Master\Missing\Maddison-Knutsen.dta", replace 
*I need to make extra obs for year=2004 and 2005*/ 
sort gwno year 
gen MaddGDPCap2= gdpppincludeinfer[_n-2] 
replace MaddGDPCap2=. if year==1958 
replace MaddGDPCap2=. if year==1959 
expandcl 3 , cluster(gwno) gen(hva) 
sort primkey 
by primkey: gen n=_n 
replace n=n-1 
replace year=year+n if year==2003 
 





by primkey: gen n=_n 
tab n 
keep if n==1 
 
*/gdppincludeinfer is incorrect for year 2004 and 2005*/ 
replace gdpppincludeinfer=. if year>2003 
 
*/Per Capita Income*/ 
gen Madd2=log(MaddGDPCap2) 








label var logMadd "log GDP this year" 









by primkey: gen a=_n 
tab a 








use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2nomissing.dta", clear 
stset pduration, failure( pcperiodends) id(pcperiod) 
stcox Madd2 Maddgrowth1, efron esr(esr*) 
set matsize 10000 
mkmat esr1 esr2, matrix(esr) 
mat V=e(V) 
mat Inf=esr*V 
svmat Inf, names(s) 
scatter s1 _t, mlab(pcperiod) s(i) 
scatter s2 _t, mlab(pcperiod) s(i) 
*/obs 5-15-21-35-38-46-54 scores above 0.5. I control for these*/ 
 
gen dum5=1 if pcperiod==5 
replace dum5=0 if dum5==. 
 stcox  Madd2 Maddgrowth1 dum5, nohr 
 
gen dum15=1 if pcperiod==15 
replace dum15=0 if dum15==. 
 stcox  Madd2 Maddgrowth1 dum15, nohr 
 
gen dum36=1 if pcperiod==36 
replace dum36=0 if dum36==. 
stcox  Madd2 Maddgrowth1 dum36, nohr 
 
gen dum47=1 if pcperiod==47 
replace dum47=0 if dum47==. 
stcox  Madd2 Maddgrowth1 dum47, nohr 
 
gen dum54=1 if pcperiod==54 
replace dum54=0 if dum54==. 
stcox  Madd2 Maddgrowth1 dum54, nohr 
 
gen dum56=1 if pcperiod==56 
replace dum56=0 if dum56==. 




gen dum71=1 if pcperiod==71 
replace dum71=0 if dum71==. 
stcox  Madd2 Maddgrowth1 dum71, nohr 
 
*/Hazard-function: "M:\Master\Cummulative\Hazardfunksjon\hazard.do"*/ 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2nomissing.dta", clear 
stset pdur, failure( pcperiodends) id(pcperiod) 
 
eststo: stcox Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop lUNexp 
UNexp_m lpop lpop_m nc2_1 nc2_1_m sip2 sip_m, basechazard (cummhaz1) 
stcurve, cumhaz at1(Madd2=6.9256) at2(Madd2=8.3188)ylabel (0(0.05)0.25) 
 
*/Accounting for repeated events:"M:\Master\Repeated Events\Repeated 
Events2.do"*/ 
clear all 
use "M:\Master\Replicating CHS\cummulative25_del2nomissing.dta", clear 
save "M:\Master\Repeated Events\Repeated Eventes Madd.dta", replace 
*/generating a sequency variable*/ 
sort pcperiod year 
drop n 
by pcperiod: gen n=_n 
 
gen seq=(gwno*10000)+n 
sort seq year 
drop a 
by seq: gen a=_n 
replace a=1 if n>1 
 
sort gwno pcperiod year 
replace a=. if n>1 
replace a = a[_n-1] if missing(a) 
drop seq n 
rename a seq 
label var seq "number of pcperiod in that country" 
 
*/generating an "enter" variable*/ 
sort pcperiod year 
by pcperiod: gen n=_n 
replace n = 0 if n==1 
replace n =1 if n>0 
rename n entrado 
 
stset pduration, fail(pcperiodends) exit(time .) enter(entrado) 
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2, nohr efron robust nolog strata(seq) 
cluster(gwno)  
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 , nohr efron robust nolog strata(seq) cluster(gwno)  
eststo: stcox  Madd2, nohr efron robust nolog strata(seq) cluster(gwno)  
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop 
lUNexp UNexp_m lpop lpop_m nc2_1 nc2_1_m, nohr efron robust nolog strata(seq) 
cluster(gwno)  
 
drop if year>2000 
eststo: stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop 
lUNexp UNexp_m lpop lpop_m nc2_1 nc2_1_m sip2 sip_m, nohr efron robust nolog 
strata(seq) cluster(gwno)  
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stcox  Maddgrowth1 Madd2 gdpchangewar gdpchangewar_m noUNpeaceop lUNexp 
UNexp_m lpop lpop_m nc2_1 nc2_1_m, nohr efron robust nolog strata(seq) 
cluster(gwno)  
esttab 
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